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The  Psychology  of  Attention. 

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The  Diseases  of  the  Will. 

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CHICAGO,  ill. 


THE 


DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY 


BY 


TH.  RIBOT 


PROFESSOR  OF  COMPARATIVE  AND  EXPERIMENTAL  PSYCHOLOGY  IN 
THE  COLLEGE  DE  FRANCE 


AUTHORISED  TRANSLATION 

THIRD,   REVISED  EDITION 


CHICAGO 

THE  OPEN  COURT  PUBLISHING  COMPANY 

FOR  SALE  BY 

Kegan  Paul,  Trench,  Truebner  &  Co.,  London. 
1898 


TRANSLATION  COPYRIGHTED  BY 

THE  OPEN  COURT  PUBLISHING  CO. 
1891. 


Biomedical 
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PREFACE  TO  THE  FOURTH  EDITION. 


Since  these  studies  were  first  published  (in  1884),  the  ques- 
tions involved  in  the  disorders  and  alterations  of  the  personality- 
have  given  rise  to  numerous  works.*  It  is  not  my  intention  here 
to  epitomise  those  investigations.  That  would  furnish  matter  for  a 
separate  volume. 

If  we  pass  in  review  all  the  cases  in  which  the  personality,  the 
unity  of  the  ego,  has  been  at  all  impaired,  from  slight  and  fugitive 
partial  alterations  to  complete  metamorphosis,  we  shall  be  able,  I 
think,  to  divide  them  into  two  large  groups  :  spontaneotis  altera- 
tions and  provoked  alterations. 

The  first,  or  natural  alterations,  are  to  be  reached  only  by  ob- 
servation and  in  grave  cases  spring  from  some  deep  and  permanent 
disorder  of  the  vital  functions. 

The  second,  the  artificial  alterations,  produced  by  experiment, 
usually  by  hypnotism,  come  from  without,  do  not  always  penetrate 
to  the  profoundest  parts  of  the  individual,  and  remain  essentially 
superficial  and  transitory,  unless  by  repetition  they  create  a  new 
mental  habitude. 

Although  the  history  of  our  subject  does  not  go  very  far  back, — 


*Binet  and  Fere,  Le  magnitisme  animal:  Binet,  Etudes  de  psychologie  ex* 
ferhnentale:  Pierre  Janet,  V automatistne  psychologique ;  Azam,  Hypnotisme, 
double  co7iscience  et  alterations  de  la  personnalite ;  Bourru  and  Burot,  Varia' 
tions  de  la personnalite :  Paulhan,  Vactiviti  mentale  et  les  iliments  de  V esprit ; 
W.  James,  Principles  0/  Psychology,  vol.  i,  ch.  x,  numerous  articles  in  the  Pro' 
ceedings  of  the  Society  for  Psychical  Research:  Max  Dessoir,  Das  Doppd-Ich, 
etc.,  etc. 


vi       THE  DISEASES  OE  PERSONALITY. 

extending,  at  most,  over  forty  years, — it  has  two  periods.  In  the 
first,  spontaneous  alterations  were  exclusively  studied  ;  in  the  sec- 
ond, following  the  renaissance  of  hypnotism,  psychologists  were 
wholly  occupied  with  provoked  and  artificial  disorders.  While 
fully  recognising  the  significance  of  the  last-named  class,  I  am  yet 
inclined  to  believe,  till  proof  is  brought  to  the  contrary,  that  the 
spontaneous  alterations,  which  are  the  principal  and  almost  exclu- 
sive subject  of  the  present  volume,  still  remain  the  solidest  data  for 
the  study  of  the  morbid  manifestations  of  personality. 

Th.  Ribot. 
Paris,  May,  1891. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 


INTRODUCTION. 

PAGE 

Definition  and  division  of  the  subject i 

Consciousness  :  nature  and  origin 3 

Consciousness,  a  perfection  of  definite  physiological  events. , ,  6 

Facts  supporting  this  hypothesis 7 

Importance  of  the  psychical  factor 16 

CHAPTER  I. 
ORGANIC  DISORDERS. 

The  sense  of  the  body,  its  importance  and  complexity 18 

Slight  variations  of  the  personality  in  the  normal  state 29 

More  serious  cases 32 

Cases  of  double  personality 33 

Personality  of  double  monsters 36 

Personality  of  twins 43 

CHAPTER  n. 
AFFECTIVE  DISORDERS. 

Classification 51 

Depressions  and  exaltations  of  the  personality 53 

Their  alternation  in  circular  insanity 57 

Complete  metamorphosis  of  the  personality 59 

Sexual  characters  :  eunuchs,  hermaphrodites,  opposite  sexu- 
ality   61 

Total  transformation  of  character 67 

Foundations  of  the  personality  :  personal  unity  and  identity 
the  psychic  expression  of  the  unity  and  identity  of  the  or- 
ganism   81 


viii     THE  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY, 

-    CHAPTER  III. 

DISORDERS  OF  THE  INTELLECT. 

PAGE 

Alterations  proceeding  from  parassthesia  and  dyssesthesia 92 

Alterations  proceeding  from  hallucinations 100 

Cerebral  dualism  and  double  personality:  discussion 106 

Role  of  the  memory 113 

Role  of  ideas  ;  transformations  proceeding  from  above  ;  their 

superficial  character  ;   "  possessed  "  and  hypnotised  subjects  117 
Disappearance  of  the  personality  in  mystics 123 

CHAPTER  IV. 
DISSOLUTION  OF  PERSONALITY,  v 

Progressive  dementia  :  cases  of  real  double  personality;  periods 
of  the  dissolution 126 

Attempt  at  a  classification  of  the  diseases  of  the  personality; 
three  principal  types  :  alienation,  alternation,  substitution. ,    133 

CONCLUSION. 

Zoological  individuality  and  its  ascending  evolution 138 

Colonial  consciousness 140 

Physical  synthesis  and  psychical  synthesis  of  personality  in 

man 145 

The  ego  is  a  co-ordination 150 

Index 159 


THE  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY 


INTRODUCTION. 
I. 

By  ''person"  in  psychological  language  we  under- 
stand generally  the  individual,  as  clearly  conscious  of 
itself,  and  acting  accordingly  :  it  is  the  highest  form 
of  individuality.  To  explain  this  attribute,  which  it 
reserves  exclusively  for  man,  metaphysical  psychology 
is  satisfied  with  the  hypothesis  of  an  ego,  absolutely 
one,  simple,  and  identical.  Unfortunately,  however, 
this  is  only  illusive  clearness  and  a  semblance  of  solu- 
tion. Unless  we  attribute  to  this  ego  a  supernatural 
origin,  it  will  be  necessary  to  explain  how  it  is  born, 
and  from  what  lower  form  it  proceeds.  Accordingly, 
experimental  psychology  must  propound  the  problem 
differently,  and  treat  it  by  different  methods.  Experi- 
mental psychology  learns  from  natural  scientists  that 
in  the  majority  of  cases  it  is  difficult  even  to  establish 
the  characteristics  of  individuality,  which  are  far  less 
complex  than  those  of  personality.  Hence  it  mistrusts 
simple  solutions,  and,  far  from  regarding  the  question 
as  solved  at  the  outset,  it  looks  for  the  solution  at  the 
close  of  its  researches,  as  the  result  of  long  and  labor- 
ious investigations.  Therefore,  it  is  but  natural  that 
the  representatives  of  the  old  school,  slightly  be- 
wildered at  the  situation,  should  accuse  the  adherents 


2         THE  DISEASES  OE  PERSONALITY. 

of  the  new  school  of  '<  filching  their  ego,"  although 
nothing  justifying  such  a  charge  has  ever  been  at- 
tempted. However,  the  language  and  the  methods  of 
the  two  sides  are  now  so  different,  that  all  mutual 
understanding  is  henceforth  impossible. 

At  the  risk  of  increasing  the  already  extant  confusion, 
I  propose  to  investigate  what  teratological,  morbid,  or 
simply  rare,  cases  can  teach  us  concerning  the  forma- 
tion and  disorganisation  of  personality,  though  without 
the  pretension  of  treating  the  subject  in  its  entirety, 
deeming  such  an  undertaking  at  present  premature. 

Personality  being  the  highest  form  of  psychic  indi- 
viduality, the  preliminary  question  arises  :  What  is 
the  individual?  There  are  few  problems  that  have 
been  more  debated  in  our  time  among  naturalists,  or 
that  remain  more  obscure  for  the  lower  stages  of  ani- 
mal life.  This  is  not  the  place  to  go  into  the  details  of 
the  problem.  At  the  close  of  our  work,  after  we  have 
studied  the  constituent  elements  of  personality,  we 
shall  consider  this  question  as  a  whole.  It  will  then 
be  time  to  compare  personality  with  the  lower  forms 
through  which  nature  has  essayed  to  produce  it,  and 
to  show,  that  the  psychic  individual  is  the  expression 
of  an  organism,  being,  as  that  is,  low,  simple,  inco- 
herent, or  unified  and  complex.  For  the  present,  it 
will  be  sufficient  to  recall  to  readers  at  all  familiar 
with  the  subject,  that  in  descending  the  animal  scale 
we  always  see  the  psychic  individual  formed  of  a  more 
or  less  complete  fusion  of  simpler  individuals,  as  also 
''a  colonial  consciousness  "  created  by  the  co-operation 
of  local  consciousnesses.  These  discoveries  of  modern 
naturalists  are  of  the  utmost  importance  to  psychol- 
ogy. By  them  the  problem  of  personality  is  completely 
transformed.     Henceforth  that  problem  must  be  stud- 


INTRODUCTION.  3 

ied  from  below ;  while  we  are  led  to  ask,  whether  the 
human  person  itself  is  also  not  vn  tout  de  coalition — a 
whole  by  coalition — the  extreme  complexity  of  which 
veils  from  us  its  origin,  and  the  origin  of  which  would 
remain  impenetrable,  if  the  existence  of  elementary 
forms  did  not  throw  some  light  upon  the  mechanism 
of  that  fusion. 

The  human  personality — the  only  one  of  which  we 
can  speak  with  any  fitness  in  a  pathological  study — 
is  a  concrete  whole,  a  complexus.  To  know  it,  we 
must  analyse  it.  But  analysis  here  is  disastrously  ar- 
tificial, since  it  disjoins  groups  of  phenomena  which 
are  not  juxtaposed,  but  co-ordinated,  their  relation  be- 
ing that  of  mutual  dependence,  not  of  simple  simulta- 
neousness.  Still,  the  work  is  indispensable.  Adopting 
a  division  both  clear  and,  as  I  trust,  self-justified,  I 
shall  study  successively  the  organic,  affective,  and  in- 
tellectual conditions  of  personality,  chiefly  emphasising 
their  anomahes  and  disorders.  Our  final  study  of  the 
subject  will  permit  us  to  group  anew  these  disjoined 
elements. 

II. 

But  before  entering  on  the  exposition  and  interpre- 
tation of  facts,  it  will  be  profitable,  in  the  interests  of 
clearness  and  candor,  to  get  first  some  understanding 
of  the  nature  of  consciousness.  It  is  not  a  question 
here  of  a  monograph,  embracing,  so  to  speak,  the  whole 
of  psychology;  it  will  suffice  to  present  the  problem  in 
a  precise  form. 

Neglecting  details,  we  are  confronted  with  only  two 
hypotheses  :  the  one,  a  very  old  hypothesis,  which  re- 
gards consciousness  as  the  fundamental  property  of 
'*  the  soul  "  or  ''mind,"  as  that  which  constitutes  its  es- 


4        THE  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

■\ 
sence  ;  the  other,  a  very  recent  theory,  which  regards  it 
as  a  simple  phenomenon,  superadded  to  the  activity  of 
the  brain — as  an  event  having  its  own  conditions  of  ex- 
istence, appearing  and  disappearing  according  to  cir- 
cumstances. 

The  first  hypothesis  has  held  sway  for  so  many 
centuries,  that  it  has  become  an  easy  matter  to  appraise 
its  merits  and  deficiencies.  It  is  not  for  me  to  call 
this  theory  to  the  bar ;  I  shall  restrict  myself  to  show- 
ing its  radical  incompetence  to  explain  the  unconscious 
life  of  the  mind.  For  a  long  time  it  took  no  notice  of 
this  unconscious  life.  The  precise  and  profound  views 
of  Leibnitz  upon  this  question  were  forgotten  or,  at 
least,  were  not  applied  ;  and  up  to  the  present  century, 
the  most  renowned  psychologists  (with  few  excep- 
tions) wholly  limited  themselves  to  consciousness. 
When  finally  the  problem  was  thrust  upon  them,  and 
it  became  plain  to  all  that  to  reduce  psychic  life  to  the 
exclusive  data  of  consciousness  was  a  conception  so 
poor  and  scant  as  to  be  practically  useless — then  great 
confusion  arose.  So-called  ^'unconscious  states"  were 
admitted — an  ambiguous  and  half-contradictory  term, 
which  has  spread  rapidl}',  and  has  its  equivalent  in  all 
languages,  but  which  clearly  betrays  the  period  of  con- 
fusion in  which  it  was  born.  What  are  these  uncon- 
scious states?  Prudent  writers  attest  their  existence, 
without  any  attempt  at  explanation.  The  more  ven- 
turesome speak  of  ''latent  ideas,"  of  "unconscious 
consciousness  ";  expressions  so  vague  and  inconsistent 
that  many  authors  have  frankly  admitted  their  defects. 
In  fact,  if  the  soul  be  conceived  as  a  thinking  sub- 
stance, of  which  the  states  of  consciousness  are  modi- 
fications, it  will  be  impossible  without  manifest  contra- 
diction to  impute  to  it  unconscious  states  ;  all  shifts 


INTRODUCTION.  5 

of  language  or  of  dialectic  are  of  no  avail  here  ;  and  as 
we  cannot  deny  the  high  importance  of  these  uncon- 
scious states  as  factors  of  the  psychic  life,  there  is  no 
exit  from  this  inextricable  situation. 

The  second  hypothesis  escapes  from  all  this  logom- 
achy; it  precludes  the  factitious  problems  that  crop  up 
in  the  first  (for  example,  whether  consciousness  is  a 
general  or  particular  faculty,  etc.),  and  we  may  fear- 
lessly claim  for  it  the  benefits  of  the  lex  parcimonice. 
It  is  simpler,  clearer,  and  more  consistent.  In  con- 
trast to  the  other,  it  may  be  characterised  by  saying 
that  it  expresses  the  unconscious  in  physiological 
terms  (states  of  the  nervous  system),  and  not  in  ps}^- 
chological  terms  (latent  ideas,  non-felt  sensations, 
etc.).  But  this  is  only  a  particular  case  of  the  hypoth- 
esis, which  must  be  considered  in  its  entirety. 

We  will  first  remark  that  consciousness,  like  all 
general  terms,  must  be  resolved  into  concrete  data. 
Just  as,  generally  speaking,  there  is  no  will,  but  only 
volitions,  so  also,  generally  speaking,  there  is  no  con- 
sciousness, but  only  states  of  consciousness.  They 
alone  are  the  reality.  To  defaie  the  state  of  conscious- 
ness, the  fact  of  being  conscious,  would  be  a  futile, 
supererogatory  task ;  it  is  a  datum  of  observation,  an  ul- 
timate fact.  Physiology  tells  us  that  its  production  is 
always  associated  with  the  activity  of  the  nervous  sys- 
tem, particularly  of  the  brain.  But  the  reverse  does 
not  hold  true.  All  psychic  activity  implies  nervous 
activity,  but  all  nervous  activity  does  not  imply  psychic 
activity.  Nervous  activity  is  far  more  extensive  than 
psychic  activity.  Consciousness,  therefore,  is  some- 
thing superadded.  In  other  words,  it  is  to  be  con- 
sidered, that  every  state  of  consciousness  is  a  complex 
event,  which  supposes  a  particular  state  of  the  ner- 


6        THE  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY, 

vous  system  ;  that  this  nervous  process  is  not  an  adsci- 
titious,  but  an  integral  part  of  the  event ;  what  is  more, 
that  it  is  its  basis  and  fundamental  condition  ;  that, 
when  produced,  the  event  exists  of  itself,  but  as  soon 
as  consciousness  is  added,  it  exists /^r  itself  ;  that  con- 
sciousness completes  and  perfects  the  event,  but  does 
not  constitute  it. 

By  this  hypothesis  it  is  easy  to  understand  how  all 
manifestations  of  psychic  life,  sensations,  desires,  feel- 
ings, volitions,  memories,  reasonings,  inventions,  etc., 
may  be  alternately  conscious  and  unconscious.  There 
is  nothing  mysterious  in  this  change  of  states,  since  in 
all  cases  the  essential  conditions,  i.  e.,  the  physiologi- 
cal conditions,  for  each  event  remain  the  same,  while 
consciousness  is  simply  its  perfection. 

It  remains  to  establish  why  this  perfection  is  some- 
times present,  and  sometimes  wanting.  For,  if  in 
the  physiological  phenomenon  itself  there  were  not 
something  more  present  in  the  first  case  than  in  the 
second,  the  victory  would  indirectly  remain  with  the 
adverse  hypothesis.  Could  it  be  proved  that  every 
time  that  certain  physiological  conditions  exist,  con- 
sciousness appears  ;  that  whenever  they  are  wanting, 
consciousness  disappears;  and  whenever  they  vary, 
consciousness  also  varies — then  we  should  no  longer 
have  an  hypothesis,  but  a  scientific  truth.  We  are  still 
very  far  from  this  goal.  In  any  event,  we  may  be  sure 
that  consciousness  itself  will  not  furnish  the  neces- 
sary light.  As  Maudsley  justly  observes,  conscious- 
ness cannot  at  the  same  time  be  effect  and  cause — 
cannot  be  itself  and  its  molecular  antecedents.  It  lives 
only  for  a  moment,  and  cannot  by  a  direct  intuition  re- 
turn to  its  immediate  physiological  antecedents ;  be- 


INTRODUCTION.  7 

sides,  to  revert  to  those  material  antecedents,  would 
be  to  lay  hold  of,  not  itself,  but  its  cause. 

At  present  it  would  be  chimerical  to  attempt  even 
a  rough  establishment  of  the  necessary  and  sufficient 
conditions  of  the  appearance  of  consciousness.  We 
know  that  the  cerebral  circulation,  in  the  double  aspect 
of  quantity  and  quality  of  blood,  is  of  great  importance. 
A  palpable  proof  of  this  is  furnished  by  experiments 
on  the  heads  of  freshly  beheaded  animals.  We  know 
that  the  duration  of  the  nervous  processes  in  the  centres 
is  also  of  influence.  Psychometric  researches  demon- 
strate daily  that  the  more  complex  a  state  of  conscious- 
ness is  the  longer  time  it  requires,  and  that,  on  the 
other  hand,  automatic  acts — primitive  or  acquired,  the 
rapidity  of  which  is  extreme — do  not  enter  conscious- 
ness. We  can  also  assume  that  the  appearance  of 
consciousness  is  connected  with  the  period  of  dis- 
assim.ilation  of  the  nervous  tissue,  as  Herzen  has  ex- 
haustively shown.*  All  these  results,  however,  are 
only  partial  conquests  ;  the  scientific  knowledge  of  the 
genesis  of  a  phenomenon  supposes  the  determination 
of  all  its  essential  conditions. 

The  near  future,  perhaps,  will  furnish  these.  In 
the  meantime,  to  corroborate  our  hypothesis,  it  will  be 
more  profitable  to  show,  that  it  alone  explains  a  chief 
character  (not  a  condition)  of  consciousness — its  inter- 
mission.  To  avoid  at  the  outset  all  dubiousness,  I 
shall  observe  that  it  is  not  a  question  here  of  the  dis- 
continuity of  the  states  of  consciousness  among  them- 
selves. Each  has  its  limits,  which,  while  permitting 
it  to  associate  with  others,  at  the  same  time  preserve 
its  peculiar  individuality.    It  is  not  this  that  occupies  us 

*  La  condizione  fisica  della  cosczenza,  Rome,  1879,  and  Le  cerveau  et  Vacti- 
viti  cerebrate ,  1887. 


8        THE  DISEASES  OE  PERSONALITY. 

here,  but  simply  that  well-known  fact  that  conscious- 
ness has  its  interruptions,  or,  as  we  say  in  popular 
parlance,  that  ''we  do  not  always  think." 

It  is  true,  this  assertion  has  been  contested  by  the 
majority  of  metaph3^sicians.  They  never  have  fur- 
nished proofs  in  the  support  of  tlieir  position,  and  as 
all  appearances  are  against  it,  the  onus  pi-obandi  ^NOvXdi 
naturally  seem  to  lie  with  them.  Their  whole  argu- 
ment reduces  itself  to  asserting  that  since  the  soul  is 
essentially  a  thinking  subject,  it  is  impossible  that 
consciousness  should  not  always  exist  in  some  degree, 
even  when  no  trace  of  it  is  left  in  memory.  But  this 
is  simply  a  begging  of  the  question,  since  it  is  pre- 
cisely their  major  premise  that  the  hypothesis  main- 
tained by  us  contests.  Their  alleged  proof,  in  fine,  is 
simply  a  deduction  drawn  from  a  contested  hypothesis. 
It  is  beyond  our  plan  here  to  examine  this  in  detail ; 
a  summary  will  suffice. 

If,  discarding  all  preconceived  ideas,  we  abide  by 
the  simple  observation  of  facts,  we  are  confronted  with 
the  following  great  practical  difficulty,  that  it  is  often 
impossible  to  decide  whether  the  case  presented  is 
unconsciousness  or  amnesia  (lack  of  memory).  If  a  state 
of  consciousness  appears,  lasts  onl}'  a  short  time,  does 
not  organise  itself  in  memory,  leaves  no  trace  of  its 
passage,  it  is  as  good  as  non-existent  for  the  individ- 
ual. Now,  the  existence  of  such  evanescent  conscious- 
nesses is  demonstrated  :  it  is  not  an  absence  of  con- 
sciousness, but  an  absence  of  m.emory.  Excluding 
such  cases,  others  remain,  where  for  impartial  criti- 
cism it  is  impossible  not  to  admit  that  the  complete 
disappearance  of  consciousness  is  the  sole  probable 
hypothesis. 

It  has  been  maintained  that  there  is  no  sleep  with- 


INTRODUCTION.  9 

out  dreams  ;  bur  this  is  a  purely  theoretical  assertion. 
The  sole  argument  of  fact  that  can  be  pleaded  in  sup- 
port of  it  is,  that  sometimes  a  sleeper,  addressed  or 
questioned,  makes  a  proper  reply,  yet  upon  waking  has 
no  recollection  of  the  matter.  However,  this  fact  does 
not  justify  a  general  conclusion. 

It  is  to  be  further  remarked — and  this  is  an  im- 
portant point — that  all  who  have  investigated  whether 
perfect  cerebral  sleep  exists  have  been  cultured  and 
active  minds,  (psychologists,  physicians,  men  of  let- 
ters,) in  whom  the  brain  is  ever  upon  the  alert,  like 
a  delicate  instrument  vibrating  to  the  touch  of  the 
slightest  excitation,  and  possessed,  as  it  were,  of  a 
habitude  of  consciousness.  Thus,  it  happens  that  the 
very  men  who  propound  the  problem:  ''Do  we  al- 
ways dream  ?  "  are  really  the  least  competent  to  supply 
a  negative  solution.  But  this  is  not  the  case  with  peo- 
ple engaged  in  manual  occupations.  A  peasant  living 
remote  from  all  intellectual  agitation,  limited  to  the 
same  occupations  and  the  same  routine  of  life,  in  gen- 
eral does  not  dream.  I  know  several,  who  regard 
dreams  as  a  rare  accident  of  nocturnal  life.  Besides, 
some  men  of  remarkable  intellectual  activity  (Lessing, 
Reid,  and  others)  affirm  they  have  never  dreamed.  It 
is  hardly  probable  that  some  sleeps,  succeeding  periods 
of  great  ph3^sical  fatigue,  are  not,  at  least  momentarily, 
free  from  dreams.  In  surgical  operations  artificial  anaes- 
thesia is  rarely  pushed  to  the  point  of  absolute  insensi- 
bility. It  seems,  however,  that  in  some  cases,  studied 
by  good  observers  *  on  their  own  persons,  complete  un- 
consciousness has  been  produced  for  a  period  varying 
from  a  few  seconds  to  a  minute  and  more.     In  epileptic 

*  See  Lacassagne,  Mimoires  de  Vacadimie  de  midecine,  v.  iii,  1869,  pp.  30 
and  36. 


10      THE  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

vertigo,  known  also  by  the  names  of  ^^ petit  vial^''  '^ ab- 
sence,'' ^^ attack,"  a  complete  loss  of  consciousness  is 
often  observed,  accompanied  by  a  sudden  interruption 
of  sentences  and  their  resumption,  after  the  attack,  at 
precisely  the  same  point.*  But  I  ascribe  without  hesi- 
tation to  the  account  of  pure  amnesia  the  states  known 
by  the  name  of  ''ambulatory  comitial  automatism," 
which  lasts  days  and  hours.  Moreover,  in  coming  back 
to  the  normal  state  many  of  these  sick  persons  volun- 
tarily declare  that  ''they  seem  to  have  awaked  from  a 
dream."  Shocks  and  blows  on  the  head,  sudden  com- 
motions usually  produce  unconsciousness  with  retroac- 
tive amnesia  ;  that  is  to  say,  the  events  immediately 
preceding  the  accident  leave  behind  no  traces  in  the 
memory,  while  there  is  produced  thus  in  the  mental 
life  of  the  patient  a  gap  varying  in  duration  from  a  fev/ 
seconds  to  several  minutes.  Dr.  Hamilton,  who  has 
studied  these  accidents  minutely  from  the  point  of 
view  of  medical  jurisprudence, f  and  has  collected 
twenty-six  authentic  cases,  believes  he  can  establish  a 
law  that  retroactive  amnesia  is  directly  proportional  to 
the  duration  of  unconsciousness.  If  the  last  is  partial 
and  brief,  retroactive  amnesia  embraces  only  a  few 
seconds  ;  if  it  is  total  and  long,  the  amnesia  increases 
proportionately.  J 

I  do  not  see  what  objections  can  be  made  to  facts 
of  this  kind,  unless,  indeed,  we  revert  to   the  inevit- 

*  Numerous  examples  maybe  found  in  all  authors  treating  of  epilepsy. 
For  interrupted  conversations,  see  especially  Forbes  Winslow,  On  Obscure  Di- 
seases of  the  Brain  and  Mind,  p.  322  et  seq.;  Maudsley,  Pathology  of  Mind, 
(French  Trans.)  pp.  9,  10;  Fuel,  De  la  catalipsie  (Mem.  de  I'acad.  de  med., 
1856,  p.  475)- 

^ Loss  of  Consciousness,  in  the  Proc.  of  the  Medico-legal  Society  of  New 
York,  3rd  series,  1886,  p.  206  et  seq. 

i  This  passage,  from  the  words  "Besides,  some  men,  etc.,"  replaces  in 
the  later  editions  of  Les  Maladies  de  la  Personnaliti  a  passage  from  Despine. 
—  Trans. 


INTRODUCTION,  ii 

able  hypothesis  of  states  of  consciousness  that  leave 
no  traces  in  memory ;  but,  I  repeat,  this  is  a  gratuitous 
hypothesis,  destitute  of  probability.  People  who  are 
subject  to  fainting  spells  with  loss  of  consciousness, 
well  knov/,  that  pending  their  duration  they  might  fall 
down,  hurt  a  limb,  or  upset  a  chair,  yet  on  recovering 
their  senses,  not  have  the  faintest  idea  of  what  had 
taken  place.  Is  it  likely  that  if  these  sufficiently  se- 
rious accidents  had  been  attended  with  consciousness, 
they  would  not  have  left  some  memory  lasting  at  least 
a  few  seconds  ?  We  do  not  deny  for  a  moment  that, 
in  certain  circumstances,  normal  or  morbid  (for  ex- 
ample in  hypnotised  subjects),  states  of  consciousness 
leave  no  apparent  trace  on  awaking,  but  can  later  be 
revived  ;  we  are  willing  to  restrict  to  any  desired  limits 
the  instances  of  complete  interruption  of  conscious- 
ness ;  but  we  have  shown  that  there  are  some^  and  it 
would  suffice  if  there  were  only  one,  to  raise  insur- 
mountable difficulties  against  the  hypothesis  of  the 
soul  as  a  thinking  substance.  By  the  contrary  hypoth- 
esis, everj^thing  is  easily  explained.  If  consciousness 
is  an  event  dependent  upon  definite  conditions,  there 
is  no  cause  for  wonderment  if  it  is  sometimes  lacking. 
It  would  also  be  possible,  if  this  were  the  occasion 
to  treat  exhaustively  this  problem,  to  prove,  that  by 
our  hypothesis  nothing  uncertain  or  contradictory  is 
presented  by  the  relations  of  the  conscious  to  the  un- 
conscious. The  term  '^  unconscious  "  may  always  be 
paraphrased  thus  :  a  physiological  state,  which,  at 
times  and  in  fact  most  frequently  accompanied  by 
consciousness,  or  at  its  origin  having  been  so,  in  the 
present  case  is  not  so  accompanied.  This  character- 
istic, although  negative  as  psychology,  is  positive  as 
physiology.     It  affirms  that  in  every  psychic  event  the 


12       THE  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

fundamental  and  active  element  is  the  nervous  pro- 
cess, that  the  other  is  only  a  concomitant.  Accord- 
ingly, there  is  no  further  difficulty  in  comprehending 
that  all  manifestations  of  psychic  life  can  by  turns  be 
either  unconscious  or  conscious.  For  the  first  case, 
it  is  necessary  and  sufficient  that  there  be  produced  a 
definite  nervous  process,  that  is  that  there  be  put  into 
play  a  definite  number  of  nervous  elements,  forming  a 
definite  association,  to  the  exclusion  of  all  other  ner- 
vous elements  and  of  all  other  possible  associations. 
For  the  latter,  it  is  necessary  and  sufficient  that  sup- 
plementary conditions,  be  they  what  they  may,  be 
added,  without  alteration  of  the  nature  of  the  phenom- 
enon, except  making  it  conscious.  We  further  com- 
prehend how  unconscious  cerebration  can  perform 
such  heavy  tasks  noiselessly,  and,  after  long  incuba- 
tion, reveal  itself  in  such  unexpected  results.  Each  state 
of  consciousness  represents  only  a  very  feeble  portion 
of  our  psychic  life,  because  at  ever}'  instant  it  is  sup- 
ported and,  as  it  were,  instigated  by  unconscious  slates. 
Each  volition,  for  example,  dives  to  the  very  depths 
of  our  being  ;  the  motives  that  accompany  and  ap- 
parently explain  it,  are  never  more  than  a  feeble  part 
of  its  true  cause.  The  same  is  true  of  a  great  number 
of  our  sympathies,  and  the  fact  is  so  manifest  that 
even  minds  completely  unused  to  observation  often 
wonder  at  being  unable  to  explain  their  aversions  or 
sympathies. 

It  would  be  wearisome  and  beside  our  purpose  to 
continue  this  demonstration.  If  the  reader  wishes,  he 
may  turn  to  the  chapter  *' Phenomenology"  in  Hart- 
mann's  "Philosophy  of  the  Unconscious."*  Here  he 
will  find  classified  all  the  manifestations  of  the  uncon- 

*  English  Translation,  by  W.  G.  Coupland,  London,  Trubner  &  Co. 


INTRODUCTION.  13 

sclous  life  of  the  mind,  and  he  will  see  that  there  is  not 
a  single  fact  there  cited  which  is  not  explained  by  the 
hypothesis  here  defended. 

One  point  still  remains  to  be  examined.  The  the- 
ory that  regards  consciousness  as  a  phenomenon,  and 
which  is  the  outcome  (as  might  easily  be  shown,  if  the 
digression  were  opportune)  of  the  fundamental  prin- 
ciple of  physiology  that  '^  reflex  action  is  the  type  of 
nervous  action  and  the  basis  of  all  ps3^chic  activity," 
has  seemed  to  many  benevolent  persons  paradoxical 
and  disrespectful.  To  them  it  seems  to  rob  psychol- 
ogy of  all  its  solidity  and  dignity.  They  are  loth  to 
admit  that  the  highest  manifestations  of  nature  arc 
unstable,  fugitive,  superadded,  and  subordinate  as  to 
their  conditions  of  existence.  But  this  is  simply  a 
prejudice.  Consciousness,  whatever  its  origin  and 
nature,  loses  not  an  iota  of  its  real  value :  it  should  be 
appraised  in  itself;  and  for  him  who  places  himself  at 
the  point  of  view  of  evolution,  not  the  origin,  but  the 
elevation  attained,  is  of  consequence.  Experience, 
moreover,  shows  that  the  higher  we  ascend  the  scale, 
the  more  complex  and  unstable  are  the  natural  com- 
pounds. If  stability  afforded  the  true  measure  of  dig- 
nity, then  the  minerals  would  occupy  the  first  rank. 
This  purely  sentimental  objection,  therefore,  is  not 
admissible.  As  to  the  difficulty  of  explaining  by  this 
hypothesis  the  unity  and  continuity  of  the  conscious 
subject,  at  present  it  would  be  premature  even  to  moot 
this  subject.  In  due  time  this  problem,  too,  will  find 
its  solution. 

There  is,  however,  one  weak  point  in  this  hypothesis 
of  consciousness  as  a  mere  phenomenon.  Its  most  con- 
vinced partisans  have  defended  it  in  a  form  that  has 
procured  them  the  name  of  theorists  of  pure  automa- 


14      THE  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

tism.  According  to  their  favorite  comparisons,  con- 
sciousness is  like  the  flash  of  light  thrown  from  a 
steam-engine,  which  illuminates  it,  but  has  no  influence 
on  its  movements ;  its  efflcacy  is  that  of  the  shadow 
that  accompanies  the  steps  of  the  traveller.  Viewed 
simply  as  forceful  illustrations  of  the  doctrine,  no  ob- 
jection is  to  be  taken  to  these  metaphors  ;  but  viewed 
strictly,  they  are  exaggerated  and  inexact.  Conscious- 
ness, in  itself  and  by  itself,  is  a  new  factor,  and  in  this 
there  is  nothing  mystical  or  supernatural,  as  we  shall 
see. 

In  the  first  place,  by  the  hypothesis  itself  (the  state 
of  consciousness  supposing  physiological  conditions 
more  numerous,  or  at  least  other,  than  the  same  state 
when  unconscious)  it  follows  that  two  individuals,  the 
first  being  in  the  first  state,  the  second  in  the  other,  all 
other  things  being  equal,  are  strictly  not  comparable. 

Still  stronger  reasons  might  be  adduced — not  logi- 
cal deductions,  but  facts.  When  a  physiological  state 
has  become  a  state  of  consciousness,  it  has  acquired 
thereby  a  special  character.  Instead  of  taking  place 
in  space,  that  is  to  say,  instead  of  admitting  of  concep- 
tion as  the  putting  into  play  of  a  certain  number  of 
nervous  elements,  occupying  a  definite  spatial  extent, 
it  has  assumed  a  position  in  tijue ;  it  has  been  produced 
after  this,  and  before  that,  while  for  the  unconscious 
state  there  is  no  before  nor  after.  It  has  been  rendered 
susceptible  of  being  recalled,  that  is  to  say,  recognised 
as  having  occupied  a  precise  position  among  other 
states  of  consciousness.  It  has  become,  accordingly,  a 
new  factor  in  the  psychic  life  of  the  individual — a  re- 
sult that  may  serve  as  a  starting-point  for  some  new 
(conscious  or  unconscious)  work ;  and  far  from  being 
the  product  of  a  supranatural  operation,  it  is  reducible 


INTRODUCTION,  15 

to  that  organic  registration  which  is  the  basis  of  all 
memory. 

For  greater  precision,  let  us  take  a  few  examples. 
Volition  is  always  a  state  of  consciousness — the  affir- 
mation that  a  thing  must  either  be  done  or  prevented  ; 
it  is  the  final  and  clear  result  of  a  great  number  of 
conscious,  subconscious,  and  unconscious  states  ;  but 
once  affirmed,  it  becomes  in  the  life  of  the  individual  a 
new  factor,  and,  in  its  new  position,  it  marks  a  result, 
the  possibility  of  being  begun  again,  modified,  pre- 
vented. Nothing  similar  exists  with  respect  to  auto- 
matic acts  not  accompanied  by  consciousness.  Nov- 
elists and  poets,  usually  good  observers  of  human  na- 
ture, have  frequently  described  the  well-known  condi- 
tion in  which  a  passion — love  or  hate — long  brooded 
upon,  unconscious,  ignorant  of  itself,  at  last  sees  light, 
recognises,  affirms  itself,  becomes  conscious.  Then 
its  character  changes ;  it  redoubles  its  intensity,  or  is 
stopped  by  antagonistic  motives.  Here,  too,  con- 
sciousness is  a  new  factor,  which  has  modified  the 
psychological  situation.  One  may,  by  instinct,  that 
is,  by  unconscious  cerebration,  solve  a  problem,  but  it 
is  probable  that  on  some  other  day,  at  some  other  mo- 
ment, the  same  person  will  succumb  to  a  similar  prob- 
lem. If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  solution  has  been 
reached  by  conscious  reasoning,  a  failure  is  not  likely 
to  occur  the  second  time  ;  because  every  step  forward 
marks  a  position  v/on,  and  from  that  moment  on  we  no 
longer  grope  in  the  dark.  This,  however,  does  not 
diminish  in  the  least  the  part  played  by  unconscious 
work  in  all  human  discoveries. 

These  examples  taken  at  hazard  will  suffice  to 
show,  that  the  metaphors  referred  to  are  true  of  each 
state  of  consciousness  in  itself.     In  itself,  it  is  indeed 


1 6       THE  DISEASES  OE  PERSONALITY. 

merely  a  light  without  efficacy,  the  simple  revelation 
of  an  unconscious  work ;  but  in  relation  to  the  future 
development  of  the  individual  it  is  a  factor  of  supreme 
importance. 

What  is  true  of  the  individual  is  true  also  of  the 
species,  and  of  the  succession  of  the  species.  In  the 
sole  point  of  view  of  the  survival  of  the  fittest,  and  ir- 
respective of  psychological  considerations,  the  appear- 
ance of  consciousness  upon  earth  v/as  a  fact  of  the  first 
magnitude.  Through  it  experience,  that  is  to  say, 
adaptation  of  a  higher  order,  became  possible  for  the 
animal.  It  is  not  for  us  to  investigate  its  origin.  On 
this  point,  very  ingenious  hypotheses  have  been  ad- 
vanced, which  enter  the  domain  of  metaphysics,  and 
which  experimental  psycholog}^  is  not  obliged  to  dis- 
cuss, since  it  takes  consciousness  as  a  datum.  It  is 
probable  that  consciousness  was  produced  like  every 
other  vital  manifestation,  first,  in  a  rudimentary  form, 
and,  to  all  appearances,  without  much  efficacy.  But 
from  the  moment  it  was  able  to  leave  behind  it  a  ves- 
tige, to  build  up  in  the  animal  a  memory,  in  a  psychic 
sense,  which  capitalised  its  past  for  the  profit  of  its 
future,  from  that  moment  a  new  chance  of  survival 
was  created.  To  unconscious  adaptation,  blind,  acci- 
dental, dependent  upon  circumstances,  was  added  a 
conscious  adaptation,  uninterrupted,  dependent  upon 
the  animal,  surer  and  quicker  than  the  other  ;  and  that 
abridged  the  work  of  selection. 

The  role  of  consciousness  in  the  development  of 
psychic  life  is  thus  evident.  If  I  have  dwelt  at  length 
upon  this  point,  it  is  because  the  advocates  of  the  hy- 
pothesis here  supported  have  considered  it  only  as  it 
actually  is,  without  occupying  themselves  with  the 
results  of   its  appearance.     They  have  said  that  it  il- 


V 


INTRODUCTION,  17 

luminates  ;  but  they  have  not  shown  that  it  adds.  To 
repeat  once  more  our  position  :  consciousness,  in  it- 
self, is  simply  a  phenomenon,  simply  an  accompani- 
ment. If  animals  existed,  in  which  at  every  instant  it 
appeared  and  disappeared,  without  leaving  behind  it 
the  slightest  traces,  it  would  be  rigorously  correct  to 
call  such  animals  spiritual  automatons ;  but  if  the 
state  of  consciousness  leaves  behind  it  traces,  records 
itself  in  the  organism,  then  it  not  only  acts  as  an  indi- 
cator, but  also  as  a  condenser.  The  metaphor  of  the 
automaton  is  no  longer  acceptable.  This  being  ad- 
mitted, many  of  the  objections  to  the  theory  of  con- 
sciousness as  a  phenomenon  fall  of  themselves.  The 
theory  is  completed,  without  being  invalidated. 


CHAPTER  I. 


ORGANIC  DISORDERS. 


I  SHALL  dwell  at  length  upon  the  organic  conditions 
of  personalit}' ;  for  everything  is  based  upon  them,  and 
they  explain  all.  Metaphysical  psychology,  with  log- 
ical consistency,  has  paid  no  attention  to  these  condi- 
tions ;  for  this  science  derives  its  ego  from  above,  not 
from  below.  With  us,  however,  the  elements  of  per- 
sonahty  must  be  sought  for  in  the  most  elementary  phe- 
nomena of  life  j  it  is  they  that  give  it  its  distinctive 
mark  and  character.  It  is  the  organic  sense,  the  sense 
of  the  body,  usually  vague  and  obscure,  but  at  times 
very  clear  in  all  of  us,  that  constitutes  for  each  animal 
the  basis  of  its  psychic  individuality.  *  It  is  that  '  *  prin- 
ciple of  individuation  "  so  much  sought  after  by  scho- 
lastic doctors  ;  for  directly  or  indirectly  all  rests  upon 
it.  We  may  regard  it  as  highly  probable,  that  the 
farther  we  descend  in  the  animal  scale  the  more  the 
sense  of  the  body  preponderates,  down  to  the  point 
where  it  becomes  the  entire  psychic  individuality.   But 

*  Incidentally,  I  may  observe  that  a  great  metaphysician,  Spinoza,  plainly 
supports  the  same  thesis,  although  in  different  terms:  "The  object  of  the 
idea  that  constitutes  the  human  soul  is  the  body  ....  and  nothing  else." 
"  The  idea  that  constitutes  the  formal  existence  of  the  human  soul  is  not  sim- 
ple, but  composed  of  several  ideas."  {Ethics,  part  ii.  propositions  13  and  15. 
See  also  the  scholium  of  prop.  17.) 


ORGANIC  DISORDERS.  19 

in  man  and  the  higher  animals  the  turbulent  world  of 
desires,  passions,  perceptions,  images,  and  ideas  covers 
up  this  silent  background.  Except  at  intervals,  it  is 
forgotten,  because  it  is  unknown.  It  is  here  as  in  so- 
ciety. The  millions  of  human  beings  that  make  up  a 
great  nation  are  reduced,  both  for  itself  and  others,  to 
a  few  thousand  men,  who  constitute  its  clear  conscious- 
ness, and  epitomise  its  social  activity  in  all  its  aspects, 
its  politics,  its  industry,  its  commerce,  and  its  intel- 
lectual culture.  Yet  it  is  these  millions  of  unknown 
beings — limited  in  mode  and  place  of  existence,  quietly 
living  and  quietly  passing  away — that  make  up  all  the 
rest ;  without  them  there  is  nothing.  They  constitute 
that  inexhaustible  reservoir,  from  which,  by  rapid  or 
abrupt  selection,  a  few  come  to  the  surface.  But  these 
favorites  of  talent,  power,  or  wealth  themselves  enjoy 
only  an  ephemeral  existence.  Degeneracy — always 
fatally  inherent  in  that  which  rises — will  again  lower 
them  or  their  race,  while  the  silent  work  of  the  ignored 
millions  will  continue  to  produce  others,  and  to  im- 
press upon  them  a  distinctive  character. 

Metaphysical  psychology  only  scans  the  heights ; 
and  internal  observation  does  not  continue  long  its  re- 
cital of  what  takes  place  within  the  body  ;  thus,  from 
the  outset,  the  study  of  the  general  sensibility  has  been 
mainly  the  work  of  physiologists. 

Henle  (1840)  defines  the  general  sensibility  or 
' * ccenaesthesis  "  as  ''the  tone  of  the  sensory  nerves,  or 
the  perception  of  the  state  of  mean  activity  in  which 
those  nerves  are  constantly  found,  even  in  moments 
Vv^hen  they  are  not  excited  by  external  impressions. " 
And  elsewhere  :  "General  sensibility  is  the  sum  total, 
the  not  yet  unravelled  chaos  of  the  sensations  inces- 
santly transmitted  from  every  point  of  the  body  to  the 


20      THE  DISEASES  OE  PERSONALITY. 

sensorium.'"''  Still  more  precise  is  E.  H.  Weber's 
definition  of  the  term  :  an  internal  sensibility,  an  in- 
terior touch  that  furnishes  to  the  sensorium  informa- 
tion concerning  the  mechanical  and  chemico-organic 
state  of  the  skin,  the  mucous  and  serous  membranes, 
the  viscera,  the  muscles,  and  the  articulations. 

In  France,  Louis  Peisse,  a  philosopher-physician, 
was  the  first  to  combat  the  doctrine  of  Jouffroy,  who 
held  that  we  know  our  body  only  objectively,  as  an 
extended,  solid  mass,  similar  to  other  bodies  of  the 
universe,  placed  outside  the  ego,  and  foreign  to  the 
perceiving  subject,  exactly  as  we  know  our  table  or 
our  mantelpiece.  Peisse  showed,  although  in  some- 
what cautious  terms,  that  our  knowledge  of  our  body 
is  pre-eminently  subjective.  His  description  of  this 
organic  consciousness  is,  in  my  judgment,  too  exact, 
not  to  be  quoted  entire. 

''Is  it  certain,"  he  says,  ''  that  we  have  absolutely 
no  consciousness  of  the  activity  of  the  organic  func- 
tions? If  the  question  be  of  a  clear,  distinct,  and  lo- 
cally determinable  consciousness,  like  that  of  external 
impressions,  it  is  plain  that  we  lack  it ;  but  we  may 
possess  a  dull,  obscure,  and,  as  it  were,  latent  con- 
sciousness of  it,  the  analogue,  for  example,  of  that  of 
the  sensations  which  provoke  and  accompany  the  re- 
spiratory movements — sensations,  which,  though  in- 
cessantly repeated,  are  scarcely  noticed.  In  fact,  might 
we  not  regard  as  a  distant,  faint,  and  confused  echo  of 
the  universal  vital  activity  that  remarkable  feeling 
which  ceaselessly  and  without  intermission  tells  us  of 
the  presence  and  actual  existence  of  our  own  body? 
Almost  always,  and  wrongly,  this  feeling  is  confounded 

* Pathologische  Untersuchungen,  1848,  p.  114.  Allgetneine  Anatofnie,  1841, 
p.  72& 


ORGANIC  DISORDERS,  21 

with  the  accidental  and  local  impressions  that  in  wak- 
ing hours  arouse,  stimulate,  and  maintain  the  play  of 
the  sensibilit}^  These  sensations,  though  incessant, 
make  only  fugitive  and  transient  appearances  on  the 
stage  of  consciousness,  while  the  feeling  we  speak  of 
lasts  and  persists  amid  all  this  mobile  display.  Con- 
dillac  appropriately  termed  it  the  fundamental  feeling 
of  existence  ;  Maine  de  Biran  called  it  the  feeling  of 
sensuous  existence.  By  this  feeling  the  body  inces- 
santly appears  to  the  ego  as  its  own,  and  by  it  the  spir- 
itual subject  feels  itself  and  perceives  itself  to  exist 
locally,  within  the  bounded  extent  of  the  organism.  A 
constant,  unfailing  monitor,  it  renders  the  state  of  the 
body  incessantly  present  to  consciousness,  and  thus 
shows  forth,  to  its  depths,  the  indissoluble  bond  of  the 
psychic  and  the  physiological  life.  In  the  ordinary 
state  of  equilibrium  which  constitutes  perfect  health, 
this  feeling,  we  may  say,  is  continuous,  uniform,  and 
equable,  which  prevents  its  reaching  the  ego  and  at- 
taining the  state  of  distinct,  special,  and  local  sensa- 
tion. To  be  distinctly  noticed,  it  must  acquire  a  cer- 
tain intensity;  it  is  then  expressed  by  a  vague  sense  of 
general  well-being  or  illness ;  the  former  signifying 
a  simple  exaltation  of  the  vital  physiological  activity, 
the  latter  its  pathologic  perversion.  But  in  such  cases 
it  does  not  fail  to  localise  itself  in  the  form  of  specific 
sensations,  connected  with  this  or  that  region  of  the 
body.  It  sometimes  reveals  itself  in  a  more  indirect, 
but  far  more  evident,  manner,  when  it  happens  to  be 
wanting  in  some  part  of  the  organism  ;  for  example,  in 
a  limb  struck  by  paralysis.  Such  a  limb  still  naturally 
belongs  to  the  living  aggregate,  but  it  is  no  longer  com- 
prised within  the  sphere  of  the  organic  ego — if  we  may 
use  that  expression.      It  ceases  to  be  perceived  by  the 


22      THE  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY, 

ego  as  its  own,  and  the  fact  of  this  separation,  though 
negative,  is  expressed  by  a  particular,  positive  sensa- 
tion, known  to  all  who  have  experienced  a  complete 
numbness  of  any  member  by  cold  or  a  compression  of 
the  nerves.  The  sensation  referred  to  is  nothing  more 
than  the  expression  of  the  break  or  loss  which  the 
universal  feeling  of  the  bodily  life  suffers ;  it  proves 
that  the  vital  state  of  the  limb  in  question  really  ex- 
isted, though  obscurely  felt,  and  that  it  constituted  one 
of  the  partial  elements  of  the  general  feeling  of  life  of 
the  organic  whole.  Similarly,  any  continuous,  mo- 
notonous noise — as  that  of  a  coach  in  which  we  ride — 
ceases  to  be  perceived,  although  always  heard ;  for  if 
it  suddenly  stops,  its  cessation  is  instantly  remarked. 
This  analogy  may  help  us  to  understand  the  nature  and 
mode  of  existence  of  the  fundamental  feeling  of  organic 
life,  which  by  this  hypothesis  would  be  simply  a  resul- 
tant in  co7ifuso  of  the  impressions  produced  on  all  the 
living  points  by  the  internal  movement  of  the  functions, 
carried  to  the  brain,  directly  by  the  cerebro-spinal 
nerves,  or  indirectly  by  the  nerves  of  the  ganglionic 
system."  * 

Since  the  epoch  in  which  this  passage  was  written 
(1844)  psychologists  and  physiologists  have  been  stead- 
ily at  work  studying  the  elements  of  this  general  sense 
of  the  body.  They  have  determined  what  share  each 
vital  function  contributes  ;  they  have  shown  how  com- 
plex this  confused  feeling  of  life  is,  which  by  incessant 
repetition  has  become  ourselves ;  that  searching  after 
it  would  be  equivalent  to  seeking  ourselves.  Conse- 
quently, we  know  it  only  by  the  variations  that  lift  it 
above,  or  force  it  below  the  normal  tone.     The  reader 

*  Note  to  his  edition  of  the  Rapports  du  physique  et  du  moral  of  Cabanis, 
pp.  108,  109. 


ORGANIC  DISORDERS.  23 

will  find  in  special  works*  the  detailed  study  of  these 
vital  functions  and  their  psychical  dowers.  It  is  be- 
side our  purpose  here  to  enter  into  a  special  investiga- 
tion of  these  topics,  so  a  brief  resume  will  suffice. 

In  the  first  place,  we  have  the  organic  sensations 
connected  with  respiration  :  the  feeling  of  comfort  pro- 
duced by  pure  air,  of  suffocation  from  close  air ;  the 
sensations  arising  from  the  alimentary  canal ;  others, 
still  more  general,  connected  with  the  state  of  nutri- 
tion. Hunger,  for  example,  and  thirst,  despite  ap- 
pearances, have  no  precise  localisation ;  they  result 
simply  from  a  discomfort  of  the  whole  organism.  They 
are  the  loud  pleadings  of  a  too  impoverished  blood. 
As  to  thirst  especially,  the  experiments  of  CI.  Bernard 
have  shown  that  it  arises  from  lack  of  water  in  the  or- 
ganism, and  not  from  dryness  of  the  pharynx.  Of  all 
the  functions,  general  and  local  circulation  exerts,  per- 
haps, the  greatest  psychological  influence,  and  its 
variations  import  the  most  from  individual  to  individ- 
ual, and  in  different  moments  within  the  same  indi- 
vidual. Let  us  recall  further  the  organic  sensations 
that  arise  from  the  state  of  the  muscles :  the  feeling  of 
fatigue,  exhaustion,  or  its  reverse  ;  finally  the  group  of 
muscular  sensations  which,  associated  with  the  exter- 
nal sensations  of  sight  and  touch,  play  such  a  promi- 
nent part  in  the  creation  of  our  knowledge.  Even  re- 
duced to  itself  alone,  in  its  purely  subjective  form, 
muscular  sensibility  will  reveal  the  degree  of  contrac- 
tion or  relaxation  of  the  muscles,  the  position  of  our 
limbs,  etc.  I  omit  purposely  the  organic  sensations  of 
the  genital  organs ;  we  shall  revert  to  this  subject 
when  studying  the  affective  bases  of  personality. 

*See  especially  Bain,    The  Senses  and  the  Intellect,  part  i,  chap,  ii,  and 
Maudsley,  Pathology  of  Mind,  pp.  31  et  seq. 


24       THE  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

If  the  reader  will  picture  to  himself  a  moment  the 
multitude  and  diversity  of  the  vital  actions  just  classi- 
fied, by  running  over  them  in  a  general  way,  he  will  be 
able  to  form  some  idea  of  what  is  to  be  understood  by 
the  expression,  ''physical  bases  of  personality."  Con- 
stantly active,  they  make  up  by  their  continuity  for 
their  weakness  as  psychic  elements.  Hence,  as  soon 
as  the  higher  forms  of  mental  life  disappear,  they  as- 
sume the  first  rank.  A  clear  example  of  this  is  found 
in  dreams  (pleasant  or  painful)  aroused  by  organic 
sensations  ;  as  night-mares,  erotic  dreams,  etc.  It  is 
even  possible  to  assign  with  some  precision  to  each 
organ  the  place  that  belongs  to  it  in  these  dreams  : 
the  sensation  of  weight  seems  mainly  connected  with 
the  digestive  and  respiratory  organs ;  the  feeling  of 
struggle  and  combat  with  the  affections  of  the  heart. 
In  rarer  instances  pathological  sensations,  unperceived 
during  waking  hours,  re-echo  in  sleep  like  premoni- 
tory symptoms.  Armand  de  Villeneuve  dreams  that 
he  is  bitten  in  the  leg  by  a  dog ;  a  few  days  later  that 
same  leg  is  attacked  by  a  cancerous  ulcer.  Gessner, 
in  his  sleep,  fancies  he  is  bitten  in  the  left  side  by  a 
serpent ;  a  little  later  at  the  same  spot  an  anthrax  de- 
veloped of  which  he  died.  INIacario  dreams  he  has  a 
very  sore  throat ;  he  rises  in  normal  health ;  a  few 
hours  later  is  attacked  by  a  severe  amygdalitis.  A 
man  sees  in  a  dream  an  epileptic  ;  a  short  time  after- 
wards he  becomes  one  himself.  A  woman  dreams  that 
she  speaks  to  a  man  who  cannot  reply  to  her,  because 
he  is  dumb  ;  on  waking  she  herself  has  lost  the  power 
of  speech.  In  all  these  cases  we  seize  as  facts  those 
obscure  incitations  which,  from  the  depths  of  the  or- 
ganism, reach  the  nervous  centres,  and  which  our  con- 


ORGANIC  DISORDERS.  25 

scious  life,  with  all  its  turmoil  and  perpetual  mobility, 
conceals  instead  of  revealing. 

It  is  clear  that  the  exclusive  faith  so  long  accorded 
by  psychology  to  the  sole  data  of  consciousness,  must 
have  completely  overshadowed  the  organic  elements  of 
personality;  by  profession,  however,  the  physicians  al- 
ways clung  to  them.  The  doctrine  of  the  temperaments, 
old  as  medical  science  itself,  ever  criticised  and  ever 
remodelled,*  is  the  vague  and  uncertain  expression 
of  the  principal  types  of  the  physical  personality,  as 
furnished  by  observation,  with  the  principal  psych- 
ical traits  that  spring  from  them.  Thus,  the  few  psy- 
chologists who  have  studied  the  different  types  of  char- 
acter, have  sought  their  point  of  support  in  this  doc- 
trine. Kant  did  so  more  than  a  century  ago.  If  the 
determination  of  the  temperaments  could  be  rendered 
scientific,  the  question  of  personality  would  be  greatly 
simplified.  Until  this  takes  place,  the  most  important 
task  will  be,  to  rid  ourselves  of  the  purely  preconceived 
notion  that  personality  is  a  mysterious  attribute, 
dropped  from  the  skies,  without  antecedents  in  nature. 
If  we  simply  cast  our  glance  at  the  animals  about  us, 
we  shall  readily  admit,  that  the  difference  between 
horses  and  mules,  between  geese  and  ducks,  their 
''principle  of  individuation,"  can  only  be  derived  from 
a  difference  of  organisation  and  of  adaptation  to  envi- 
ronment, with  the  psychical  consequences  that  thence 
result ;  and  that  in  the  same  species  the  differences  of 

*  Henle  has  recently  attempted  {Anthropologische  Vortrage,  1877,  p.  103- 
130J,  to  connect  the  temperaments  with  different  degrees  of  activity,  or  tone, 
of  the  sensory  and  motor  nerves.  When  this  degree  is  at  its  lowest,  we  obtain 
the  phlegmatic  temperament.  At  a  high  degree,  with  a  rapid  exhaustion  of 
nerves,  we  have  the  sanguine  temperament.  The  choleric  also  supposes  a  high 
tonus,  but  with  persistence  in  the  nervous  action.  The  melancholic  tempera- 
ment cannot  be  defined  by  the  simple  quantity  of  the  nervous  action;  it  supposes 
a  high  tonus,  with  the  tendency  to  emotions  rather  than  to  voluntary  activity. 


26      THE  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

one  individual  from  another  cannot  originally  be  owing 
to  any  other  cause.  In  the  natural  order  of  things  there 
is  no  reason  for  making  an  exception  of  man  ;  the  diffi- 
culty is  that  here  the  excessive  development  of  the  in- 
tellectual and  emotional  faculties  creates  illusion,  and 
masks  the  origins. 

We  may  now  ask  whether  ''physical  personality" 
exists  in  nature  ;  understanding  by  that  term  the  mere 
feeling  of  the  state  of  the  organism  ;  a  mode  of  being 
where,  by  hypothesis,  all  consciousness,  clear  or  ob- 
scure, actual  or  reproduced,  of  external  facts  is  ab- 
sent? Evidently  not  among  the  higher  animals;  phys- 
ical personality,  in  the  sense  postulated,  can  be  re- 
garded only  as  a  very  artificial  abstraction.  It  is  prob- 
able that  that  form  of  psychic  individuality  which  con- 
sists simply  of  the  consciousness  which  the  animal  has 
of  its  own  body,  exists  in  very  low  species,  but  not  in 
the  lowest. 

In  the  latter, — for  example,  in  multicellular  indi- 
viduals composed  of  cells  absolutely  alike, — the  con- 
stitution of  the  organism  is  so  homogeneous  that  each 
element  lives  for  itself,  and  each  cell  has  its  own  spe- 
cial action  and  reaction.  But,  taken  together,  they  no 
more  represent  an  individual  than  six  horses,  drawing 
a  carriage  in  the  same  direction,  constitute  a  single 
horse.  There  is  neither  co-ordination  nor  consensus, 
but  simply  juxtaposition  in  space.  If,  as  some  authors 
do,  we  assign  to  each  cell  the  analogue  of  conscious- 
ness (which  would  be  only  the  ps3xhic  expression  of 
their  irritability),  we  shall  obtain  consciousness  in  a 
state  of  complete  diffusion.  An  impenetrability  of  one 
element  towards  the  other  would  exist,  that  would  leave 
the  entire  mass  in  the  state  of  living  matter,  without 
even  external  unity. 


ORGANIC  DISORDERS.  27 

But  higher  up,  for  example  in  Hydra,  observation 
shows  a  certain  consensus  in  the  actions  and  reactions, 
and  a  certain  division  of  work.  Yet  the  individuality 
is  very  precarious.  With  his  scissors  Trembly  cut  fifty 
individuals  from  one.  Conversely,  out  of  two  hydras 
we  can  form  one  ;  simply  by  turning  the  smaller  in- 
side out,  before  introducing  it  into  the  larger,  so  that 
the  two  endoderms  touch  and  blend.  So  far  as  one 
can  venture  an  opinion  on  this  obscure  matter,  the 
adaptation  of  the  movements  seems  to  denote  a  tem- 
porary, unstable  unit}^,  at  the  mercy  of  circumstances, 
yet  probably  not  wholly  destitute  of  some  obscure  con- 
sciousness on  the  part  of  the  organism. 

If  we  find  we  are  still  too  low,  we  may  ascend  the 
scale  (for  every  determination  of  this  kind  is  arbitrary), 
to  fix  the  point  at  which  the  animal  has  only  the  con- 
sciousness of  its  organism,  of  what  it  suffers  and  cre- 
ates— only  an  organic  consciousness.  Perhaps,  this 
form  of  consciousness,  in  the  pure  state,  does  not  ex- 
ist ;  for,  as  soon  as  the  rudiments  of  the  special  senses 
appear,  the  animal  rises  above  the  level  of  general 
sensibility.  Besides,  it  must  be  asked.  Is  general  sensi- 
bility sufficient  of  itself  to  constitute  a  consciousness? 
It  is  known  that  the  human  foetus  makes  efforts  to  ex- 
tricate itself  from  inconvenient  positions,  to  avoid  im- 
pressions of  cold  or  painful  irritations.  Are  these  un- 
conscious reflexes? 

But  I  hasten  away  from  such  conjectures.  One 
thing,  at  least,  is  incontestable  ;  it  is,  that  the  organic 
consciousness  (the  consciousness  which  the  animal  has 
of  its  body  and  only  of  its  body)  possesses,  in  the 
greater  part  of  animal  existence,  an  enormous  prepon- 
derance ;  that  it  stands  in  an  inverse  ratio  to  the 
higher,   psychic  development;  that,   everywhere  and 


28      THE  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

alwa3^s,  this  consciousness  of  the  organism  is  the  basis 
upon  which  individuality  rests.  By  it  all  is ;  with- 
out it  nothing  is.  Indeed,  the  contrary  is  inconceiv- 
able ;  for  do  not  the  external  impressions — the  first 
matter  of  all  mental  life — enter  by  the  organism,  and — 
what  is  still  more  important — are  not  the  instincts, 
feelings,  aptitudes  proper  to  each  species,  to  each  in- 
dividual, stamped  and  fixed  by  heredity  in  the  organ- 
ism— we  know  not  how,  but  facts  prove  it — with  im- 
pregnable solidity? 

II. 

If,  then,  we  admit  that  the  organic  sensations  com- 
ing from  all  the  tissues,  organs,  and  movements — in 
a  word,  from  all  the  states  of  the  body — are  in  some 
degree  and  form  represented  in  the  seiisoriujn ;  and  if 
the  physical  personality  is  simply  their  sum  total,  it 
follows  that  the  physical  personality  must  vary  as  they 
vary,  and  that  these  variations  admit  of  all  possible 
gradations,  from  simple  ill-health  to  a  total  metamor- 
phosis of  the  individual.  The  examples  of  ''double 
personality"  that  have  recently  been  made  so  much  of 
(we  shall  speak  of  them  later  on)  are  only  extreme 
cases.  With  patience  and  careful  research  one  could 
find  in  mental  pathology  sufficient  observations  to  es- 
tablish a  progression,  or  rather  a  continuous  regres- 
sion, from  the  most  transient  change  to  the  most  com- 
plete alteration  of  the  ego.  That  the  ego  exists  only 
on  the  condition  of  continually  changing,  is  an  incon- 
testable fact.  As  to  its  identity,  that  is  simply  a  ques- 
tion of  quantity.  Its  identity  persists  so  long  as  the 
sum  of  the  states  that  remain  relatively  fixed  is  greater 
than  the  sum  of  the  states  that  are  added  to  or  de- 
tached from  this'  stable  group. 


ORGANIC  DISORDERS.  29 

For  the  present,  we  have  only  to  study  the  dis- 
orders of  personality  immediately  connected  with  or- 
ganic sensations.  As  by  itself  the  general  sensibility 
has  only  a  very  feeble  psychic  value,  it  produces  only 
partial  disorders,  except  where  the  alteration  is  total 
or  sudden. 

To  begin,  we  shall  notice  a  state,  hardly  morbid, 
yet  probably  well-known  to  all,  which  consists  in  a 
feeling  of  exuberance  or  depression,  without  apparent 
cause.  The  usual  tone  of  life  changes,  rises,  or  falls. 
In  the  normal  state  we  have  a  positive  *' euphoria"; 
neither  comfort  or  discomfort  spring  from  the  body. 
But  sometimes  the  vital  functions  become  exalted ; 
activity  superabounds  and  seeks  to  expend  itself; 
everything  appears  easy  and  favorable  for  us.  This 
state  of  well-being,  at  first  entirely  physical,  is  propa- 
gated throughout  the  whole  nervous  organisation,  and 
awakens  a  multitude  of  pleasant  feelings,  to  the  exclu- 
sion of  others.  Everything  looks  bright.  At  other 
times  the  contrary  occurs  :  disease,  despondency,  list- 
lessness,  impotence,  and — as  consequences  of  melan- 
choly— fear,  painful  or  depressing  feelings.  At  such 
times  everything  looks  black.  In  either  case,  moreover, 
there  is  no  intelligence,  no  event,  nothing  external  to 
us,  to  justify  this  sudden  joy  or  sadness. 

Surely  it  cannot  be  said  that  the  personality  is 
transformed,  in  an  absolute  sense.  Relatively  it  has 
been  so.  For  himself,  and  more  so  for  others  who 
know  him,  the  individual  is  changed,  is  not  the  same. 
This,  translated  into  the  language  of  analytic  psychol- 
ogy, means,  that  his  personality  is  made  up  of  ele- 
ments some  of  which  are  relatively  fixed,  others  vari- 
able ;  that  the  variable  parts  having  far  exceeded  their 


30      THE  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

average  power,  the  stable  portion  has  been  impaired, 
but  has  not  disappeared. 

Now,  if  we  suppose  (a  supposition  daily  realised) 
that  instead  of  disappearing  to  return  after  a  short  in- 
terval to  the  normal  state,  this  change  persists,  in  other 
words,  if  the  physical  causes  that  induce  the  change  are 
permanent,  and  not  transitory,  then  a  new  physical 
and  mental  habitude  will  be  formed,  and  the  centre  of 
gravity  of  the  individual  will  tend  to  be  displaced. 

This  first  change  may  give  rise  to  others,  so  that 
the  transformation  constantly  increases.  For  the  pres- 
ent I  shall  not  discuss  this  subject.  I  simply  wished 
to  show  that  from  a  com.mon  state  by  imperceptible 
degrees  we  can  descend  to  complete  metamorphosis  ; 
it  is  simply  a  question  of  degree. 

In  studying  the  disorders  of  personality,  it  is  im- 
possible to  determine  rigorously  those  that  have  their 
inunediate  cause  in  the  perturbations  of  the  general 
sensibility,  as  the  latter  by  secondary  actions  excite 
psychic  states  of  a  higher  order  (hallucinations,  emo- 
tions, and  morbid  ideas).  I  shall  limit  myself  to  cases 
where  they  appear  to  preponderate. 

We  shall  find  in  the  ^'Annales  medico-psycholo- 
giques"*  five  observations  which  the  author  has 
grouped  under  this  title  :  ''An  Aberration  of  the  Phys- 
ical Personality."  Without  cavilling  at  the  title,  which 
says  perhaps  more  than  it  ought,  we  see  here,  without 
external  cause,  an  unknown  organic  state,  an  altera- 
tion of  the  ccenaesthesis,  produce  a  feeling  of  corporeal 
annihilation.  ''In  the  fulness  of  health,  and  while 
possessed  of  exuberant  vitality  and  strength,  the  pa- 
tient experiences  an  ever-increasing  sensation  of  weak- 
ness, such,  that  he  is  in   momentary  fear  of  fainting 

*  September,  1878.     se  serie,  vol.  xs,  pp.  191-223. 


ORGANIC  DISORDERS.  31 

and  of  death."  However,  the  sensibility  remains  in- 
tact ;  the  patient  eats  with  appetite,  and  if  his  will  is 
opposed  he  reacts  with  great  energy;  but  he  keeps  re- 
peating that  he  feels  his  life  is  slowly  ebbing  away; 
that  only  a  few  hours  are  left  for  him  to  live.  Natu- 
rally, on  this  purely  physical  trunk  are  also  grafted 
delirious  conceptions  :  one  subject  believes  he  is  poi- 
soned, another  maintains  that  a  demon  has  entered 
his  system  and  is  ^* sucking  his  life  away,"  etc. 

But  let  us  keep  to  the  immediate  consequences  of 
the  physical  state.  We  find  here  that  state  of  despon- 
dency, already  described  and  known  to  everybody, 
in  a  much  graver  and  more  stable  form.  The  mental 
disorder  grows  apace  and  systematises  itself.  The 
individual  tends  no  longer  to  be  the  same.  It  is  a  new 
step  in  the  dissolution  of  the  ego,  although  as  yet  far 
from  being  attained. 

This  commencement  of  transformation,  due  to 
wholly  physical  causes,  is  also  met  with  in  persons  who 
maintain  that  they  are  wrapped  in  a  veil  or  a  cloud, 
cut  off  from  the  external  world,  insensible.  Others 
(and  such  phenomena  are  naturally  explained  by  troub- 
les of  the  muscular  sensibility)  rejoice  at  the  lightness 
of  their  bodies  ;  feel  as  if  suspended  in  mid-air ;  be- 
lieve they  are  able  to  fly  ;  or  have  a  feeling  of  heavi- 
ness, in  the  whole  body,  in  certain  limbs,  or  in  a  single 
limb,  which  seems  stout  and  heavy.  ''At  times  a  young 
epileptic  felt  his  body  so  extraordinarily  heavy,  that 
he  could  scarcely  support  it.  At  other  times  he  felt  so 
light  that  he  fancied  he  did  not  touch  the  ground. 
Sometimes  it  seemed  to  him  that  his  body  had  be- 
come so  great  that  it  would  be  impossible  to  pass 
through  a  door."*     In  this  last  illusion,  which  refers 

♦Griesinger,  Traiti des  maladies  nientales,  French  trans.  (Doumic),  p.  92. 


32       THE  DISEASES  OE  PERSONALITY. 

to  the  dimensions  of  the  body,  the  patient  feels  him- 
self much  smaller  or  much  larger  than  he  really  is. 

The  local  perversions  of  the  general  sensibility — 
although  by  nature  limited — are  of  no  less  psycholog- 
ical importance.  Some  subjects  assert  that  they  no 
longer  have  teeth,  mouth,  stomach,  intestines,  brain : 
which  can  only  be  explained  by  a  suppression  or  altera- 
tion of  the  internal  sensations  that  exist  in  the  normal 
state  and  contribute  to  constitute  the  notion  of  the 
physical  ego.  To  the  same  cause,  at  times  aggravated 
by  cutaneous  anaesthesia,  we  must  refer  the  cases  where 
the  patient  believes  that  one  of  his  limbs  or  even  his 
whole  body,  is  of  wood,  glass,  stone,  butter,  etc.  A 
while  afterwards,  he  will  say,  that  he  has  no  body  at 
all,  that  he  is  dead.  Instances  of  the  kind  are  fre- 
quently encountered.  Esquirol  speaks  of  a  woman  who 
believed  that  the  Devil  had  carried  off  her  body ;  the 
surface  of  her  skin  was  completely  insensible.  The 
physician  Baudelocque,  during  the  last  period  of  his 
life,  lost  all  consciousness  of  the  existence  of  his  body: 
he  maintained  he  no  longer  possessed  head,  arms,  etc. 
Finally,  there  is  Foville's  widely  known  case.  **A 
soldier  believed  himself  dead  since  the  battle  of  Aus- 
terlitz,  at  which  he  had  been  seriously  wounded.* 
When  asked  about  his  condition,  he  would  reply: 
*  You  want  to  know  how  old  Lambert  is  ?  He  is  dead ; 
he  was  carried  off  by  a  cannon-ball.  What  you  see 
here  is  not  he,  but  a  poor  machine  that  they  have 
made,  in  imitation  of  him  ;  3^ou  ought  to  ask  them  to 
make  another.'  In  speaking  of  himself,  he  never  said 
*I,'but  *that  thing.'  His  skin  was  insensible,  and 
often  he  would  fall  into  a  state  of  complete  insensibil- 
ity and  immobility,  lasting  several  days." 

♦Michea,  Annales  medico-psychologiques,  1856,  p.  249  et  seqq. 


ORGANIC  DISORDERS.  33 

We  enter  here  the  realm  of  grave  disorders  ;  meet- 
ing for  the  first  time  a  double  personality,  or  more 
strictly  speaking,  a  discontinuity,  a  lack  of  fusion  be- 
tween two  periods  of  psychic  life.  The  case  might  be 
thus  interpreted.  Before  his  accident,  this  soldier, 
like  every  one  else,  had  his  organic  consciousness,  the 
sense,  the  feeling  of  his  own  body,  of  his  physical  per- 
sonality. After  the  accident  a  profound  change  was 
produced  in  his  nervous  organisation.  Concerning  the 
nature  of  this  change  we  can  unfortunately  only  form 
hypotheses,  the  effects  alone  being  known.  Whatever 
it  may  have  been,  it  resulted  in  the  formation  of  an- 
other organic  consciousness — that  of  a /'poor  ma- 
chine." Between  this  and  the  old  consciousness,  the 
memory  of  which  still  tenaciously  remains,  no  amalga- 
mation is  effected.  The  feeling  of  identity  is  lacking  ; 
because  in  the  organic  states  as  well  as  in  the  others, 
this  feeling  can  only  result  from  a  slow,  progressive, 
and  continuous  assimilation  of  the  new  states.  Here, 
the  new  states  did  not  enter  the  old  ego  as  an  integral 
part.  Hence,  that  odd  situation  in  which  the  old  per- 
sonality appears  to  itself  as  having  been,  and  as  being 
no  more,  and  in  which  the  present  state  appears  as  an 
external,  foreign  thing,  and  as  non-existent.  Be  it  re- 
marked, finally,  that  in  a  state  where  the  surface  of 
the  body  no  longer  yields  sensations,  and  where  those 
that  do  arrive  from  the  organs  are  equivalent  almost 
to  none  at  all ;  where  both  superficial  and  profound 
sensibility  is  extinguished — in  such  a  state  the  organ- 
ism no  longer  excites  the  feelings,  images,  and  ideas 
that  connect  it  with  the  higher  psychical  life  :  it  is  re- 
duced to  the  automatic  acts  that  constitute  the  habitude 
or  routine  of  life;  properly  speaking,  it  is  '*a  ma- 
chine." 


34      THE  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

In  a  very  strict  sense  we  might  maintain,  that  the 
only  personality  in  this  example  is  the  personality 
which  recollects  ;  but  we  must  acknowledge  that  it  is 
of  a  very  extraordinary  nature,  existing  only  in  the 
past ;  and  that,  instead  of  calling  it  a  person,  it  would 
be  more  exact  to  call  it  a  memory. 

What  distinguishes  this  case  from  those  which  we 
shall  speak  of  elsewhere,  is,  that  here  the  aberration 
is  altogether  physical,  springs  solely  from  the  body  and 
refers  solely  to  the  body.  This  old  soldier  did  not 
imagine  himself  another  (Napoleon,  for  example,  al- 
though he  was  at  Austerlitz).  The  case  thus  is  as  free 
as  possible  from  intellectual  elements. 

The  illusion  of  patients  or  convalescents  who  be- 
lieve themselves  double,  must  also  be  referred  to  per- 
turbations of  the  general  sensibility.  At  times  the  il- 
lusion is  pure  and  simple,  without  doubling  :  the  mor- 
bid state  is  projected  outwards  ;  the  individual  alienates 
a  part  of  his  physical  personality.  Such  are  the  pa- 
tients of  whom  Bouillaud  speaks,  who  having  lost  the 
sensibility  of  half  of  their  body,  imagine  they  have  be- 
side them  in  bed  another  person,  or  even  a  corpse. 
But  when  the  group  of  morbid  organic  sensations,  in- 
stead of  thus  being  alienated,  cleaves  to  the  normal, 
organic  ego,  and  coexists  with  it  for  a  time,  without 
fusion,  then  and  during  that  time  the  patient  believes 
that  he  has  two  bodies.  *'A  man  convalescing  from  a 
fever  believed  he  consisted  of  two  individuals,  of  which 
one  was  in  bed,  while  the  other  walked  about.  Al- 
though without  appetite,  he  ate  a  great  deal,  having,  as 
he  said,  two  bodies  to  feed."* 

'*  Pariset,  in  his  early  youth  having  been  attacked 
by  an  epidemic  typhus,  remained  several  days  in  an 

♦Leuret,  Fragments  psychologiques  sur  la  folic,  p.  95. 


ORGANIC  DISORDERS.  35 

extremely  low  state,  verging  on  death.  One  morning 
a  more  distinct  feeling  of  himself  was  suddenly  awak- 
ened. He  began  to  think  ;  the  impression  was  that  of 
a  genuine  resurrection  ;  but,  strange  to  say,  at  the 
same  instant  he  had,  or  believed  he  had,  two  bodies ; 
and  these  bodies  seemed  to  him  to  lie  in  two  different 
beds.  In  so  far  as  his  soul  was  present  in  one  of  these 
bodies,  he  felt  healed,  and  enjoyed  a  delightful  repose. 
In  the  other  body  his  soul  suffered,  and  he  argued  with 
himself :  Why  am  I  so  well  in  this  bed,  and  so  ill  and 
oppressed  in  the  other?  This  thought  occupied  him 
for  a  long  while.  Pariset  himself — a  man  exceedingly 
subtle  in  psychological  analysis — has  often  related  to 
me  the  detailed  history  of  the  impressions  which  he 
experienced  at  that  time."* 

In  the  above  we  possess  two  examples  of  double 
physical  personality.  Although  we  are  still  not  far  ad- 
vanced in  our  study,  the  reader  may  see  that,  closely 
examined,  the  two  cases  referred  to  are  really  unlike. 
The  current  term  <Mouble  personality  "  is  simply  an 
abstraction.  As  soon  as  we  translate  it  into  concrete 
facts,  into  authentic  observations,  we  find  only  diversity. 
Each  case,  so  to  speak,  calls  for  special  interpretation. 
A  priori,  that  might  be  expected.  If,  as  we  maintain, 
and  as  we  shall  gradually  attempt  to  prove,  personality 
is  a  very  complex  compound,  it  is  manifest  that  its 
perturbations  must  be  multiform.  Each  case  shows 
it  differently  decomposed.  Disease,  becomes  a  subtle 
instrument  of  analysis ;  it  makes  experiments  impos- 
sible by  any  other  method.  The  difficulty  is  to  interpret 
them  properly;  but  even  errors  can  only  be  transitory, 
since  the  facts  which  the  future  has  in  store  will  serve 
either  to  disprove  or  to  rectify  them. 

♦Gratiolet,  Anatomie  comparie  du  systime  nerveux,  vol.  ii,  p.  548. 


36      THE  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 


in. 

The  part  sustained  b}'  the  physical  personality  as 
an  element  of  the  total  personality  is  so  important  and 
has  been  so  much  neglected,  often  intentionalty,  that 
too  much  light  cannot  be  shed  upon  it.  In  this  con- 
nexion we  may  derive  much  profit  from  the  considera- 
tion of  a  number  of  rare  cases  which  psychology  has 
overlooked  but  which  bring  to  the  support  of  our 
thesis  the  supplemental  evidence  of  facts  which,  if 
they  are  not  more  convincing,  are  at  least  more  strik- 
ing.    I  refer  to  the  double  monsters. 

We  must  admit  that  the  available  data  of  such 
cases  are  very  meagre.  Nature  does  not  multiply 
monsters,  and  of  the  seventy  or  eighty  species  pointed 
out  by  teratologists,  the  majority  have  no  interest 
for  us.  Of  double  monsters,  moreover,  many  do  not 
reach  the  adult  age.  The  anatomist  and  physiologist 
may  learn  much  from  them,  but  not  the  psychologist. 
Furthermore,  good  observations  on  this  subject  rarely 
reach  back  more  than  a  centur3^  Beyond  that  date, 
the  marvellousness  and  vagueness  of  the  descriptions 
recorded  nullify  their  value. 

The  ego,  it  has  often  been  affirmed,  is  impene- 
trable ;  it  forms  by  itself  a  complete,  perfectly  limited 
whole :  which  is  a  proof  of  its  essential  unity.  That 
assertion,  as  a  fact,  is  incontestable  ;  but  the  impenetra- 
bility referred  to  is  merely  the  subjective  expression  of 
the  impenetrability  of  the  organism.  It  is  because  one 
definite  organism  cannot  be  another  organism,  that 
one  ego  cannot  be  another  ego.  But  if,  by  a  concur- 
rence of  causes  which  we  need  not  here  enumerate, 
two  human  beings,  whose  condition  dates  from  the 


ORGANIC  DISORDERS.  37 

foetal  stage,  be  united  together  at  some  part  of  their 
bodies,  while  their  heads,  the  essential  organs  of  human 
individuality,  remain  perfectly  distinct,  then  something 
like  this  state  of  things  will  exist :  each  organism  will 
no  longer  be  completely  limited  in  space,  and  distinct 
from  every  other  organism ;  there  will  be  a  joint  and 
undivided  part  common  to  both;  and  if,  as  we  main- 
tain, the  unity  and  complexity  of  the  ego  are  only  the 
subjective  expression  of  the  unity  and  complexity  of 
the  organism,  there  will  be  of  necessity,  in  the  case 
presented,  a  partial  penetration  of  the  two  egos,  and 
there  must  exist  a  determinate  element  of  psychic  life 
held  in  common  by  them,  that  cannot  be  said  to  be- 
long to  an  /,  but  must  belong  to  a  We.  Each  individual 
is  thus  a  little  less  than  an  individual.  Which  has 
been  fully  corroborated  by  experience. 

**From  an  anatomical  point  of  view  a  double  mon- 
ster is  always  more  than  a  single  individual,  and  less 
than  two ;  at  one  time  it  approaches  nearer  to  unity, 
at  another  nearer  to  duality.  In  the  same  way,  from 
a  physiological  point  of  view,  a  double  monster  is  al- 
ways possessed  of  something  more  than  a  single  life, 
and  of  something  less  than  two  lives  ;  but  its  double 
life  may  tend  alternately  to  unity  or  to  duality. 

*'  Keeping  merely  to  the  phenomena  of  sensibility 
and  of  will,  a  monster  composed  of  two  almost  com- 
plete individuals,  united  only  at  one  part  of  their  body, 
will  be  double  morally  as  well  as  physically.  Each 
individual  will  have  a  sensibility  and  a  will  of  its  own, 
the  effects  of  which  will  extend  to  its  own  body,  and 
to  its  alone.  It  may  even  happen  that  the  twins, 
widely  different  in  facial  outHnes,  stature,  and  physical 
constitution,  are  no  less  so  in  point  of  character  and  in 
degree  of  intelligence.     At  the  same  moment  one  will 


38       THE  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

be  merry,  and  the  other  sad ;  one  will  want  to  walk, 
while  the  other  will  want  to  rest  ;  and  from  this  con- 
flict of  two  wills,  animating  two  bodies  indissolubly 
bound  together,  movements  may  arise  that  are  wholly 
without  results,  that  end  neither  in  resting  nor  in  walk- 
ing. These  two  human  halves  may  quarrel,  or  even 
come  to  blows.  .  .  .  Thus  their  moral  duality,  the  con- 
sequence of  their  physical  duality,  is  demonstrated  by 
a  hundred  proofs.  But,  at  the  same  time,  as  a  point 
exists  in  the  double  body,  situated  at  the  line  of  divi- 
sion of  the  two  component  individuals,  and  which  is 
common  to  both,  other  phenomena,  though  less  numer- 
ous, indicate  in  them  the  beginnings  of  unity. 

<' Impressions  made  upon  the  region  of  union,  es- 
pecially if  made  at  its  central  point,  are  perceived  at 
the  same  time  by  both  the  brains,  and  both  are  able  to 
react  upon  the  impressions  in  the  same  manner.  .  .  . 
Let  us  add,  that  although  peace  is  often  ruptured  be- 
tween the  twins,  still  there  nearly  always  prevails  be- 
tween them  a  harmony  of  feelings  and  desires,  a  sym- 
pathy and  reciprocal  attachment,  of  which  it  is  im- 
possible to  appreciate  the  full  extent  without  having 
read  the  whole  evidence.  .  .  . 

*'The  same  and  still  other  phenomena  are  pre- 
sented where,  by  a  still  more  intimate  union,  we  find 
two  heads  with  one  body  and  only  a  single  pair  of 
legs.  Anatomical  analysis  shows  that  in  such  beings 
each  individual  possesses  as  its  own,  one  side  of  the 
common  body  and  one  of  the  two  legs.  The  observa- 
tion of  physiological  and  psychological  phenomena 
fully  corroborates  this  singular  result.  Impressions 
made  at  any  point  along  the  axis  of  union  are  perceived 
at  the  same  time  by  both  the  heads ;  beyond  and  at  a 
distance  from  the  axis  impressions  are  perceived  by 


ORGANIC  DISORDERS.  39 

only  one  head  ;  and  it  is  the  same  with  the  will  as  with 
the  sensations.  The  right  brain  feels  only  by  the  right 
leg,  acts  only  upon  the  right  leg,  the  left  by  the  left, 
and  so  forth ;  so  that  the  act  of  walking  results  from 
movements  executed  by  two  limbs  belonging  to  two 
different  individuals  and  co-ordinated  by  two  distinct 
wills. 

^'Finally,  in  parasitic  monsters,  where  the  organi- 
sation approaches  unity,  all  vital  acts,  sensations,  and 
manifestations  of  will  are  performed  almost  exactly  as 
they  are  in  normal  beings.  The  smaller  of  the  two 
individuals,  having  become  a  subordinate  and  inert 
portion  of  the  larger,  exerts  but  a  feeble  influence  upon 
it,  limited  to  a  very  small  number  of  functions."* 

To  these  general  traits  we  shall  add  a  few  details 
borrowed  from  the  most  celebrated  cases. 

We  possess  numerous  records  concerning  Helen 
and  Judith,  a  bi-female  monster,  born  at  Szony  (Hun- 
gary) in  1 70 1,  died  at  Presbourg  at  the  age  of  twenty- 
two.  The  bodies  were  placed  almost  back  to  back, 
being  joined  at  the  buttocks  and  a  part  of  the  loins. 
The  sexual  organs  were  double  externally,  but  with  a 
single  vulva  hidden  between  the  four  thighs ;  there 
were  two  intestines  terminating  in  a  single  anus.  The 
two  aortae  and  two  inferior  venae  cavae  communicated 
at  their  lower  extremities,  and  thus  formed  two  large 
and  direct  communications  between  the  two  hearts : 
hence  a  semi-communion  of  life  and  functions.  '*The 
two  sisters  had  neither  the  same  temperament  nor  the 
same  character.  Helen  was  taller,  prettier,  more  agile, 
more  intelligent,  and  of  a  sweeter  disposition.  Judith, 

*  I.  Geofifroy  Saint-Hilaire,  Histoire  des  anomalies,  v.  iii,  p,  373.  The 
monster  called  "Home's  epicome  "  had  a  parasitic  head  which  exhibited  only 
a  very  imperfect  outline  of  the  normal  form  and  life. 


40      THE  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

who  had  been  attacked  at  the  age  of  six  with  a  partial 
paralysis,  was  smaller  and  more  sluggish.  She  was 
slightly  malformed,  and  had  a  somewhat  difficult  ut- 
terance. She  spoke,  nevertheless,  like  her  sister,  Hun- 
garian, German,  French,  and  even  a  little  English  and 
Italian.  Each  seemed  to  have  a  tender  affection  for 
the  other,  although  in  their  infancy  they  had  sometimes 
quarrelled  and  even  come  to  blows.  The  needs  of  na- 
ture were  felt  simultaneously,  except  in  the  case  of 
urination.  They  had  been  simultaneously  afflicted 
with  measles  and  small-pox ;  and  if  a  malady  attacked 
one  alone,  the  other  experienced  internal  discomfort 
and  keen  anxiety.  Finally  Judith  was  struck  down 
with  a  disease  of  the  lungs  and  brain.  Helen,  attacked 
several  days  afterwards  with  a  low  fever,  lost  her 
strength  almost  at  once,  though  still  preserving  her 
clearness  of  mind  and  the  faculty  of  speech.  After  a 
brief  struggle  she  too  fell  a  victim,  not  to  her  own,  but 
to  her  sister's  maladies.  Both  expired  at  the  same  in- 
stant." 

The  Siamese  twins,  Chang-Eng,  born  in  1811,  in 
the  kingdom  of  Siam,  were  joined  at  the  xiphoid  ap- 
pendix by  a  cartilaginous  band  in  the  centre  of  which 
was  their  common  umbilicus.  After  a  description  of 
their  external  appearance,  I.  Geoffroy  Saint-Hilaire 
adds:  ''The  two  brothers  exhibit  also  in  their  other 
functions  [other  than  respiration  and  arterial  pulsation] 
a  remarkable  concordance,  though  not  absolutely  con- 
stant, as  some  have  been  pleased  to  maintain,  and  as 
Chang  and  Eng  themselves  have  stated  to  persons  who 
were  satisfied  with  putting  to  them  a  few  vague  ques- 
tions. Doubtless,  there  is  nothing  more  singular  than 
the  contrast  of  an  almost  complete  physical  duality 
and  of  an  absolute  moral  unity;  but,  at  the  same  time, 


ORGANIC  DISORDERS.  41 

nothing  is  more  opposed  to  sound  theory.  I  have  care- 
fully made  all  observations,  and  sought  out  all  informa- 
tion, that  could  enlighten  me  upon  the  value  of  so  fre- 
quent an  assertion,  and  I  have  found  that  in  the  conflict 
between  the  misconstrued  principles  of  theory  and  the 
psychological  assertions  of  which  the  unity  of  the  Si- 
amese twins  has  formed  so  long  the  inexhaustible  text, 
the  facts — as  was  to  be  expected — have  rendered  a 
verdict  in  favor  of  the  former.  Twins,  formed  upon 
two  almost  identical  types  ;  submitted  inevitably  dur- 
ing their  life  to  the  influence  of  the  same  physical  and 
moral  circumstances;  similar  in  organisation  and  edu- 
cation— the  Siamese  brothers  became  two.  beings  whose 
functions,  actions,  words,  and  even  thoughts,  are  al- 
most always  concordant,  conceived  and  produced  in 
parallelisms.  .  .  .  Their  joys  and  griefs  are  common. 
In  these  twin-souls  the  same  desires  are  manifested  at 
the  same  instant  -,  a  phrase  begun  by  one,  is  often  fin- 
ished by  the  other.  But  all  these  concordances  prove 
parity,  not  unity.  Twins  in  the  normal  state  frequently 
present  similarities,  and  would  doubtless  reveal  still 
more  remarkable  ones,  if  during  their  whole  life  they 
had  always  seen  the  sam.e  objects,  felt  the  same  sensa- 
tions, enjoyed  the  same  pleasures,  and  suffered  the 
same  griefs.  ..."  *  I  will  add  that  with  advancing  age 
and  as  the  result  of  circumstances  the  differences  of 
character  of  the  two  twins  became  more  and  more 
marked,  and  that  one  of  their  last  observers  describes 
one  as  morose  and  taciturn,  the  other  as  gay  and 
cheerful. 

The  subject  of  the  present  work  not  being  a  psy- 
chology of  double  monsters,  for  these  only  figure  here  as 
examples  of  the  deviations  of  physical  personality,  I 

*  For  further  details,  see  the  work  cited,  vol.  iii,  p.  90,  and  following. 


42       THE  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

shall  only  recall  the  recent  case  of  Millie  and  Christina, 
in  whom  the  sensibility  of  the  lower  limbs  is  common  ; 
the  two  spinal  cords,  consequently,  must  form  a  true 
commissure  at  the  plane  of  the  point  of  union. 

The  civil  and  ecclesiastical  laws,  which  are  inter- 
ested in  this  problem  under  several  heads,  (questions 
of  civil  condition,  marriage,  right  of  succession,  bap- 
tism, etc.,)  have  never  hesitated  to  acknowledge  two 
persons  where  two  distinct  heads  existed ;  and  justly 
so,  although  in  practice  perplexing  cases  might  arise. 
The  head  in  man  being  the  true  seat  of  personality, 
the  locality  in  which  the  synthesis  is  effected,  (we  shall 
see  later  on  that  lower  down  in  the  animal  scale  this 
point  is  more  doubtful,)  it  may  be  said,  upon  the  whole, 
to  represent  the  individual.  But,  if  the  question  is 
discussed  scientifically,  it  is  impossible  in  double  mon- 
sters to  consider  each  individual  as  complete. 

I  shall  not  weary  the  reader  with  useless  comments, 
since  the  facts  speak  for  themselves.  If  he  will  care- 
fully examine  the  preceding  pages,  he  will  convince 
himself  that,  even  where  the  personalities  are  the  most 
distinct,  there  exists  an  interpenetration  of  organs  and 
functions  such  that  each  cannot  be  itself  except  on 
condition  of  being  more  or  less  the  other,  and  of  being 
conscious  of  the  fact. 

The  ego,  therefore,  is  not  an  entity  acting  where 
and  as  it  chooses ;  controlling  the  organs  at  its  fancy, 
and  restricting  its  domain  at  its  pleasure.  On  the  con- 
trary, it  is  a  resultant,  to  such  a  degree  that  its  domain 
is  determined  by  the  anatomical  connexions  with  the 
brain,  and  that  at  one  time  it  represents  an  entire  body, 
less  an  undivided  part,  and  at  another  time  the  half 
of  a  body,  and  in  parasitic  monsters  a  domain  so  lim- 


ORGANIC  DISORDERS.  43 

ited,  that  it  is  insufficient  to  support  life,  and  is  ac- 
cordingly expelled. 

IV. 

To  prove  again  and  differently  that  the  principle  of 
individuation  is  the  organism  ;  that  it  is  such  without 
restriction,  immediately  by  the  organic  sensations,  me- 
diately by  the  affective  and  intellectual  states,  of  which 
we  shall  speak  later :  let  us  examine  what  takes  place 
in  twins.  Psychology  has  not  occupied  itself  more 
with  twins  than  with  double  monsters  ;  but  the  biol- 
ogists furnish  some  curious  data. 

In  the  first  place,  let  us  recall  that  the  proportion 
of  twins  in  all  births  is  about  i  in  70.  Triplets  or 
quadruplets  are  very  rare,  not  more  than  i  in  5000  and 
I  in  150,000  respectively,  so  that  their  discussion  would 
uselessly  complicate  our  researches.  Let  us  further 
remember  that  twins  are  of  two  kinds.  Either  they 
are  germinated  each  from  a  separate  ovule,  in  which 
case  they  may  be  of  the  same  or  of  a  different  sex ,  or 
they  may  have  sprung  from  two  germinal  spots  in  the 
same  ovule,  in  which  case  they  are  enveloped  within 
the  same  membrane  and  are  invariably  of  the  same 
sex.  The  latter  case  alone  yields  two  personaHties  that 
are  rigorously  comparable. 

Leaving  aside  animals,  let  us  consider  man,  and  at- 
tack the  problem  in  all  its  complexity.  It  is  evident, 
that  since  the  physical  and  moral  condition  of  the 
parents  is  the  same  for  both  twin  individuals,  at  the 
moment  of  procreation,  one  cause  of  difference  is  thus 
eliminated.  As  their  development  has  for  its  point  of 
departure  the  materials  of  the  same  fecundated  ovule, 
there  is  great  likelihood  of  extreme  resemblance  in 
physical  constitution,  and  consequently,  according  to 


44      THE  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

our  thesis,  in  mental  constitution.  Let  us  now  look 
at  the  facts  in  our  favor ;  afterwards  we  shall  consider 
objections  and  exceptions. 

The  perfect  resemblance  of  some  twins  is  a  matter 
of  common  observation.  Since  antiquity  this  topic 
has  furnished  material  for  the  comic  poets,  and  in  later 
times  it  has  been  more  than  once  used  by  novelists. 
But  writers  usually  have  confined  themselves  to  ex- 
ternal resemblances  :  stature,  form,  face,  voice,  etc. 
There  are,  however,  many  deeper  ones.  Physicians 
have  long  remarked  that  the  majority  of  twins  exhibit 
extraordinary  agreement  of  tastes,  aptitudes,  facul- 
ties, and  even  of  destinies.  Recently  Mr.  Galton  has 
made  an  investigation  of  this  subject,  issuing  circulars 
of  inquiry,  to  which  about  eighty  answers  were  re- 
turned, thirty-five  with  minute  details.  Mr.  Galton's 
aim  was  totally  different  from  ours.  Extending  his 
researches  on  heredity,  he  wished  to  determine  by  a 
new  method  the  respective  parts  played  by  nature  and 
education  ;  but  among  his  materials  there  is  much  that 
is  of  great  value  to  us.* 

Mr.  Galton  reports  a  number  of  anecdotes  similar 
to  those  which  have  been  long  current :  a  sister  taking 
two  music-lessons  daily,  to  gain  for  her  twin  sister  a  holi- 
day ;  the  perplexities  of  a  certain  college-porter,  who, 
when  a  twin  came  to  see  his  brother,  did  not  know 
which  of  the  two  he  ought  to  allow  to  depart,  etc. 
Others  show  a  persistent  resemblance  under  circum- 
stances little  favorable  to  preserve  it.  '^A  was  again 
coming  home  from  India,  on  leave  ;  the  ship  did  not 
arrive  for  some  days  after  it  was  due  ;  the  twin  brother 


*  They  will  be  found  under  the  caption  "  History  of  Twins  "  in  his  book 
Inquiries  into  Human  Faculty  atid  Its  Developjnent  (pp.  216-242),  London: 
Macmillan,  1883. 


ORGANIC  DISORDERS.  45 

B  had  come  up  from  his  quarters  to  receive  A,  and 
their  old  mother  was  very  nervous.  One  morning  A 
rushed  in  saying,  <  Oh,  mother,  how  are  you  ?  '  Her 
answer  was,  '  No,  B,  it's  a  bad  joke ;  you  know  how 
anxious  I  am  ! '  and  it  was  a  little  time  before  A  could 
persuade  her  that  he  was  the  real  man."     (P.  224.) 

But  cases  which  relate  to  mental  organisation  have 
a  higher  interest  for  us.  "A  point  which  illustrates 
the  extremely  close  resemblance  between  twins,"  says 
Galton,  'Ms  the  similarity  in  the  association  of  their 
ideas.  No  less  than  eleven  out  of  the  thirty-five  cases 
testify  to  this.  They  make  the  same  remarks  on  the 
same  occasion,  begin  singing  the  same  song  at  the 
same  moment,  and  so  on  ;  or  one  would  commence  a 
sentence,  and  the  other  would  finish  it.  An  observant 
friend  graphically  described  to  me  the  effect  produced 
on  her  by  two  such  twins  whom  she  had  met  casually. 
She  said  :  '  Their  teeth  grew  alike,  they  spoke  alike 
and  together,  and  said  the  same  things,  and  seemed 
just  like  one  person.'  One  of  the  most  curious  anec- 
dotes that  I  have  received  concerning  this  similarity 
of  ideas  was  that  one  twin,  A,  who  happened  to  be  at  a 
town  in  Scotland,  bought  a  set  of  champagne  glasses 
which  caught  his  attention,  as  a  surprise  for  his 
brother  B  ;  while  at  the  same  time  B,  being  in  Eng- 
land, bought  a  similar  set  of  precisely  the  same  pat- 
tern, as  a  surprise  for  A.  Other  anecdotes  of  a  like 
kind  have  reached  me  about  these  twins."  (P.  231.) 

The  nature  and  evolution  of  physical  and  mental 
maladies  also  furnish  some  very  cogent  facts.  If  the 
latter  alone  interest  psycholog}^,  the  former  reveal  a 
similarity  in  the  innermost  constitution  of  the  two 
organisms  which  sight  cannot  discover  in  the  form  of 
external  resemblances. 


46      THE  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

'<  I  attended  two  twin-brothers,"  says  Trousseau, 
"  so  marvellously  alike,  that  it  was  impossible  to  tell 
which  was  which  without  seeing  them  side  by  side. 
But  their  physical  resemblance  extended  still  deeper ; 
they  had,  so  to  speak,  a  pathological  resemblance  even 
more  remarkable.  One  of  them,  whom  I  saw  in  Paris, 
while  suffering  from  rheumatic  ophthalmia,  said  to 
me  :  'At  this  instant  my  brother  must  be  suffering  from 
an  ophthalmia  exactly  like  mine.'  And  as  I  scouted 
the  idea,  a  few  days  afterwards  he  showed  me  a  letter 
that  he  had  just  received  from  his  brother,  then  at 
Vienna,  who  wrote  :  '  I  have  got  my  ophthalmia,  you 
must  have  yours.'  Singular  as  this  story  may  appear, 
it  is  none  the  less  a  fact.  It  was  not  told  to  me,  but  I 
saw  it  myself,  and  I  have  observed  other  analogous 
cases  in  my  practice."  *  Galton  gives  several  exam- 
ples, of  which  we  shall  cite  only  one:  ''Two  twin- 
brothers,  closely  alike,  singularly  attached  to  each 
other,  and  having  identical  tastes,  had  both  obtained 
government  clerkships,  and  kept  house  together ;  one 
of  them  sickened  of  Bright's  disease  and  died  of  it ; 
the  other  sickened  of  the  same  disease  and  died  seven 
months  later."     (P.  226). 

We  might  fill  pages  with  analogous  cases.  In  the 
order  of  mental  diseases  it  is  the  same ;  a  few  exam- 
ples will  suffice.  Moreau  (de  Tours)  records  a  case  of 
twins,  physically  alike,  who  were  attacked  by  insanity. 
In  both  patients  "the  dominant  ideas  are  absolutely 
the  same.  Both  believe  themselves  to  be  the  objects 
of  imaginary  persecutions.  The  same  enemies  have 
sworn  their  ruin,  and  employ  the  same  means  to  ac- 
complish their  ends.  Both  are  subject  to  hallucina- 
tions of  hearing.     They  talk  to  no  one,  and  they  refuse 

♦Trousseau,  Clinique  Midicale,  "  Le§on  sur  I'asthme,"  vol.  i,  p.  253. 


ORGANIC  DISORDERS.  47 

to  answer  questions.  They  always  keep  apart,  and 
never  communicate  with  each  other.  An  extremely 
curious  fact  that  has  been  frequently  observed  by  the 
attendants  of  the  ward  and  also  by  ourselves  is  the  fol- 
lowing :  from  time  to  time,  at  irregular  intervals,  of 
two,  three,  or  several  months,  without  apparent  cause 
and  by  an  entirely  spontaneous  caprice  of  their  malady, 
a  very  marked  change  takes  place  in  the  condition  of 
the  two  brothers.  Both,  at  the  same  period,  and  often 
on  the  very  same  day,  emerge  from  their  habitual  stupor 
and  prostration  ;  they  make  the  same  complaints  and 
imperiously  demand  of  the  physician  their  release.  I 
have  seen  this  strange  phenomenon  take  place  even 
when  they  were  separated  from  each  other  by  a  dis- 
tance of  several  miles ;  the  one  being  at  Bicetre,  while 
the  other  was  at  Sainte-Anne."  * 

More  recently  the  Journal  of  Mental  Sciefice^  has 
published  two  observations  of  insanity  in  twins,  where 
we  see  two  sisters  who  resembled  each  other  so  closely 
in  features,  manners,  language,  and  intellectual  dispo- 
sition, 'Hhat  it  would  be  very  easy  to  mistake  one 
for  the  other,'*  and  who,  placed  in  different  wards  of 
the  same  asylum,  with  no  possibility  of  seeing  each 
other,  presented  exactly  the  same  symptoms  of  mental 
alienation. 

But  we  must  forestall  here  certain  objections.  There 
are  twins  of  the  same  sex  that  are  unlike ;  and  although 
the  statistics  do  not  tell  us  in  what  proportion  true 
twins  (issues  of  the  same  ovule)  present  these  differ- 
ences, it  is  sufficient  if  it  takes  place  only  in  a  single 

*  Psychologic  morbide,  p.  172.  We  also  find  an  extraordinarily  curious  case 
in  the  Annates  tnedicopsychologiques,  1863,  vol.  i,  p.  312.  On  the  subject  of 
twins  the  special  work  of  Kleinwaechter,  Die  Lehre  von  den  Zwillingen,  Prague, 
1871,  may  be  consulted. 

t  April,  1883,  and  Ball,  De  lafolie  gSmellaire,  in  VEncij>hale. 


48       THE  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

case  to  be  worthy  of  discussion.  Elsewhere  *  we  have 
enumerated  the  numerous  causes  which  in  every  indi- 
vidual from  conception  till  death  tend  to  produce  va- 
riations, that  is,  certain  marks  which  are  peculiar  to 
the  individual,  and  which  differentiate  it  from  every 
other.  Here,  as  we  have  said,  one  class  of  causes 
must  be  eliminated  :  those  which  come  immediately 
from  the  parents.  But  the  impregnated  ovule  also 
represents  ancestral  influences — 4,  12,  28  possible  in- 
fluences according  as  we  ascend  to  grandparents,  great- 
grandparents,  great-great-grandparents,  etc.  We  can 
know  only  from  experience  which  of  them  prevail,  and 
in  what  degree.  True,  in  the  present  case,  it  is  the 
same  ovule  which  goes  to  produce  the  two  individ- 
uals ;  but  nothing  proves  that  everywhere  and  always 
the  division  made  between  the  two  is  rigorously  equiva- 
lent in  quantity  and  quality  of  materials.  The  eggs  of 
all  animals  not  only  exhibit  the  same  anatomical  struc- 
ture, but  chemical  analysis  can  only  reveal  in  them  in- 
finitesimal differences  ;  yet,  the  one  produces  a  sponge, 
the  other  a  man.  This  apparent  resemblance  must 
conceal,  accordingly,  profound  differences,  although  it 
escapes  our  subtlest  means  of  investigation.  Do  they 
spring  from  the  character  of  the  molecular  movements, 
as  some  authors  think  ?  We  may  assume  anything  we 
please,  provided  we  thoroughly  understand  that  the 
egg  itself  is  already  a  complex  thing,  and  that  the  two 
individuals  that  come  from  it  cannot  be  absolutely 
similar.  Our  perplexity  springs  only  from  our  ignor- 
ance of  the  processes  according  to  which  the  primitive 
elements  arrange  themselves  to  constitute  each  indi- 
vidual, and  in  consequence,  of  the  physical  and  psych- 
ical differences  which  thence  result.    Some  of  Galton's 

*  Vhir edits psychologique,  2nd  edition,  part,  ii,  ch.  iv. 


ORGANIC  DISORDERS.  49 

correspondents  have  reported  the  curious  fact  of  cer- 
tain twins  who  were  *' complementary  to  each  other." 
*^  There  seemed  to  be,"  writes  the  mother  of  the  twins, 
'^a  sort  of  interchangeable  likeness  in  expression  that 
often  gave  to  each  the  effect  of  being  more  like  his 
brother  than  himself." — ''A  fact  struck  all  our  school 
contemporaries  (writes  a  senior  wrangler  of  Cambridge) 
that  my  brother  and  I  were  complementary,  so  to 
speak,  in  point  of  ability  and  disposition.  He  was 
contemplative,  poetical,  and  literary  to  a  remarkable 
degree.  I  was  practical,  mathematical,  and  linguistic. 
Between  us  we  should  have  made  a  very  decent  sort 
of  a  man."  (Pp.  224  and  240.)  The  physical  and 
mental  capital  seems  to  have  been  divided  between 
them  not  by  equality  but  by  equivalence. 

If  the  reader  will  carefully  consider  how  complex 
the  psychic  organisation  is  in  man  ;  how  improbable 
it  is,  by  reason  of  this  complexity,  that  two  persons 
should  be  the  repetition  of  each  other,  although  twins 
approach  that  point  to  an  astonishing  degree,  he  will 
be  irresistibly  led  to  conclude,  that  a  single  well-veri- 
fied fact  of  this  kind  proves  more  than  ten  exceptions, 
and  that  the  moral  resemblance  is  only  the  correlative 
of  the  physical  resemblance.  If,  by  an  impossible  hy- 
pothesis, two  men  were  so  created  that  their  two  or- 
ganisms were  constitutionally  identical ;  that  their 
hereditary  influences  were  rigorously  alike ;  if,  by  a 
still  greater  impossibility,  both  received  at  the  same 
instant  the  same  physical  and  moral  impressions,  there 
would  be  no  other  difference  between  them  than  that 
of  their  position  in  space. 

As  the  organism,  so  the  personality  !  In  closing 
this  chapter,  I  feel  somewhat  ashamed  of  havmg  ac- 
cumulated so  many  data  and  proofs  to  establish  a  truth 


50      THE  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

so  evident  to  my  eyes  as  that  just  formulated.  I  should 
have  greatly  hesitated  to  do  so,  if  it  had  not  been  too 
easy  to  show  that  this  truth  has  been  forgotten  and 
ignored  rather  than  denied  ;  and  that  writers  have  al- 
most always  rested  content  with  mentioning  it  under 
the  vague  rubric  of  the  influence  of  the  physical  on  the 
mental. 

The  facts  hitherto  studied  cannot  alone  lead  to  a 
conclusion  :  they  only  pave  the  way  to  it.  They  have 
shown  that,  reduced  to  its  last  elements,  physical  per- 
sonality presupposes  the  properties  of  living  matter 
and  their  co-ordination  ;  that  just  as  the  body  is  only 
the  organised  and  co-ordinated  sum  of  all  the  elements 
that  constitute  it,  so  also  the  physical  personality  is 
only  the  organised  and  co-ordinated  sum  of  the  same 
elements  as  psychic  factors.  It  expresses  their  nature 
and  dispositions,  nothing  more.  The  normal  state, 
teratological  cases,  the  resemblance  of  twins  have 
proved  it.  The  aberrations  of  the  physical  personality, 
or  as  M.  Bertrand  ingeniously  calls  them,*  '<the  hal- 
lucinations of  the  sense  of  the  body  "  supply  an  addi- 
tional mass  of  evidence.  But  there  are  deviations  of 
the  human  person  arising  from  other  causes  and  pro- 
duced by  a  more  complicated  mechanism,  which  we  will 
now  proceed  to  investigate. 

*^De  V aperception  du  corps  humain  par  la  conscience,  p.  269  et  seqq. 


CHAPTER  II. 


AFFECTIVE  DISORDERS. 


At  the  outset,  we  must  remind  the  reader,  once  for 
all,  (and  this  applies  also  to  the  intellectual  disorders,) 
that  we  are  still  continuing  our  study  of  organic  con- 
ditions, only  under  a  different  form.  The  desires,  feel- 
ings, passions,  that  impart  to  character  its  fundamen- 
tal tone,  have  their  roots  in  the  organism  and  are  pre- 
determined by  it.  The  same  is  true  also  of  the  highest 
intellectual  manifestations.  Still,  as  the  psychic  states 
here  play  a  preponderating  part,  we  shall  treat  them 
as  the  immediate  causes  of  the  changes  of  personality, 
without  forgetting,  however,  that  these  causes  are  in 
their  turn  effects. 

Without  pretending  to  give  a  rigorous  classification 
of  the  affective  manifestations,  which  it  is  not  our  pur- 
pose to  study  in  detail,  we  shall  reduce  them  to  three 
groups,  of  which  the  psychological  complexity  in- 
creases and  the  physiological  importance  decreases. 
They  are  :  (i)  the  tendencies  connected  with  the  pre- 
servation of  the  individual  (nutrition,   self-defence); 

(2)  those  relating  to  the  preservation  of  the  species ; 

(3)  the  highest  of  all,  those  which  presuppose  the  de- 
velopment of  intelligence  (moral,  religious,  aesthetic, 
and  scientific  manifestations,  ambition  in  all  its  forms. 


52      THE  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

etc.).  If  we  consider  the  development  of  the  individ- 
ual, we  shall  find  that  it  is  in  this  chronological  order 
that  the  sentiments  appear.  We  see  it  still  better  in 
the  evolution  of  the  human  species.  Inferior  human 
races — with  whom  education  does  not  correct  nature 
by  supplying  the  accumulated  results  of  the  labor  of 
centuries — never  pass  beyond  the  preservation  of  the 
individual  and  of  the  species,  or  at  most  exhibit  only  a 
slight  trace  of  the  sentiments  belonging  to  the  third 
group. 

The  affective  states  connected  with  nutrition  are  in 
the  early  infancy  of  the  child  the  only  elements,  so  to 
speak,  of  its  nascent  personality.  Thence  arise  com- 
fort and  discomfort,  desires  and  aversions.  It  is  the 
sense  of  the  body,  of  which  we  have  so  much  spoken, 
arrived  at  its  highest  psychic  expression.  Natural 
causes,  too  manifest  to  need  enumeration,  make  nutri- 
tion predominate  almost  exclusively  in  the  child ;  it 
has,  and  can  only  have,  a  personality  almost  entirely 
nutritive,  that  is,  the  most  indefinite  and  lowest  form 
of  personality.  The  ego,  for  him  who  does  not  regard 
it  as  an  entity,  can  here  only  be  a  compound  of  ex- 
treme simplicity. 

As  we  get  away  from  infancy,  the  preponderating 
role  of  nutrition  diminishes  ;  but  it  never  completely 
loses  its  rights,  because  of  all  the  properties  of  the  liv- 
ing animal  it  alone  is  fundamental.  Accordingly,  grave 
alterations  of  personality  are  connected  with  its  varia- 
tions. If  it  diminishes,  the  individual  feels  depressed, 
weakened,  contracted  ;  if  it  is  increased,  he  feels  stimu- 
lated, strengthened,  extended.  Of  all  the  functions 
whose  harmony  constitutes  this  basic  property  of  life, 
the  circulation  seems  to  be  that  of  which  sudden  varia- 
tions have  the  greatest  influence  on  the  affective  states 


AFFECTIVE  DISORDERS.  53 

and  are  betrayed  by  immediate  results ;  but  let  us 
leave  conjectures  of  detail  to  take  a  look  at  the  facts. 
In  the  states  known  as  hypochondria,  lypemania, 
melancholia  (in  all  its  forms),  we  find  alterations  of 
personality  that  admit  of  all  possible  degrees,  includ- 
ing even  complete  metamorphosis.  Among  these  dif- 
ferent morbid  states  physicians  have  established  cer- 
tain clinical  distinctions,  which  are  of  no  importance 
here.  We  can  comprise  all  in  a  single  description. 
What  is  found  is  a  feeling  of  fatigue,  oppression,  anx- 
iety, dejection,  sadness,  absence  of  desires,  permanent 
lassitude.  In  the  most  serious  cases,  the  source  of 
the  emotions  is  completely  dried  up  :  **The  patients 
have  become  insensible  to  everything.  They  no  longer 
have  affection  either  for  their  parents  or  their  children, 
and  even  the  death  of  persons  that  are  dear  to  them 
leaves  them  perfectly  cold  and  indifferent.  They  can- 
not weep,  and  nothing  moves  them  except  their  own 
sufferings."*  As  to  the  activity,  there  is  torpor,  inca- 
pacity to  act  or  even  to  will,  an  insurmountable  inac- 
tion that  will  last  for  hours,  in  a  word,  that  '^ abulia" 
(lack  of  will)  of  which  we  have  studied  all  the  forms  in 
treating  of  the  diseases  of  the  will.f  As  for  the  external 
world,  the  patient,  without  having  hallucinations,  finds 
his  relations  to  it  changed.  It  seems  as  if  his  habitual 
sensations  had  lost  their  true  character.  *'A11  that  sur- 
rounds me,"  said  one  of  them,  *' is  still  as  formerly, 
and  yet  some  change  must  have  taken  place ;  things 
still  have  their  old  forms,  I  see  them  perfectly  well, 
and  yet  they  have  changed  much."  One  of  Esquirol's 
patients  complains  that  his  existence  is  incomplete. 

♦  Falret,  Archives  ginirales  demidecine^  December,  1878. 
t  The  Diseases  of  the  Will,  Chicago,  The  Open  Court  Publishing  Company, 
1894. 


54      THE  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

'^  Each  of  my  senses,  each  part  of  myself,  as  it  were,  is 
separated  from  me  and  can  no  longer  give  me  sensa- 
tions ;  it  seems  to  me  as  if  I  never  actually  reach  the 
objects  that  I  touch."  That  state,  due  sometimes  to 
cutaneous  anaesthesia,  may  reach  a  point  ''where  it 
seems  to  the  patient  that  the  real  world  has  completely 
faded  away,  or  is  dead,  and  that  there  only  remains  an 
imaginary  world,  in  which  he  is  afraid  to  dwell."*  To 
this  picture  are  to  be  added  physical  phenomena  : 
troubles  of  the  circulation,  of  the  respiration,  and  of 
the  secretions.  The  emaciation  of  the  subjects  may 
be  considerable,  and  the  weight  of  the  body  diminish 
rapidly  during  the  period  of  depression.  The  respira- 
tory function  is  slackened,  the  circulation  reduced,  and 
the  temperature  of  the  body  lowered. 

Gradually  these  morbid  states  take  form,  organise 
and  unify  themselves  in  some  false  conception,  which 
— having  been  excited  by  the  psycho-physiological 
mechanism  of  association — becomes  in  its  turn  a  centre 
of  attraction  toward  w^iich  all  converges.  One  patient 
will  say  that  his  heart  is  petrified,  another  that  his 
nerves  are  like  burning  coals,  etc.  These  aberrations 
assume  innumerable  forms,  and  vary  with  individuals. 
In  extreme  cases,  the  individual  doubts  his  existence, 
or  denies  it.  A  young  man,  who  maintained  that  he 
had  been  dead  for  two  years,  expressed  his  perplexity 
as  follows  :  ''I  exist,  but  outside  the  real  material  life 
and  in  spite  of  myself,  nothing  having  killed  me. 
Everything  in  me  is  mechanical,  and  is  done  uncon- 
sciously." Is  not  this  contradictory  situation,  in  which 
the  subject  claims  to  be  alive  and  dead  at  the  same 
time,  the  logical  and  natural  expression  of  a  state  in 

♦Griesinger,  Traiti  des  maladies  mentales  (Fr.  trans.,  p.  265);  DEnci- 
phale,  June,  1882. 


AFFECTIVE  DISORDERS.  55 

which  the  old  ego  and  the  new,  vitality  and  annihila- 
tion are  equilibrated? 

Besides,  the  psychological  interpretation  of  all 
these  cases  is  not  doubtful.  What  we  have  are  or- 
ganic disturbances,  the  first  result  of  which  is  to  de- 
press the  faculty  of  feeling  in  general,  and  the  second 
to  pervert  it.  In  this  way  a  group  of  organic  and  psy- 
chic states  is  formed  that  tend  to  modify  the  constitu- 
tion of  the  ego  to  its  very  depths,  because  they  do  not 
act  after  the  fashion  of  sudden  emotions,  the  effect  of 
which  is  violent  and  superficial,  but  by  slow,  silent  ac- 
tions of  unconquerable  tenacity.  At  first  this  new 
mode  of  existence  seems  strange  to  the  individual, 
and  outside  its  ego.  But  by  degrees  and  by  habit,  the 
new  feeling  gets  a  lodging  in  and  becomes  an  integral 
part  of  the  ego,  changing  its  constitution,  and  when  of 
a  powerful  nature,  wholly  transforming  it. 

In  seeing  how  the  ego  is  dissolved,  we  discover 
how  it  is  made.  In  most  instances,  doubtless,  the  al- 
teration is  only  partial.  The  individual,  though  grown 
different  to  himself,  and  to  those  who  know  him,  still 
preserves  a  certain  residuum  of  himself.  In  fact,  com- 
plete transformation  can  only  be  rare ;  and  be  it  ob- 
served, that  when  a  patient  maintains  that  he  is  changed 
or  transformed,  he  is  right,  notwithstanding  the  de- 
nials or  hilarity  of  his  friends.  It  is  impossible  for  him 
to  feel  himself  differently,  as  his  consciousness  is  simply 
the  expression  of  his  organic  state.  Subjectively  he  is 
not  the  sport  of  an  illusion  ;  he  is  merely  what  he  ought 
to  be.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  the  unconscious,  un- 
avowed  hypothesis  of  an  independent  ego,  existing  by 
itself  as  an  unalterable  entity,  that  urges  us  instinc- 
tively to  think  that  this  change  is  only  an  external 
event,  an  unusual  or  ridiculous  garb  in  which  the  per- 


56      THE  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

sonality  is  dressed,  while  in  reality  the  change  is  in- 
ternal, and  implies  certain  losses  and  acquisitions  in 
the  very  substance  of  the  ego. 

The  counterpart  of  these  partial  alterations  of  the 
ego  is  to  be  found  in  cases  where  the  ego  is  exalted, 
amplified,  and  lifted  above  its  normal  tone.  Instances 
of  this  are  found  at  the  beginning  of  general  paralysis, 
in  some  cases  of  mania,  and  in  the  period  of  excite- 
ment of  circular  insanity.  It  is  exactly  the  reverse  of 
the  previous  picture.  A  feeling  of  physical  and  moral 
well-being  exists,  superabundant  strength,  exuberant 
activity,  venting  itself  with  reckless  prodigality  in 
speeches,  projects,  enterprises,  and  incessant,  fruitless 
journeys.  To  this  superexcitation  of  the  psychic  life 
corresponds  a  superactivity  of  all  the  organic  func- 
tions. Nutrition  increases — often  in  an  exaggerated 
manner — respiration  and  circulation  are  quickened, 
the  genital  function  is  exalted  ;  and  notwithstanding  a 
great  expenditure  of  force  the  individual  feels  no  fa- 
tigue. Afterwards  these  states  group  and  unify  them- 
selves, in  the  end  considerably  transforming  the  ego. 
One  individual  feels  herculean  strength,  is  able  to  lift 
prodigious  weights,  procreate  thousands  of  children, 
race  with  a  railway-train,  etc.  Another  is  an  inexhaust- 
ible mine  of  learning,  imagines  himself  a  great  poet, 
artist,  or  inventor.  At  times  the  transformation  ap- 
proaches still  nearer  to  complete  metamorphosis  ;  and 
then  the  subject,  entirely  overwhelmed  by  the  feeling  of 
his  matchless  power,  proclaims  himself  pope,  emperor, 
God.  *' The  patient,"  as  Griesinger  justly  observes, 
**  feeling  proud,  bold,  and  enlivened,  discovering  in 
himself  unwonted  freedom  in  his  decisions,  and  feeling 
the  superabundance  of  his  thoughts,  is  led  naturally  to 
have  ideas  of  grandeur,  rank,  riches,  of  great  moral 


AFFECTIVE  DISORDERS.  57 

or  intellectual  power,  such  as  only  the  fullest  liberty  of 
thought  and  volition  can  exhibit  in  a  like  degree.  This 
exaggerated  idea  of  force  and  of  freedom  must  never- 
theless have  a  motive  ;  there  must  be  in  the  ego  some- 
thing that  corresponds  to  it ;  the  ego  must  have  mo- 
mentarily become  different ;  and  the  patient  knows  no 
other  way  of  expressing  this  change,  than  by  proclaim- 
ing himself  Napoleon,  the  Messiah,  or  some  other  ex- 
alted personage."  * 

It  would  be  a  waste  of  time  to  show  that  this  trans- 
formation of  the  ego,  whether  partial  or  complete, 
momentary  or  permanent,  is  of  the  same  kind  as  in  the 
preceding  cases,  and  that  it  supposes  the  same  mech- 
anism, with  the  sole  difference  that  here  the  ego  is  dis- 
solved in  the  inverse  sense — not  by  defect  but  by  excess. 

These  alterations  of  the  personality  by  increase  or 
decrease,  this  metamorphosis  of  the  ego,  raising  or 
lowering  it,  would  be  still  more  striking  if  they  followed 
each  other  regularly  in  the  same  individual.  Now,  in- 
stances of  this  frequently  occur  in  so-called  circular 
insanity,  or  insanity  of  double  form,  a  mental  derange- 
ment characterised  by  a  regular  sequence  of  two  peri- 
ods, one  of  depression  and  one  of  excitement,  accom- 
panied in  some  patients  with  intervals  of  lucidity. 
Here,  the  following  singular  fact  may  be  witnessed. 
Upon  what  might  be  called  the  primitive  and  funda- 
mental personality,  of  which  there  still  remain  a  few 
altered  fragments,  are  grafted  by  turns  two  new  per- 
sonalities— not  only  quite  distinct,  but  wholly  exclud- 
ing each  other.  It  is  indispensable  here  to  give  a 
r^sum^  of  some  observations,  f 

*Op.  cit.,  p.  333. 

t  They  will  be  found  in  extenso  in  Ritti,  Traiti  clinique  de  lafolie  h  double 
forme.     Paris,  1883,  observations  xvii,  xix,  xxx,  xxxi. 


58      THE  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY, 

A  woman,  observed  by  Morel,  had  been  abandoned 
by  her  mother  to  a  hfe  of  vice  when  fourteen  years  old. 
**  Later  in  her  career,  a  prey  to  every  pang  of  shame 
and  wretchedness,  she  had  no  other  resource  than  to 
enter  a  house  of  ill-fame.  A  year  afterwards  she  was 
rescued  from  it  and  placed  in  the  convent  of  the  Good 
Shepherd,  at  Metz.  She  remained  here  for  two  years, 
but  the  too  intense  reaction  effected  in  her  sentiments 
resulted  in  an  outburst  of  religious  mania,  which  was 
followed  by  a  period  of  profound  stupidity."  Then, 
while  under  the  treatment  of  the  physician,  she  passes 
through  alternate  periods,  when  she  imagines  herself 
by  turns  a  prostitute  and  a  nun.  On  issuing  from  the 
period  of  stupidity,  *<she  sets  to  work  methodically 
and  speaks  with  propriety;  but  she  arranges  her  toilet 
with  a  certain  coquetry.  Then  this  tendency  increases, 
her  eyes  sparkle,  her  glances  grow  lascivious,  she 
dances  and  sings.  Finally  the  obscenity  of  her  utter- 
ances and  her  erotic  solicitations  necessitate  her  soli- 
tary confinement.  She  gives  herself  the  name  of  Mme. 
Poulmaire,  and  furnishes  the  most  cynical  details  of 
her  former  state  of  prostitution."  Then  again,  after  a 
period  of  depression,  '*she  becomes  meek  and  timid; 
and  evinces  the  most  scrupulous  decency  in  her  de- 
meanor. She  arranges  her  toilet  with  extreme  severity. 
The  intonation  of  her  voice  is  peculiar.  She  speaks 
of  the  convent  of  the  Good  Shepherd  at  Metz  and  of 
her  desire  to  return  there  ;  she  now  calls  herself  Sister 
Martha  of  the  Five  Wounds,  Theresa  of  Jesus,  Sister 
Mary  of  the  Resurrection.  She  refrains  from  speaking 
in  the  first  person  :  says  to  the  sisters.  Take  our  dress, 
this  is  our  pocket-handkerchief.  Nothing  now  belongs 
to  her  personally  (according  to  the  rule  of  Catholic 


AFFECTIVE  DISORDERS,  59 

convents).  .  .  .  She  sees  angels  who  smile  upon  her, 
and  has  moments  of  ecstasy." 

In  another  case  reported  by  Krafft-Ebing,  a  neuro- 
pathic patient  of  insane  parentage,  "  during  the  period 
of  depression  was  disgusted  with  the  world,  preoccu- 
pied with  the  thought  of  approaching  death  and  of 
eternity,  and  in  this  condition  thought  of  becoming  a 
priest.  During  the  maniacal  periods  he  is  turbulent, 
studies  furiously,  will  not  hear  a  word  more  about  the- 
ology, and  only  thinks  of  practising  medicine." 

An  insane  woman  of  Charenton,  of  a  very  distin- 
guished and  highly  gifted  mind,  would  change  ''from 
day  to  day  in  person,  condition,  and  even  in  sex.  At 
one  time  she  would  be  a  princess  of  royal  blood,  be- 
trothed to  an  emperor ;  at  another  time  a  woman  of  the 
people  and  democratic;  to-day  married  and  enceinte  \ 
to-morrow  once  more  a  maiden.  It  would  even  come 
upon  her  at  times  to  be  a  man ;  and  one  day  she  im- 
agined herself  a  political  prisoner  of  importance,  and 
composed  verses  upon  the  subject." 

Finally,  in  the  following  case  we  find  the  complete 
formation  of  a  second  personality.  ''A  lunatic,  an  in- 
mate of  the  asylum  at  Vanves,"  says  Billod,*  "every 
eighteen  months  about,  would  let  his  beard  grow  and 
present  himself,  altered  in  dress  and  manners,  to  the 
whole  house  as  a  lieutenant  of  artillery,  named  Nabon, 
recently  arrived  from  Africa,  to  act  as  a  substitute  for 
his  brother.  He  would  say,  that  before  leaving,  his 
brother  had  given  him  all  the  requisite  information 
about  every  one  ;  and  at  his  arrival  he  would  ask  and 
obtain  the  honor  of  being  introduced  to  each  person. 
The  patient  would  then  remain  for  several  months  in  a 
state  of  marked  exaltation,  adapting  his  whole  conduct 

*Annales  midico-psychologiques,  1858,  according  to  Ritti,  op.  cit.,  p.  156. 


6o       THE  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

to  his  new  individuality.  At  the  expiration  of  a  cer- 
tain time,  he  would  announce  the  return  of  his  brother, 
who,  as  he  said,  was  in  the  village  and  would  come  to 
replace  him.  Whereupon  he  would  have  his  beard 
shaved  off,  change  his  dress  and  manner,  and  resume 
his  real  name.  But  he  would  then  exhibit  a  marked 
expression  of  melancholy,  walking  along  slowly,  silent 
and  alone,  usually  reading  the  '■  Imitation  of  Jesus 
Christ,'  or  the  'Fathers  of  the  Church.'  In  this  men- 
tal state — a  lucid  one  perhaps,  but  one  that  I  am  far 
from  considering  normal — he  would  remain  until  the 
return  of  the  imaginary  Lieutenant  Nabon. " 

The  two  first  cases  cited  are  simply  an  exaggera- 
tion, an  extra  augmentation,  of  what  exists  in  the  nor- 
mal state.  The  ego  of  all  of  us  is  made  up  of  contradic- 
tory tendencies  :  virtues  and  vices,  modesty  and  pride, 
avarice  and  prodigality,  desire  for  rest  and  craving  for 
action,  and  of  a  host  of  others.  In  the  ordinary  state 
these  opposite  tendencies  are  balanced,  or,  at  least,  that 
which  prevails  is  not  without  a  counterpoise.  But  here, 
owing  to  perfectly  determinate  organic  conditions, 
there  is  not  even  the  possibility  of  equilibrium  :  one 
group  of  tendencies  is  hypertrophied  at  the  expense  of 
the  antagonist  group,  which  is  atrophied ;  then  a  re- 
action takes  place  in  the  inverse  sense,  so  that  the  per- 
sonality, instead  of  consisting  of  those  average  oscilla- 
tions of  which  each  represents  a  side  of  human  na- 
ture, passes  constantly  from  one  excess  to  the  other. 
In  passing,  we  may  remark  that  these  diseases  of  per- 
sonality consist  in  a  reduction  to  a  simpler  state.  But 
the  time  is  not  come  to  dwell  on  this  point. 


AFFECTIVE  DISORDERS.  6i 


IT. 

Nutrition  being  less  a  function  than  the  fundamen- 
tal property  of  all  that  lives,  it  follows  that  the  tenden- 
cies and  feelings  connected  with  it  have  a  very  general 
character.  This  is  not  true  of  the  preservation  of  the 
species.  This  function,  connected  with  a  determinate 
part  of  the  organism,  reveals  itself  by  feelings  of  a  very 
precise  character.  Hence,  it  is  eminently  fitted  to 
verify  our  thesis.  For,  if  personality  is  a  compound, 
varying  with  its  constituent  elements,  a  change  in  the 
sexual  instincts  will  change  it,  a  perversion  will  per- 
vert it,  an  inversion  will  invert  it;  and  this  is  what 
happens. 

In  the  first  place,  let  us  recall  some  well-known 
facts,  the  obvious  conclusions  of  which  are  not  gen- 
erally drawn.  At  puberty,  a  new  group  of  sensations, 
and,  consequently,  of  emotions  and  ideas,  are  devel- 
oped. This  afflux  of  unaccustomed  psychic  states — 
stable,  because  their  cause  is  stable,  co-ordinate,  be- 
cause their  source  is  co-ordinate — tends  profoundly  to 
modify  the  constitution  of  the  ego.  It  feels  undecided, 
tortured  by  a  vague,  latent  discomfort,  the  cause  of 
which  is  unknown  ;  gradually  these  new  elements  of 
the  moral  life  are  assimilated  by  the  old  ego,  enter  into 
it,  become  a  part  of  it,  but  at  the  same  time  make  it 
different.  The  ego  is  changed  ;  a  partial  alteration  of 
the  personality  has  been  accomplished,  the  result  of 
which  has  been  to  constitute  a  new  type  of  character — 
the  sexual  character.  This  development  of  an  organ 
and  its  functions,  with  their  train  of  instincts,  images, 
sentiments,  and  ideas,  has  produced  in  the  neuter  per- 


62       THE  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY, 

sonality  of  the  child  a  differentiation,  has  made  of  it  a 
male  or  a  female,  in  the  complete  sense.  Up  to  this 
period  there  existed  simply  a  ground-plan,  by  virtue  of 
which,  however,  the  change  could  be  effected  without 
a  sudden  shock,  without  a  break  between  the  past  and 
the  present, without  a  complete  alteration  of  personality. 

If  we  pass  now  from  the  normal  development  to  the 
exceptions  and  the  morbid  cases,  we  find  certain  vari- 
ations or  transformations  of  the  personality  connected 
with  the  state  of  the  genital  organs. 

The  effect  of  castration  upon  animals  is  well  known. 
It  is  not  less  marked  in  man.  Apart  from  a  few  ex- 
ceptions (some  of  which  are  historical),  eunuchs  rep- 
resent a  deviation  from  the  psychic  t3^pe.  According 
to  Maudsley,  they  are  said  to  be  cowardly,  envious, 
liars,  utterly  deceitful,  destitute  of  social  and  moral 
feeling,  mutilated  in  mind  as  in  bod3^*  Whether  this 
moral  degradation  results  directly  from  castration,  as 
some  authors  maintain,  or  indirectly  from  a  dubious 
social  position,  matters  little  for  our  thesis  :  direct  or 
indirect,  the  cause  remains  the  same. 

In  hermaphrodites,  experience  corroborates  what 
might  have  been  predicted  a  priori.  With  the  ap- 
pearances of  one  sex  they  present  some  of  the  charac- 
teristics of  the  other  ;  but,  far  from  combining  both 
functions,  they  exhibit  only  incomplete  organs,  usually 
destitute  of  sexual  ability.  Their  moral  character  is 
sometimes  neuter,  sometimes  masculine,  and  some- 
times feminine.  Abundant  examples  of  this  are  found 
in  writers  who  have  studied  the  question. f  '*  Some- 
times the  hermaphrodite,  after  showing  a  lively  incli- 

♦  The  Physiology  of  Mind,  p.  372. 

+  For  the  facts,  see  Isid.  Geoffroy  Saint-Hilaire  :  Histoire  des  anomalies, 
V.  ii.  p.  65  et  seq.  Tardieu  and  Laugier,  Dictionnaire  de  medicine,  art.  "  Her- 
maphrodisme."  etc. 


AFFECTIVE  DISORDERS.  63 

nation  for  women,  exhibits,  upon  the  descent  of  the 
testicles,  completely  opposite  instincts."  In  a  recent 
case  observed  by  Dr.  Magitot,  an  hermaphrodite  wo- 
man evinced  alternately  very  pronounced  feminine  and 
masculine  tastes.  "In  general,  the  affective  faculties 
and  the  moral  dispositions  suffer  the  countereffect  of 
the  faulty  conformation  of  the  organs."  Still,  as  Tar- 
dieu  adds,  "it  is  only  fair  to  ascribe  much  of  this  al- 
teration of  character  to  the  influence  of  habits  and  oc- 
cupations which  the  mistake  made  as  to  their  real  sex 
has  forced  upon  the  individuals.  Some  males,  from 
the  first,  dressed,  educated,  employed,  and  even  mar- 
ried as  women,  retain  the  thoughts,  habits,  and  man- 
ners of  women.  Such  was  the  case  of  Maria  Arsano, 
who  died  at  the  age  of  eighty,  and  who  in  reality  was 
a  man,  but  whose  character  had  been  effeminised  by 
her  habits." 

It  is  not  my  purpose  here  to  review  the  perversions 
or  aberrations  of  the  sexual  instinct,*  each  of  which 
stamps  its  mark  upon  the  personality,  and  affects  it  little 
or  much,  transiently  or  permanently.  As  the  close  of 
these  partial  alterations,  we  have  the  total  transforma- 
tion, the  change  of  sex.  There  are  numerous  examples 
of  this  :  the  following  may  serve  as  a  type.  Lallemant 
relates  "the  fact  of  a  patient,  who  believed  himself  a 
woman,  and  used  to  write  letters  to  an  imaginary  lover. 
At  the  autopsy  it  was  discovered  that  hypertrophy 
with  induration  of  the  prostate  gland  and  impairment 
of  the  ejaculatory  ducts  had  taken  place."  It  is  prob- 
able that  in  many  cases  of  this  kind  perversion  or  abo- 
lition of  the  sexual  sensations  has  occurred. 


*  For  the  complete  exposition  of  this  question  see  the  article  of  Dr.  Gley 
"  Sur  les  aberrations  de  I'instinct  sexuel,"  in  the  Revue  philosophique  for 
January,  1884. 


64      THE  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

I  must,  however,  point  out  a  few  exceptions.  Sev- 
eral detailed  observations,  (they  may  be  found  in  Leu- 
ret,  '*  Fragments  psych.,"  p.  114  et  seqq.)  show  us 
individuals,  who  assume  the  carriage,  habits,  voice, 
and  when  they  can,  the  dress  of  the  sex  they  imag- 
ine themselves  to  belong  to,  yet  do  not  exhibit  any 
anatomical  or  physiological  anomaly  of  the  sexual  or- 
gans. In  such  cases  the  starting-point  of  the  meta- 
morphosis must  be  elsewhere.  This  can  only  be  in  the 
cerebro-spinal  organ.  In  fact,  it  is  to  be  noted,  that 
all  that  has  been  said  of  the  sexual  organ  as  making 
up  or  modif3ang  the  personality  must  not  be  understood 
simply  of  that  organ  itself  as  limited  to  its  anatomic 
conformation  ;  it  includes  also  its  connexions  with  the 
brain,  where  it  is  represented.  Physiologists  place  the 
genito-spinal  reflex  centre  in  the  lumbar  region  of  the 
cord.  From  this  centre  to  the  brain,  all  is  dark ;  for 
the  hypothesis  of  Gall,  who  makes  the  cerebellum  the 
seat  of  physical  love,  notwithstanding  a  few  favorable 
observations  of  Budge  and  of  Lussana,  has  not  been 
widely  accepted.  But  be  our  ignorance  on  this  point 
what  it  may,  plainly  the  sexual  impressions  must 
reach  the  brain,  for  the}^  are  felt,  and  there  are  centres 
there  whence  the  psychic  incitations  are  transmitted 
to  the  sexual  organs,  to  set  them  in  action.  These 
nerve-elements,  whatever  be  their  nature,  number,  or 
seat,  whether  localised  or  diffused,  are  the  cerebral, 
and  consequently  the  psychic,  representatives  of  the 
sexual  organ  ;  and  as  in  creating  one  particular  state 
of  consciousness,  they  usually  excite  others,  there 
must  needs  exist  an  association  between  this  group  of 
psycho-ph5^siological  states  and  a  certain  number  of 
others.  The  conclusion  to  be  drawn  from  the  above- 
cited  cases  is  that  a  cerebral  disturbance  of  unknown 


AFFECTIVE  DISORDERS.  65 

nature  is  produced,  (a  woman  believing  herself  a  man, 
a  man  believing  himself  a  woman,)  the  result  of  which 
is  a  fixed  and  erroneous  state  of  consciousness.  This 
fixed,  exclusively  predominant  state  thereupon  pro- 
duces almost  automatic  natural  associations,  which 
are,  as  it  were,  its  radiations  (feelings,  carriage,  lan- 
guage, dress  of  the  imaginary  sex)  :  it  tends  to  com- 
plete itself.  It  is  a  metamorphosis  which  proceeds 
from  above,  and  not  from  below.  We  have  here  an 
example  of  what  is  called  the  influence  of  the  mental 
upon  the  physical ;  and  we  shall  try  to  show  further 
on  that  the  ego  discussed  by  the  majority  of  psychol- 
ogists, (it  is  not  here  a  question  of  the  real  ego,)  is 
formed  by  an  analogous  process.  But  these  cases  be- 
long to  the  intellectual  deviations  of  the  personality,  of 
which  we  shall  speak  in  the  next  chapter. 

Before  quitting  this  subject,  I  should  like  to  notice 
a  few  facts  which  are  difficult  to  explain,  but  which  can- 
not be  seriously  advanced  against  us.  I  allude  to  the 
singular  phenomenon  called  ''opposite  sexuality,"  or 
''sexual  perversion,"  which  has  been  much  discussed 
of  late,  and  which  it  will  suffice  to  mention  in  a  few 
words.  Certain  patients  observed  by  Westphal,  Krafft- 
Ebing,  Charcot  and  Magnan,  Servaes,  Gock,*  etc., 
exhibit  a  congenital  inversion  of  the  sexual  instinct, 
whence  results,  notwithstanding  a  normal  physical 
constitution,  an  instinctive  and  violent  attraction  for 
persons  of  the  same  sex,  with  a  marked  repulsion  for 
the  opposite  sex;  briefly,  "a  woman  is  physically  a 
woman  and  psychically  a  man,  a  man  is  physically  a 
man  and  psychically  a  woman. "  Such  facts  are  in  com- 
plete disaccord  with  all  that  logic  and  experience  teach 

*  Charcot  and  Magnan,  Archives  de  Neurologie,  1882,  Nos.  7  and  12 ;  West- 
phal, Archiv fur  Psychiatric,  1870  and  1876;  Krafft-Ebing,  ibid.,  1877,  etc. 


66       THE  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

us.  The  physical  and  the  mental  contradict  each  other. 
Strictly  speaking,  those  who  make  of  the  ego  an  entity 
might  avail  themselves  of  these  anomalies,  and  as- 
sert that  they  prove  its  independence,  its  autono- 
mous existence.  But  that  would  be  a  great  illusion, 
for  their  reasoning  would  rest  upon  two  very  fragile 
foundations :  upon  facts  which  are  very  uncommon, 
and  upon  our  present  difficulty  in  explaining  them. 
Nobody  will  deny  that  the  cases  of  opposite  sexuality 
represent  an  infinitely  small  fraction  of  the  totality  of 
the  cases  furnished  by  experience.  By  their  rarity  they 
are  exceptions ;  by  their  nature,  a  psychological  mon- 
strosity. Still,  monstrosities  are  not  miracles,  and  we 
should  know  whence  they  come. 

We  might  venture  several  explanations,  which 
usually  means  that  none  is  competent.  I  shall  spare 
the  reader.  Psychology,  like  every  other  science, 
must  submit  to  provisory  ignorance  on  many  points, 
and  not  be  afraid  to  confess  it.  In  this  respect  it  dif- 
fers from  metaphysics,  which  undertakes  to  explain 
everything.  Scientists  who  have  studied  these  singu- 
lar creatures  from  the  point  of  view  of  medicine,  re- 
gard them  as  degenerated  beings.  What  we  should 
like  to  know  is,  why  this  degeneration  should  have 
taken  this  particular  form  and  not  another.  It  is  prob- 
able that  the  clearing  up  of  this  mystery  must  be  sought 
for  in  the  multiple  elements  of  heredity,  in  the  com- 
plicated play  of  the  conflicting  male  and  female  in- 
fluences ;  but  I  shall  leave  this  task  to  more  clear- 
sighted and  fortunate  individuals.  Setting  aside  the 
question  of  causes,  it  is  impossible  to  refuse  to  admit 
an  aberration  of  the  cerebral  mechanism,  as  in  the  cases 
of  Leuret  and  their  analogues.  However,  the  influence 
of  the  sexual  organs  upon  the  nature  and  formation  of 


AFFECTIVE  DISORDERS.  67 

character  is  so  little  contested  that  to  dwell  longer 
upon  the  subject  would  be  loss  of  time,  while  a  hypo- 
thetical explanation  of  opposite  sexuality  would  not  in 
the  least  advance  our  researches. 


III. 

The  instincts,  desires,  tendencies,  and  sentiments 
connected  with  the  preservation  of  the  individual  and 
of  the  species  have  their  perfectly  determinate  material 
conditions — the  first  in  the  totality  of  the  organic  life, 
the  second  in  a  particular  organ.  But  when  we  pass 
from  the  primitive  and  fundamental  forms  of  the  affec- 
tive life  to  those  that  are  of  secondary  formation,  born 
later  in  the  course  of  evolution  (social,  moral,  intellec- 
tual, aesthetic  tendencies),  besides  the  impossibility  of 
assigning  to  them  their  immediate  organic  bases — a 
fact  which  renders  our  path  uncertain — we  observe 
that  they  have  not  even  the  same  degree  of  generality. 
With  the  exception,  perhaps,  of  the  moral  and  social 
tendencies,  none  of  them  expresses  the  individual  in 
its  totality;  they  are  partial,  they  represent  only  a 
single  group  in  the  ensemble  of  its  tendencies.  Hence 
no  one  of  them  has  by  itself  the  power  of  producing  a 
metamorphosis  of  the  personality.  So  long  as  that 
habitude  which  we  call  the  feeling  of  the  body,  and 
that  other  habitude  which  is  memory,  do  not  enter  into 
play,  a  complete  transformation  does  not  take  place : 
the  individual  may  change,  but  it  cannot  become  an- 
other. 

Still,  these  variations,  even  though  partial,  have 
their  interest.  They  show  the  transition  from  the  nor- 
mal to  the  morbid  state.  In  studying  the  diseases  of 
the  will,  we  found  in  ordinary  life  many  prefigurements 


68       THE  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

of  the  gravest  forms.  Here,  likewise,  common  obser- 
vation shows  us  how  little  the  normal  ego  is  endowed 
with  cohesion  and  unity.  Leaving  apart  characters 
that  are  perfectly  consistent,  (in  a  rigorous  sense  of 
the  word  they  do  not  exist,)  there  are  in  every  one  of 
us  tendencies  of  all  sorts,  all  kinds  of  possible  contra- 
dictions, and  among  these  contradictions,  all  kinds  of 
intermediate  shades,  and  among  those  tendencies  all 
possible  combinations.  This  is  because  the  ego  is  not 
solely  a  memory,  a  storehouse  of  recollections  con- 
nected with  the  present,  but  an  aggregate  of  instincts, 
tendencies,  desires  which  are  simply  the  activity  of  its 
innate  and  acquired  constitution.  To  use  expressions 
in  vogue,  we  might  say  the  memory  is  the  static  ego, 
the  group  of  tendencies  the  dynamic  ego.  If,  instead 
of  being  guided  unconsciously  by  the  conception  of  an 
ego-entity, — a  prejudice  that  has  been  strengthened  in 
us  by  education  and  the  supposed  evidence  of  con- 
sciousness,— we  should  consent  to  take  it  as  it  is,  to- 
wit,  as  a  co-ordination  of  tendencies  and  psychic  states, 
the  proximate  cause  of  which  is  to  be  sought  in  the 
co-ordination  and  consensus  of  the  organism,  we  should 
no  longer  be  surprised  at  these  oscillations, — incessant 
in  flighty  characters,  but  rare  in  steady  ones, — which, 
for  a  long,  a  short,  or  even  an  almost  imperceptible 
space  of  time,  show  us  the  person  in  a  new  light.  An 
organic  state,  an  external  influence  strengthen  a  ten- 
dency; this  then  becomes  a  centre  of  attraction  toward 
which  converge  the  states  and  tendencies  that  are  di- 
rectly associated  with  it ;  thereupon  the  associations 
gradually  expand  :  the  centre  of  gravit}^  of  the  ego  is 
displaced,  and  the  personality  has  become  another. 
''Two  souls,"  said  Goethe,  *'  dwell  within  my  breast." 
Only  two  !    If   moralists,    poets,   novelists,   dramatists 


AFFECTIVE  DISORDERS,  69 

have  shown  us  to  satiety  these  two  egos  in  a  state  of 
conflict  within  the  same  ego,  common  experience  is 
still  richer;  it  shows  us  several,  each  excluding  the 
others,  as  it  advances  to  the  front.  This  may  be  less 
dramatic,  but  it  is  truer.  '^Our  ego  at  different  epochs 
is  very  different :  according  to  age,  the  various  duties 
and  events  of  life,  and  the  excitations  of  the  moment, 
certain  complexes  of  ideas,  at  a  given  moment  repre- 
senting the  ego,  are  more  strongly  developed  than  the 
others  and  take  the  first  place.  We  become  another 
and  are  yet  the  same.  My  ego  as  a  physician,  as  a 
scientist,  my  sensual  ego,  my  moral  ego,  etc.,  that  is, 
the  complexes  of  ideas,  inclinations,  and  directions  of 
the  will  designated  by  these  terms,  may  at  a  given  mo- 
m.ent  enter  into  mutual  combat  and  repel  each  other. 
The  consequence  of  this  state  of  things  would  be,  not 
only  inconsistency  and  division  of  thought  and  will, 
but  also  a  complete  absence  of  energy  for  each  of  these 
isolated  phases  of  the  ego,  if,  in  all  these  spheres  there 
was  not  a  more  or  less  clear  repetition  for  conscious- 
ness of  some  of  these  fundamental  directions."*  The 
orator,  master  of  his  words,  who  while  speaking  is  his 
own  critic,  the  actor  Vv^atchiDg  himself  play,  the  psy- 
chologist studying  himself,  are  additional  examples  of 
this  norm.al  division  of  the  ego. 

Between  these  momentary  and  partial  transforma- 
tions, whose  commonness  conceals  their  importance 
as  psychological  documents,  and  the  serious  states,  of 
which  we  shall  speak,  there  are  intermediate  varia- 
tions, m.ore  constant,  more  profound,  or  both.  The  dip- 
somaniac, for  example,  has  two  alternate  lives ;  in  the 

♦Griesinger,  TraitS  des  maladies  mentales,"  French  trans,  of  Doumic,  p. 
55.  See  also  the  excellent  study  by  M.  Paulhan  on  "The  variations  of  per- 
sonality in  the  normal  state,"  June,  i8ti2,  in  the  Revue philosophique. 


yo       THE  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

one  he  is  sober,  methodical,  industrious ;  in  the  other  he 
is  entirely  swayed  by  his  passion,  improvident,  disor- 
derly, dissipated.  Have  we  not  here,  as  it  were,  two 
incomplete  and  opposite  individuals  welded  together 
so  as  to  form  a  common  trunk  ?  The  same  is  true  of  per- 
sons subject  to  irresistible  impulses,  who  insist  that 
some  alien  power  impels  them  to  act  in  spite  of  them- 
selves. Let  us  remember  also  those  transformations  of 
character  that  are  accompanied  by  cutaneous  anaesthe- 
sia, and  which  have  been  described  by  several  alienists. 
One  of  the  most  curious  of  these  cases  was  observed 
by  Renaudin.  A  young  man  whose  conduct  had  al- 
ways been  exemplary  suddenly  abandons  himself  to 
tendencies  of  the  worst  kind.  In  his  mental  condition 
it  was  impossible  to  discover  any  symptom  of  evident 
alienation,  but  examination  showed  that  the  entire  sur- 
face of  his  skin  had  become  absolutely  insensible.  The 
cutaneous  anaesthesia  was  intermittent.  ''As  soon  as  it 
ceases,  the  inclinations  of  the  5^oung  man  are  entirely 
different ;  he  is  docile,  affectionate,  and  understands 
thoroughly  the  painful  character  of  his  condition. 
When  it  again  manifests  itself,  the  resistless  power  of 
the  worst  inclinations  is  its  immediate  consequence, 
and  we  have  proof  that  it  could  proceed  as  far  as  mur- 
der." Maudsley  reports  certain  analogous  cases  of  in- 
sanity in  children,  which  suggested  to  him  the  follow- 
ing reflexions:  "The  special  defective  sensibility  of 
skin  in  these  cases  is  full  of  instruction  in  relation  to  the 
profound  and  general  defect  or  perversion  of  the  sensi- 
bility or  receptive  capacity  of  the  whole  nervous  sys- 
tem which  is  shown  in  their  perverted  likings  and  dis- 
likes, in  their  inability  to  join  with  other  children  in 
play  or  work,  and  in  the  impossibility  to  modify  their 
characters  by  discipline  ;  they  cannot  feel  impressions 


AFFECTIVE  DISORDERS.  71 

as  they  naturally  should  feel  them  nor  adjust  them- 
selves to  their  surroundings,  with  which  they  are  in 
discord  ;  and  the  motor  outcomes  of  the  perverted  af- 
fections of  self  are  accordingly  of  a  meaningless  and 
destructive  character.  The  insensibility  of  skin  is  the 
outward  and  visible  sign  of  a  corresponding  inward 
and  invisible  defect,  as  it  notably  is  also  in  idiocy."  * 

We  revert,  inevitably,  to  the  organism.  But  this 
review  we  have  made  of  facts  of  every  kind,  monoton- 
ous as  it  may  seem,  shows  us  the  variations  of  person- 
ality in  all  its  aspects.  As  there  are  no  two  cases  iden- 
tical, each  case  presents  a  particular  decomposition  of 
the  ego.  The  last  cases  show  us  a  transformation  of 
character  without  lesion  of  memory.  As  we  progress 
in  our  review  of  the  facts,  one  conclusion  appears,  as 
it  were,  of  itself  ;  it  is  that  personality  results  fro7Ji  two 
fu7idamental factors,  the  constitution  of  the  body  with  the 
tendencies  and  sentiments  that  manifest  it,  a?id  the  fnemory. 

If  (as  above)  only  the  first  factor  is  modified,  a  mo- 
mentary dissociation  results,  followed  by  a  partial 
change  of  the  ego.  If  the  modification  is  so  serious 
that  the  organic  bases  of  memory  suffer  a  sort  of  paral- 
ysis, from  which  they  cannot  revive,  then  the  disinte- 
gration of  the  personality  is  complete :  there  is  no 
longer  a  past,  and  there  is  a  different  present.  Then 
a  new  ego  is  formed,  usually  unaware  of  the  former 
ego.  Of  these  we  have  several  examples,  so  well 
known,  that  I  shall  simply  mention  them  :  the  Amer- 
ican lady  of  Macnish,  the  case  of  Dr.  Azam  (Felida), 
and  the  case  of  Dr.  Dufay."}*  Owing  to  their  generality 

♦Maudsley,  Pathology  of  Mind,  p.  287;  Moreau  (de  Tours),  Psychologie 
morbide,  p.  313  ;  Rendu,  Des  anesthisies  spontanies,  pp.  60-67. 

tFor  complete  observations,  see  Taine,  De  V intelligence ,  v.  i,  p.  165  ;  Azam 
Revue  scientifique,  1876,  20th  May  and  i8th  September,  1877,  loth  November, 
1879,  8th  March  ;  and  Dufay  ibid.,  15th  July,  1876.     As  to  the  part  played  by 


72       THE  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

these  cases  do  not  come  under  any  special  division, 
and  we  have  no  reason  for  mentioning  them  here  rather 
than  elsewhere,  except  to  remark,  that  the  transition 
from  one  personality  to  another  is  ahvays  accompanied 
by  a  change  of  character,  undoubtedly  connected  with 
the  unknown  organic  change  which  dominates  the 
whole  situation.  This  change  is  distinctly  and  repeat- 
edly pointed  out  by  Dr.  Azam  :  his  patient  during  one 
period  is  gloomy,  cold,  reserved;  in  the  other  gay,  un- 
reserved, buoyant  to  the  verge  of  turbulence.  This 
change  is  still  greater  in  the  following  case,  which  I 
shall  report  more  fully,  because  it  is  recent  and  little 
known.* 

The  subject  is  a  young  man  of  seventeen  years, 
V  .  .  .  L  .  .  .,  affected  with  hysterical  epilepsy,  who 
entirely  lost  the  memory  of  one  j^ear  of  his  existence, 
and  during  the  period  of  forgetfulness  totally  changed 
his  character. 

Born  of  an  unmarried  mother,  who  was  '' addicted 
to  an  open  life  of  debauchery,  and  of  an  unknown  father, 
he  began  to  roam  and  beg  on  the  streets  as  soon  as  he 
could  walk.  Later  he  became  a  thief,  was  arrested, 
and  sent  to  the  reformatory  of  Saint- Urbain  where  he 
did  some  field-work."  One  day  being  occupied  in  a 
vineyard  he  happened  to  lay  his  hands  upon  a  ser- 
pent, hidden  in  a  fagot  of  twigs.  The  boy  was  ter- 
ribly frightened,  and  in  the  evening,  on  returning  to 
the  reformatory,  became  unconscious.  These  crises 
were  repeated  from  time  to  time,  his  legs  grew  weak, 
finally  a  paralysis  of  the  lower  limbs  set  in,  his  intel- 
lect remaining  unimpaired.      He  was  thereupon  trans- 

the  memory  in  these  pathological  cases  I  refer  the  reader  to  my  work  Les 
maladies  de  la  vihnoire,  p.  76  and  following. 

*This  observation  of  Dr.  Camuset  is  found  in  extenso  in  the  Annales  mi- 
dico-psychologiques,  January,  1882. 


AFFECTIVE  DISORDERS,  73 

ferred  to  the  asylum  of  Bonneval.  There  it  was  re- 
ported ''  that  the  patient  has  an  open  and  sympathetic 
expression,  that  his  character  is  amiable,  and  that  he 
shows  himself  grateful  for  the  care  that  is  bestowed 
upon  him.  He  tells  the  history  of  his  life  in  all  its 
minutest  details,  even  his  thefts  which  he  deplores,  of 
which  he  is  ashamed,  and  which  he  attributes  to  his 
forsaken  condition  and  his  comrades  who  led  him  into 
evil  ways.  He  regrets  very  much  what  has  happened, 
and  declares  that  in  the  future  he  will  be  more  honest. 
It  was  then  decided  to  teach  him  a  trade  compatible 
with  his  infirmity.  He  can  read  and  is  learning  to 
write.  He  is  taken  every  morning  to  the  tailors'  shop, 
where  he  is  placed  upon  a  table  and  assumes  naturally 
the  classical  position  owing  to  the  condition  of  his 
lower  limbs,  which  are  atrophied  and  contracted.  In 
two  months'  time  he  learned  to  sew  pretty  well.  He 
works  with  enthusiasm,  and  everybody  is  satisfied 
with  his  progress." 

At  this  stage  he  is  seized  with  an  attack  of  hystero- 
epilepsy,  which  after  fifty  hours  ends  in  a  tranquil 
sleep.     It  is  then  that  his  old  personality  reappears. 

"On  awakening,  V.  .  .  wants  to  get  up.  He  asks 
for  his  clothes,  and  is  able  to  dress  himself,  but  per- 
forms the  operation  in  a  very  bungling  manner;  he 
then  takes  a  few  steps  through  the  hall ;  his  paraplegia 
having  disappeared.  His  legs  totter  and  with  difficulty 
support  the  body  because  of  the  atrophy  of  the  mus- 
cles. .  .  .  When  once  dressed,  he  asks  to  go  with  his 
comrades  into  the  vineyards  to  work.  .  .  .  We  quickly 
perceive  that  our  subject  still  believes  himself  at  Saint- 
Urbain,  and  wishes  to  resume  his  habitual  occupations. 
In  fact,  he  has  no  recollection  of  his  crisis  and  recog- 
nises nobody,  the  physicians  and  attendants  no  more 


74      THE  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

than  his  companions  of  the  ward.  He  does  not  admit 
having  been  paralysed  and  accuses  those  about  him  of 
teasing  him.  We  thought  of  temporary  insanity,  which 
was  very  likely  after  so  severe  an  attack  of  hysteria, 
but  time  passes  and  still  his  memory  does  not  return. 
V .  .  .  remembers  very  distinctly  that  he  had  been  sent 
to  Saint-Urbain  ;  he  knows  that  *the  other  day*  he 
was  frightened  by  a  serpent ;  but  from  that  time  all  is 
oblivion.  He  remembers  nothing  more,  and  has  not 
even  the  feeling  of  the  time  elapsed. 

''It  was  thought  that  he  might  be  simulating,  as 
hysterical  patients  often  do,  and  we  employed  all  means 
to  make  V  .  .  .  contradict  himself,  but  without  success. 
Thus,  without  letting  him  know  where  he  is  going,  we 
have  him  taken  to  the  tailors'  workshop.  We  walk  by 
his  side,  and  take  care  not  to  influence  him  as  to  the 
direction  to  be  taken.  V .  .  .  does  not  know  whither 
he  is  going.  On  arriving  at  the  shop  he  has  every 
appearance  of  a  person  who  does  not  know  where  he 
is,  and  he  declares  that  he  has  never  been  there  be- 
fore. He  is  given  a  needle  and  asked  to  sew.  He  sets 
about  the  task  as  awkwardly  as  a  man  who  performs  a 
job  of  this  kind  for  the  first  time.  They  show  him 
some  clothes,  the  seams  of  which  had  been  sewn  by 
him,  during  the  time  he  was  paralysed.  He  laughs 
and  seems  to  doubt,  but  finally  inclines  to  our  observa- 
tions. After  a  month  of  experiment  and  trials  of  all 
kinds,  we  are  convinced  that  V  .  .  .  really  remembers 
nothing." 

One  of  the  most  interesting  points  of  this  case  is 
the  modification  that  the  character  of  the  patient  un- 
derwent, which  was  a  return  to  his  early  life  and  to 
his  hereditary  antecedents  :  ' '  He  is  no  longer  the  same 
subject ;  he  has  become  quarrelsome  and  is  a  glutton ; 


AFFECTIVE  DISORDERS.  75 

he  answers  impolitely.  Formerly  he  did  not  like  wine 
and  usually  gave  his  share  to  his  companions  ;  but  now 
he  steals  theirs.  When  they  tell  him  that  he  once 
committed  thefts,  and  caution  him  not  to  begin  again, 
he  becomes  arrogant  and  will  say,  '  if  he  did  steal,  he 
paid  for  it,  as  they  put  him  into  prison.'  They  employ 
him  in  the  garden.  One  day  he  escapes,  taking  with 
him  sixty  francs  and  the  effects  of  an  attendant  of  the 
infirmary.  He  is  recaptured  five  miles  from  Bonneval, 
at  the  moment  when,  after  selling  his  clothes  to  pur- 
chase others,  he  is  on  the  point  of  boarding  the  rail- 
way train  for  Paris.  He  resists  arrest,  and  strikes  and 
bites  at  the  wardens  sent  in  search  of  him.  Brought 
back  to  the  asylum,  he  becomes  furious,  cries,  rolls  on 
the  ground  ;  finally  it  is  necessary  to  confine  him  in  a 
solitary  cell." 

Dismissed  from  the  asylum,  after  many  peregrina- 
tions he  is  taken  to  Bicetre,  escapes,  and  enlists  in  the 
Marine  Corps  at  Rochefort.  Convicted  of  stealing,  he 
is  confided,  at  the  end  of  a  violent  attack  of  hystero- 
epilepsy,  to  the  care  of  Messrs.  Bourru  and  Burot, 
who  have  studied  him  with  great  care.  With  the  help 
of  physical  methods  of  transference  (steel,  soft  iron, 
magnet,  electricity),  they  obtained  in  their  subject  the 
six  following  states  :  * 

First  state.  Hemiplegia  and  hemiancBsthesia  of  the 
right  side.      Ordinary  state  of  the  subject. 

<'V.  .  .  is  talkative,  violent,  and  arrogant  in  look 
and  manner  ;  his  language  is  correct  but  rude  ;  he  ad- 
dresses every  one  in  the  second  person  singular,  and 
gives  to  each  a  disrespectful  surname.  He  smokes 
from  morning  till  night,  and  besieges  every  one  with 

*For  the  full  account  of  this  case  see  Bourru  and  Burot,  Variations  de  la 
personnaliti,  1888. 


76      THE  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

his  demands  for  tobacco,  etc.  Still,  he  is  intelligent. 
He  keeps  himself  an  courant  with  all  the  events  of  the 
day,  great  and  small,  affects  the  most  anti-religious 
views  in  religion,  and  the  most  ultra-radical  opinions 
in  politics.  Incapable  of  discipline,  he  wishes  to  slay 
all  his  superiors,  or  any  one  even  who  would  exact 
from  him  a  mark  of  respect.  His  speech  is  embar- 
rassed ;  his  defective  pronunciation  permits  only  the 
endings  of  his  vv'ords  to  be  heard.  He  can  read,  but 
this  vice  of  pronunciation  renders  his  reading  aloud 
unintelligible.  He  cannot  write,  his  right  hand  being 
paralysed.  His  memory,  very  precise  for  the  slightest 
details,  present  or  recent,  (he  recites  whole  columns 
from  the  newspapers,)  is  very  limited  in  point  of  time. 
It  is  impossible  for  him  to  carry  back  his  memory  be- 
yond his  present  sojourn  in  Rochefort  and  the  last 
part  of  his  stay  at  Bicetre  in  the  service  of  M.  Voisin. 
Nevertheless,  he  has  preserved  the  memory  of  the 
second  part  of  his  stay  at  Bonneval,  when  he  worked 
in  the  garden.  Between  Bonneval  and  Bicetre  a  great 
gap  yawns  in  his  memory.  Beyond  this,  his  birth,  his 
childhood,  his  sojourn  at  Saint-Urbain,  the  trade  of 
tailoring,  which  he  learned  upon  his  arrival  at  Bonne- 
val, are  a  total  blank  to  him. 

Second  state.  He?niplegia  of  the  left  side  {face  and 
Iwibs')  with  heniiancBsthesia.  This  state  was  obtained  by 
the  application  of  steel  to  the  right  arm. 

''On  waking,  V.  .  .  is  at  Bicetre  (ward  Cabanis, 
No.  ii)  the  second  of  Januar}^  1884;  age,  twenty- 
one  ;  saw  M.  Voisin  yesterday.  He  is  reserved  in  his 
bearing  ;  his  expression  is  gentle  ;  his  language  is  cor- 
rect and  respectful ;  he  now  addresses  no  one  in  the 
second  person  singular,  but  calls  each  of  us  '  Mon- 
sieur.'    He  smokes,   but  not  passionately.     He  has 


AFFECTIVE  DISORDERS.  77 

no  opinions  in  politics  or  in  religion  ;  these  questions, 
he  seems  to  say,  do  not  concern  an  ignorant  man  like 
him.  He  shows  himself  respectful  and  orderly.  His 
speech  is  easy  and  his  pronunciation  remarkably  clear. 
He  reads  perfectly  well,  and  writes  a  tolerable  hand. 

"He  knows  nothing  whatever  of  the  events  that 
have  taken  place  since  the  second  of  January,  1884; 
he  does  not  know  where  he  is,  nor  any  of  the  persons 
who  surround  him.  He  never  came  to  Rochefort.  He 
never  heard  of  the  Marine  Corps  or  of  the  war  with 
Tonquin. 

''In  evoking  his  prior  memories  he  recounts  that 
before  entering  Bicetre  he  had  stayed  for  a  while  at 
Sainte-Anne ;  beyond  that  point,  in  his  life,  no  memory 
subsists." 

TJiird  state.  He7niplegia  of  the  left  side  {the  limbs 
alone')  with  general  hemiancesthesia.  This  state  was  ob- 
tained by  applying  a  magnet  to  the  right  arm.  The  pa- 
tient awakes  at  the  asylum  of  Saint-Georges  de  Bourg, 
August,  1882  ;  he  is  nineteen  years  old.  France  is  at 
war  with  Tunis.  M.  Gr^vy  is  President  of  the  Republic; 
Leo  XHI.  is  Pope.  His  character,  his  affective  facul- 
ties, his  language,  his  physiognomy,  his  tastes  are  like 
those  of  the  second  state.  As  to  his  memory,  he  is 
limited  to  a  prior  epoch.  He  comes  from  Chartres  to 
his  mother,  whence  he  has  been  sent  to  Macon  with  a 
large  landed  proprietor,  where  he  was  put  to  work  in 
the  vineyards.  Having  been  taken  sick  several  times 
he  was  cared  for  in  the  hospital  of  Macon,  then  at  the 
as3dum  of  Bourg  where  he  is  at  present.  All  that  pre- 
cedes, all  that  follows,  this  short  period  of  his  life  is 
totally  foreign  to  him." 

Fourth  state.  Paraplegia.  Obtained  by  the  applica- 
tion of  the  magnet  to  the  nape  of  the  neck. 


78      THE  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

''He  has  just  seen  several  persons  of  the  asylum  of 
Bonneval.  He  is  decorous,  timid,  even  sad.  His  pro- 
nunciation is  distinct,  but  his  language  is  incorrect, 
impersonal,  childish.  He  has  forgotten  how  to  read 
and  write.  He  spells  capital  letters.  His  intelligence 
is  very  obtuse  ;  his  confused  memory  knows  nothing 
of  the  events  or  of  the  personages  of  that  epoch.  He 
knows  only  two  places  ;  Bonneval,  where  he  believes 
he  now  is,  and  Saint-Urbain  whence  he  has  come, 
where  he  was,  he  says,  paralysed,  stricken  down.  The 
whole  prior  part  of  his  life,  from  his  birth  to  the  acci- 
dent with  the  viper  which  brought  on  his  malady,  all 
that  followed  the  attack  and  the  spontaneous  altera- 
tion 'Of  his  condition  at  Bonneval,  are  absolutely  un- 
known to  him.  He  does  not  recognise  the  place  he  is 
in,  nor  has  he  ever  seen  us  who  are  about  him.  His 
ordinary  occupation  is  work  in  the  tailors'  shop.  He 
sews  like  one  long  in  the  business." 

Fifth  state.  Neither  paralysis  nor  ancesthesia.  Ob- 
tained by  statical  electricity  or  by  the  application  of  the 
magnet  to  the  front  part  of  the  head. 

''He  regains  consciousness  at  Saint-Urbain  in  1877; 
he  is  fourteen  years  old.  Marshall  McMahon  is  Pres- 
ident of  the  Repubhc  ;  Pius  IX.  is  Pope.  Timid  as  a 
child,  his  expression,  language,  and  attitude  accord 
perfectly.  He  can  read  perfectly  well  and  writes  tol- 
erably. He  knows  his  whole  childhood,  the  bad  treat- 
ment he  received  at  Luysant,  etc. 

"He  remembers  having  been  arrested  and  con- 
demned to  imprisonment  in  a  house  of  correction.  He  is 
at  the  reformatory  directed  by  M.  Pasquier.  He  learns 
to  read  at  the  school  of  Mile.  Breuille,  the  instructress 
at  Saint-Urbain.  He  is  employed  in  agricultural  work. 
His  memory  is  arrested  exactly  at  the  accident  of  the 


AFFECTIVE  DISORDERS.  79 

viper,  the  mention  of  which  brings  on  a  terrible  crisis 
of  hystero-epilepsy. " 

Sixth  state.  Neither  paralysis  nor  ancesthesia.  Ob- 
tained dy  the  application  of  soft  iron  to  the  right  thigh. 

*'  He  comes  to  consciousness  on  the  sixth  of  March, 
1885  ;  is  twenty- two  years  of  age  ;  he  knows  the  events 
of  the  times  and  personages  in  power;  but  Victor 
Hugo,  the  great  poet  and  senator,  is  still  living.  He 
is  no  longer  the  timid  child  of  a  moment  ago.  He  is 
a  proper  young  man,  neither  pusillanimous  nor  arro- 
gant ;  he  is  a  soldier  of  the  Marine  Corps.  His  lan- 
guage is  correct ;  his  pronunciation  is  distinct.  He 
reads  very  well  and  writes  passably.  His  memory  em- 
braces his  whole  life  with  the  exception  of  one  epoch, 
that  during  which  he  was  afflicted  with  paraplegia  at 
Saint-Urbain  and  Bonneval.  Also  he  does  not  remem- 
ber having  been  a  tailor  and  does  not  know  how  to  sew. 

"These,  then,  are  the  six  different  states  of  con- 
sciousness, the  ensemble  of  which  embraces  the  whole 
life  of  the  subject.  They  were  all  obtained  by  physical 
agents  concordantly  with  the  manifestation  of  sensi- 
bility and  motility,  although  the  experimenter  in  act- 
ing on  the  somatic  state  could  obtain  at  his  pleasure 
any  known  state  of  consciousness,  complete  for  the 
epoch  which  it  embraced,  that  is  to  say,  with  its  lim- 
ited memory  of  time,  places,  persons,  arts  acquired, 
automatic  movements  learned  (writing,  tailoring),  with 
their  appropriate  sentiments  and  expression  by  lan- 
guage, gesture,  and  mien.  The  concordance  is  per- 
fect. 

''It  remained  to  make  the  complementary  proof  :  to 
act  directly  on  the  states  of  consciousness  and  to  dis- 
cover whether  the  somatic  state  was  transformed  in  ac- 
cordance with  that. 


8o       THE  DISEASES  OE  PERSONALITY. 

"To  act  on  the  psychic  state  we  have  no  other 
means  except  suggestion  in  somnambulism.  We  make, 
therefore,  the  following  suggestion:  *V,  .  .,  you  are 
to  wake  up  at  Bicetre,  ward  Cabanis.'  V.  .  .  obeys. 
On  awaking  from  provoked  somnambulism  he  believes 
it  is  the  second  of  January,  1884 ;  his  intelligence  and 
affective  faculties  are  exactly  what  we  have  seen  de- 
scribed in  the  second  state.  At  the  same  time  he  is 
afflicted  with  hemiplegia  and  hemianaesthesia  of  the 
left  side  ;  the  force  exerted  upon  the  dynamometer, 
the  hystero-genic  zone,  all  is  transferred  as  in  the  sec- 
ond state. 

'■'■  In  another  suggestion  we  command  him  to  awake 
at  Bonneval  when  he  was  a  tailor.  The  psychic  state 
obtained  is  similar  to  that  described  in  the  fourth  state, 
and  simultaneously  with  it  the  paraplegia  appeared 
with  contracture  and  insensibility  of  the  lower  parts  of 
the  body." 

Messrs.  Bourru  and  Burot  conclude  as  follows : 

<'(i)  In  acting  on  the  somatic  state  by  physical 
means,  the  experimenter  places  the  subject  in  the  con- 
cordant state  of  consciousness. 

"(2)  In  acting  on  the  psychic  state  the  experi- 
menter renders  the  somatic  state  concordant." 

Our  conscious  personality — more  clearly,  the  con- 
sciousness which  each  one  of  us  has  of  his  present 
state  as  connected  with  prior  states — can  never  be 
more  than  a  feeble  portion  of  our  total  personality, 
which  remains  buried  deep  within  us.  In  the  normal 
state  the  connexion  between  the  two  is  sufficient  and 
coherent.  We  are  for  ourselves  and  for  others  a  liv- 
ing history,  without  great  gaps.  But  if  in  that  uncon- 
scious (physiological)  substratum  whence  all  emerges, 
unusually  large  groups  remain  inactive,  then  the  ego 


AFFECTIVE  DISORDERS.  8i 

can  no  longer  appear  to  itself  as  concordant  with  its 
true  history.  From  the  pathological  state  to  the  nor- 
mal state  there  is  no  difference  except  that  of  greater 
and  less.  Consciousness  reveals  to  us  our  ego  at  each 
instant  only  under  one  aspect  of  several  possible  ones. 

IV. 

Although  we  have  not  yet  studied  the  anomalies  of 
personality  in  all  their  forms,  it  will  not  be  out  of  place 
here  to  essay  a  few  conclusions,  at  least  partial  and 
provisory,  which  will  diminish  the  obscurity  of  the 
subject.  In  so  doing,  I  shall,  however,  confine  my- 
self to  a  single  point — namely,  to  cases  of  false  person- 
ality reducible  to  a  fixed  idea,  to  a  dominant  idea, 
toward  which  a  whole  group  of  concordant  ideas  con- 
verges, all  others  being  eliminated,  practically  anni- 
hilated. Such  are  those  who  believe  themselves  God, 
pope,  or  emperor,  and  speak  and  act  accordingly.  The 
study  of  the  intellectual  conditions  of  personality  has 
in  store  for  us  a  large  number  of  examples  of  this  kind 
(as  hypnotised  subjects  upon  whom  a  personage  or  role 
is  imposed):  but  the  cases  that  we  already  know  are 
sufficient  to  justify  our  asking  what  they  teach. 

At  first  sight,  these  cases  are  quite  simple  as  re- 
gards mechanism  of  formation.  The  first  origin  is  ob- 
scure :  Why  is  this  particular  idea  produced  and  not 
some  other?  Usually  we  know  nothing  of  this;  but 
the  morbid  conception,  once  born,  grows  and  increases, 
until  its  climax  is  reached  by  the  simple  automatism 
of  association.  I  need  not  dw^ell  upon  this  point, 
longer  than  to  show  that  these  pathological  cases  ex- 
plain for  us  an  illusion,  into  which  the  psychology 
based  wholly  upon  internal  observation  has  almost  in- 


82       THE  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY, 

variably  fallen,  and  which  may  be  stated  thus  :  the 
substitution  for  the  real  ego  of  a  factitious  ego,  much 
more  simple. 

To  lay  hold  of  the  real  concrete  personality,  and 
not  an  abstraction  put  in  its  place,  the  right  course  is 
not  to  retreat  within  consciousness,  with  closed  eyes, 
and  obstinately  to  interrogate  that  for  our  knowledge ; 
but  to  open  our  eyes  and  observe.  The  child,  the  peas- 
ant, the  workingman,  the  millions  of  people  that  walk 
in  the  streets  and  fields,  who  never  in  their  lives  have 
heard  of  Fichte,  or  of  Maine  de  Biran,  who  never  have 
read  dissertations  upon  the  ego  and  the  non-ego,  or 
even  a  line  of  psychology — one  and  all  of  them  have 
their  distinct  personality  and  at  each  instant  instinc- 
tively affirm  it.  Ever  since  that  long-forgotten  epoch 
when  their  ego  was  constituted,  that  is,  since  their  ego 
was  formed  as  a  coherent  group  in  the  midst  of  the 
processes  that  assailed  it, — that  group  has  constantly 
maintained  itself,  though  constantly  changing.  It  is 
composed,  in  great  part,  of  the  states  and  actions, 
almost  automatic,  that  constitute  in  each  of  us  the 
feeling  of  the  body  and  the  routine  of  life,  and  that 
serve  as  a  support  for  all  the  rest,  but  of  which  any 
alteration,  even  if  short  and  partial,  is  immediately 
felt.  In  part  also  it  is  composed  of  a  group  of  sensa- 
tions, images,  and  ideas  representing  the  habitual  me- 
dium in  which  we  live  and  move,  together  with  the 
memories  that  are  connected  with  them.  All  this  rep- 
resents organised  states,  solidly  connected,  mutually 
awakening  one  another,  forming  a  body.  Every  mo- 
ment we  affirm  the  fact,  without  seeking  its  cause. 
Everything  new  or  unusual,  every  change  in  the  state 
of  the  body  or  its  environment,  is  adopted  unhesitat- 
ingly, and  classed  by  an  instinctive  act,  either  as  part 


AFFECTIVE  DISORDERS,  83 

of  the  personality  or  as  foreign  to  it.  This  operation 
is  performed  every  moment,  not  by  a  clear  and  explicit 
judgment,  but  by  an  unconscious  and  far  profounder 
logic.  If  this  natural,  spontaneous,  and  real  form  of 
personality  had  to  be  denoted  by  a  single  word,  I 
should  call  it  2.  habit,  and  it  cannot  be  aught  else,  being, 
as  we  maintain,  onl}^  the  expression  of  an  organism. 
If  the  reader  instead  of  observing  himself  will  proceed 
objectively,  that  is,  observe  and  interpret  by  the  aid 
of  the  data  of  his  own  consciousness  the  condition  of 
those  who  have  never  reflected  on  their  personality, 
(and  this  is  the  great  majority  of  the  human  species,) 
he  will  find  that  the  preceding  thesis  is  exact,  and  that 
the  real  personality  affirms  itself  not  by  reflexion  but 
by  acts. 

Let  us  now  look  at  factitious,  or  artificial,  person- 
ality. When  the  psychologist  attempts  by  internal 
observation  to  catch  himself,  as  he  calls  it,  he  attempts 
an  impossibility.  At  the  instant  he  sets  about  this 
task,  either  he  will  adhere  to  the  present,  which  will 
hardly  advance  him  ;  or  extending  his  reflexion  over 
the  past,  he  will  affirm  himself  to  be  the  same  as  he 
was  one  year  or  ten  years  ago  ;  in  either  case  he  only 
expresses  in  a  more  learned  and  laborious  way  what 
every  peasant  knows  as  well  as  he.  By  inward  obser- 
vation he  can  only  apprehend  passing  phenomena  ; 
and  I  am  not  aware  that  any  reply  has  been  given  to 
the  following  just  remarks  of  Hume  :  *'For  my  part, 
when  I  enter  most  intimately  into  what  I  call  myself, 
I  always  stumble  on  some  particular  perception  *  or 
other  of  heat  or  cold,  light  or  shade,  love  or  hatred, 
pain  or  pleasure.   I  never  can  catch  myself  at  any  time 

*  In  Hume's  language,  "  perception  "  corresponds  about  to  what  we  now 
call  "state  of  consciousness." 


84      THE  DISEASES  OF  PERSONAL] I'V. 

without  a  perception,  and  never  can  observe  anything 
but  the  perception.  If  any  one,  upon  serious  and  un- 
prejudiced reflexion,  thinks  he  has  a  different  notion 
of  himself,  I  must  confess  I  can  reason  no  longer  with 
him.  All  I  can  allow  him  is,  that  he  may  be  in  the 
right  as  well  as  I,  and  that  we  are  essentially  different 
in  this  particular.  He  may,  perhaps,  perceive  some- 
thing simple  and  continued,  which  he  calls  himself, 
though  I  am  certain  there  is  no  such  principle  in  me."  * 
Since  Hume,  it  has  been  said  :  "By  effort  and  resist- 
ance we  feel  ourselves  causes."  This  is  very  good  ; 
and  all  schools  more  or  less  agree,  that  through  this 
the  ego  is  distinguished  from  the  non-ego  ;  but  this 
feeling  of  effort  remains  none  the  less  a  simple  state  of 
consciousness  like  the  others,  the  feeling  of  muscular 
energy  employed  to  produce  some  effect. 

To  seek  by  analysis  to  lay  hold  of  a  synthetic  whole 
like  the  personality,  or  by  a  mere  intuition  of  con- 
sciousness, which  lasts  hardly  a  few  seconds,  to  com- 
pass such  a  complex  structure  as  the  ego,  is  to  at- 
tempt a  problem,  of  which  the  data  are  contradictory. 
Accordingly,  psychologists  have  adopted  a  different 
course.  They  have  considered  the  states  of  conscious- 
ness as  accessories,  and  the  bond  which  unites  them 
as  the  essential  element ;  and  it  is  this  mysterious  tni- 
derlying  so7nethi?ig  that,  under  the  names  of  unity,  iden- 
tity, and  continuity,  has  become  the  true  ego.  It  is 
plain,  however,  that  we  have  nothing  here  but  an  ab- 
straction, or  more  precisely,  a  scheme.  For  the  real 
personality  is  substituted  the  idea  of  the  personality, 
which  is  quite  another  thing.  This  idea  of  the  per- 
sonality resembles  all  general  terms  formed  in  the  same 
way  (sensibility,  will,  etc.)  ;  but  it  no  more  resembles 

*  Philosophical  Works,  vol,  i.  p.  312. 


AFFECTIVE  DISORDERS.  85 

the  real  personality  than  the  plan  of  a  city  resembles 
the  city.  And  as  in  cases  of  aberration  of  personality, 
which  led  us  to  our  present  remarks,  a  single  idea  is 
substituted  for  a  complexus,  constituting  an  imaginary 
and  diminished  personality  ;  so  here  by  the  psychol- 
ogists a  scheme  of  the  personality  is  substituted  for  the 
concrete  personality,  and  on  this  framework,  almost  to- 
tally devoid  of  contents,  they  reason,  induce,  deduce, 
and  dogmatise.  It  is  plain,  moreover,  that  this  com- 
parison is  made  only  mutatis  mutandis  and  with  many 
restrictions,  which  the  reader  will  discover  for  himself. 
Many  other  observations  might  be  made,  but  my  work 
here  is  not  that  of  criticism. 

In  fine,  to  reflect  upon  the  ego,  is  to  assume  an  ar- 
tificial attitude,  which  changes  the  nature  of  the  ego  ; 
it  is  to  substitute  an  abstract  representation  for  a  real- 
ity. The  true  ego  is  that  which  feels,  thinks,  acts,  with- 
out exposing  itself  to  its  own  view ;  for  by  nature  and 
by  definition  it  is  a  subject ;  and  to  become  an  object, 
it  must  undergo  a  reduction,  a  kind  of  adaptation  to 
the  optics  of  the  mind  which  transform  and  mutilate  it. 

Hitherto  we  have  treated  the  question  only  from  its 
negative  side.  To  what  positive  hypothesis  of  the  na- 
ture of  the  personality  are  we  led  by  morbid  cases? 
First,  let  us  eliminate  the  hypothesis  of  a  transcenden- 
tal entity,  which  is  incompatible  with  pathology,  and 
which,  besides,  explains  nothing.  Let  us  set  aside, 
also,  the  hypothesis  which  makes  of  the  ego  <'a  bundle 
of  sensations"  or  states  of  consciousness,  as  is  fre- 
quently repeated  after  Hume.  This  is  to  abide  by 
appearances,  to  take  a  group  of  signs  for  a  thing,  or, 
more  precisely,  to  take  effects  for  their  cause.  Further- 
more, if,  as  we  contend,  consciousness  is  simply  an  in- 
dicative phenomenon,  it  cannot  be  a  constitutive  state. 


86      THE  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY, 

We  must  penetrate  still  further,  to  that  consensus 
of  the  organism  of  which  the  conscious  ego  is  only  the 
psychological  expression.  Has  this  hypothesis  more 
solidity  than  the  other  two?  Objectively  and  subject- 
ively, the  characteristic  trait  of  personality  is  that  con- 
tinuity in  time,  that  permanence,  which  we  call  iden- 
tity. This  has  been  denied  to  the  organism,  upon  the 
strength  of  arguments  too  well  known  to  need  repeti- 
tion here ;  but  it  is  strange  that  it  should  not  have  been 
perceived,  that  all  arguments  pleaded  in  favor  of  a 
transcendental  principle  are  really  applicable  to  the 
organism,  and  that  all  reasons  that  can  be  adduced 
against  the  organism  are  applicable  to  a  transcendental 
principle.  The  remark  that  every  superior  organism 
is  single  in  its  complexity  is  as  old,  at  least,  as  the 
Hippocratic  writings,  and  since  Bichat  no  one  attrib- 
utes this  unity  to  a  mysterious  vital  principle ;  but 
some  people  have  made  much  ado  about  this  vortex  or 
continuous  molecular  renovation  which  constitutes  life, 
and  ask,  ''Where  is  the  identity?"  Now,  the  fact  is 
everybody  believes  in  this  identity  of  the  organism, 
and  attests  it.  Identity  is  not  immobility.  If,  as  some 
scientists  think,  life  resides  less  in  the  chemical  sub- 
stance of  the  protoplasm  than  in  the  movements  with 
which  the  particles  of  this  substance  are  animated,  it 
would  be  a  ''combination  of  movements"  or  a  "form 
of  movement,"  and  this  continuous  molecular  renova- 
tion would  be  itself  subordinated  to  conditions  more 
profound.  Without  dwelling  upon  the  subject,  it  must 
be  evident  to  any  unprejudiced  mind  that  the  organism 
has  its  identity.  And  from  this  point,  what  simpler  or 
more  natural  hypothesis  than  that  of  perceiving  in  con- 
scious identity  the  internal  manifestation  of  the  external 
identity  which  is  in  the  organism  ?   "If  any  one  chooses 


AFFECTIVE  DISORDERS.  87 

to  assure  me  that  not  a  single  particle  of  my  body  is 
what  it  was  thirty  years  ago,  and  that  its  form  has  en- 
tirely changed  since  then  ;  that  it  is  absurd,  therefore, 
to  speak  of  its  identity;  and  that  it  is  absolutely  neces- 
sary to  suppose  it  to  be  inhabited  by  an  immaterial 
entity  which  holds  fast  the  personal  identity  amidst 
the  shifting  changes  and  chances  of  structure  : — I  an- 
swer him  that  other  people  who  have  known  me  from 
my  youth  upwards,  but  have  not  my  self-conscious 
certainty  of  identity,  are,  nevertheless,  as  much  con- 
vinced of  it  as  I  am,  and  would  be  equally  sure  of  it 
even  if,  deeming  me  the  greatest  liar  in  the  world, 
they  did  not  believe  a  word  of  my  subjective  testi- 
mony; that  they  are  equally  convinced  of  the  personal 
identity  of  their  dogs  and  horses,  whose  self-conscious 
testimony  goes  for  nothing  in  the  matter;  and  lastly, 
that  admitting  an  immaterial  substance  in  me,  it  must 
be  admitted  to  have  gone  through  so  many  changes, 
that  I  am  not  sure  the  least  immaterial  particle  of  it  is 
what  it  was  thirty  years  ago  ;  that  with  the  best  inten- 
tion in  the  world,  therefore,  I  see  not  the  least  need  of, 
nor  get  the  least  benefit  from,  the  assumed  and  seem- 
ingly superfluous  entity."* 

Upon  this  physical  basis  of  the  organism  rests, 
according  to  our  thesis,  what  is  called  the  unity  of  the 
ego,  or  that  solidarity  which  connects  the  states  of 
consciousness.  The  unity  of  the  ego  is  that  of  a  com- 
plexus,  and  it  is  only  by  a  metaphysical  illusion  that 
the  ideal  and  fictitious  unity  of  the  mathematical  point 
can  be  attributed  to  it.  It  does  not  consist  in  the  act 
of  a  supposed  simple  ''essence,"  but  in  a  co-ordination 
of  the  nerve-centres,  which  themselves  represent  a  co- 
ordination of  the  functions  of  the  organism.    Undoubt- 

♦Maudsley,  Body  and  Will,  p.  -j-]. 


88       THE  DISEASES  OE  PERSONALITY. 

edly,  here,  we  are  in  the  province  of  hypotheses,  but 
they  are  at  least  not  of  a  supernatural  character. 

Take  man  in  the  fcetal  state,  before  the  birth  of  the 
psychic  life  :  leave  aside  the  hereditary  dispositions 
already  inscribed  in  him  which  will  not  enter  into  play 
until  later.  At  some  period  of  the  fcetal  state,  at  least 
during  the  last  few  weeks  of  it,  some  kind  of  sense  of 
the  body  will  be  produced,  if  only  consisting  of  a 
vague  feeling  of  well-being  or  discomfort.  Confused 
as  we  may  suppose  it  to  be,  still  it  implies  certain  modi- 
fications of  the  nerve-centres,  as  much  as  their  rudi- 
mentary state  admits.  When  to  these  simple,  vital,  or- 
ganic sensations  are  added  subsequently  sensations 
from  external  sources  (objective  or  not),  these  also 
necessarily  produce  modifications  in  the  nerve-centres. 
But  they  are  not  inscribed  upon  a  tabula  rasa  ;  the  web 
of  the  psychic  life  has  already  been  woven,  and  this 
web  is  the  general  sensibility,  the  vital  feeling,  which, 
vague  as  it  may  be  at  this  period,  after  all  constitutes 
almost  the  whole  of  consciousness.  The  bond  which 
connects  together  the  states  of  consciousness  here  re- 
veals its  origin.  The  first  sensation  (supposing  there 
could  be  such  in  the  isolated  state)  does  not  come  un- 
expectedly, like  an  aerolite  in  a  desert ;  at  its  first  en- 
trance it  is  connected  with  others,  with  those  states  that 
constitute  the  sense  of  the  body,  and  which  are  simply 
the  psychic  expression  of  the  organism.  Translated 
into  physiological  terms,  this  means  that  the  modifica- 
tions of  the  nervous  system  which  represent  materially 
the  sensations  and  their  resultant  desires  (the  first  ele- 
ments of  the  high  psychic  life)  associate  themselves 
with  previous  modifixcations  which  are  the  material 
representatives  of  the  vital  and  organic  sensations  ;  by 
which  means  relations  are  established  between  these 


AFFECTIVE  DISORDERS.  89 

nervous  elements  ;  so  that  from  the  very  outset  th^ 
complex  unity  of  the  ego  has  its  conditions  of  existence 
in  this  general  consciousness  of  the  organism,  which, 
though  so  frequently  overlooked,  serves  as  the  support 
of  all  the  rest.  Thus,  finally,  upon  the  unity  of  the  or- 
ganism everything  depends,  and  when  the  psychic  life, 
having  passed  from  the  embryonic  state,  is  formed,  the 
mind  may  be  compared  to  a  gorgeous  piece  of  tapestry, 
in  which  the  warp  has  completely  disappeared,  here  be- 
neath a  faint  design,  there  beneath  a  thick  embroidery 
in  high  relief ;  the  psychologist  who  restricts  himself 
to  internal  observation,  sees  only  the  patterns  and  em- 
broidery and  is  lost  in  conjectures  and  guesses  as  to 
what  lies  hidden  beneath;  if  he  would  consent  to 
change  his  position  or  to  look  at  the  tapestry  from 
behind,  he  would  save  himself  many  useless  induc- 
tions, and  considerably  increase  his  knowledge. 

*  * 

We  might  reach  the  same  thesis  under  the  form  of 

a  criticism  of  Hume.  The  ego  is  not,  as  he  maintained, 
a  mere  bundle  of  perceptions.  Without  recourse  to 
the  teachings  of  physiology  but  confining  ourselves 
wholly  to  ideological  analysis,  a  serious  omission  is 
^'noticeable  here — that  of  the  relatioris  between  the 
primitive  states.  A  relation  is  an  element  of  a  vague 
nature,  difficult  to  determine,  because  it  does  not  exist 
by  itself.  Still,  it  is  something  more  than  and  different 
from  the  two  states  by  which  it  is  limited.  In  Herbert 
Spencer's  '^  Principles  of  Psychology"  there  is  an  in- 
genious study  (too  little  noticed)  of  these  elements  of 
psychic  life,  with  certain  hypotheses  respecting  their 
material   conditions.*     Prof.   W.  James  has  recently 

♦Herbert  Spencer,  Principles  of  Psychology,  vol.  i.  §  65.    W.  James,  Prin- 
ciples of  Psychology,  vol.  i,  p.  237  et  seq.     See  also  Huxley's  Hume. 


go      THE  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

|aken  up  this  question.  He  compares  the  irregular 
course  of  our  consciousness  to  the  life  of  a  bird  that 
alternately  flies  and  perches.  The  resting-places  are 
occupied  by  relatively  stable  sensations  and  images  ; 
the  places  passed  in  flight  are  represented  by  thoughts 
of  the  relations  between  the  points  of  rest :  the  latter — 
the  <' transitive  parts" — are  almost  always  forgotten. 
It  seems  to  us  that  this  is  another  form  of  our  thesis, 
that  of  the  continuity  of  the  psychic  phenomena,  in 
virtue  of  a  deep,  hidden  sttbstratum^  which  must  be 
sought  in  the  organism.  In  truth,  that  would  be  a 
very  precarious  personality  that  had  no  other  basis 
than  consciousness,  and  this  hypothesis  is  defective  in 
the  face  even  of  the  simplest  facts ;  as,  for  example, 
to  explain  how  after  six  or  eight  hours  of  profound 
sleep,  I  have  no  hesitation  in  recognising  my  own  iden- 
tity. To  place  the  essence  of  our  personality  in  a  mode 
of  existence  (consciousness)  which  vanishes  during 
almost  one  third  of  our  life  is  a  singular  solution. 

We  maintain  here,  therefore,  as  we  have  main- 
tained elsewhere  in  regard  to  memory,  that  we  must  not 
confound  individuality  in  itself,  as  it  actually  exists  in 
the  nature  of  things,  with  individuality  as  it  exists  for 
itself,  in  virtue  of  consciousness  (personality).  The 
organic  memory  is  the  basis  of  all  the  highest  forms 
of  memory,  which  are  only  the  products  of  its  perfec- 
tion. The  organic  individuality  is  the  basis  of  all  the 
highest  forms  of  personality,  which  are  only  the  pro- 
ducts of  its  perfection.  I  shall  repeat  of  personality 
as  of  memory,  that  consciousness  completes  and  per- 
fects it,  but  does  not  constitute  it. 

Although, — in  order  not  to  prolong  these  already 
protracted  considerations, —  I  have  strictly  refrained 
from  all  digression,  from  criticism  of  adverse  doctrines, 


AFFECTIVE  DISORDERS.  91 

and  from  the  exposition  of  points  of  detail,  I  must  in- 
cidentally point  out  a  problem  which  very  naturally 
presents  itself.  There  has  been  a  great  deal  of  discus- 
sion as  to  whether  the  consciousness  of  our  personal 
identity  rests  on  memory  or  vice  versa.  One  says  :  It 
is  evident  that  without  memory  I  should  only  be  a 
present  existence  incessantly  renovated,  which  does 
away  with  all,  even  the  faintest  possibility  of  identity. 
The  other  says  :  It  is  evident  that  without  some  feel- 
ing of  identity  which  would  connect  them  together  and 
stamp  upon  them  my  mark,  my  recollections  would  be 
no  longer  my  own ;  they  would  be  extraneous  events. 
So  then,  is  it  the  memory  that  produces  the  feeling  of 
identity,  or  the  feeling  of  identity  that  constitutes  the 
memory?  I  answer  :  neither  the  one  nor  the  other  : 
both  are  effects^  the  causes  of  which  must  be  sought  in 
the  organism  ;  for,  on  the  one  hand,  the  objective  iden- 
tity of  the  organism  is  revealed  by  that  subjective  con- 
dition which  we  call  the  feeling  of  personal  identity; 
and,  on  the  other  hand,  in  it  are  registered  the  organic 
conditions  of  our  recollections,  and  in  it  is  to  be  found 
the  basis  of  our  conscious  memory.  The  feeling  of  per- 
sonal identity,  and  memory  in  the  psychological  sense, 
are,  accordingly,  effects  of  which  neither  can  be  the 
cause  of  the  other.  Their  common  origin  is  in  the  or- 
ganism, in  which  identity  and  organic  registration  (i.  e., 
memory)  are  one.  Here  we  encounter  one  of  those 
incorrectly  formulated  problems  that  frequently  occur 
in  connexion  with  the  hypothesis  of  a  ''  consciousness- 
entity." 


CHAPTER  III. 


DISORDERS  OF  THE  INTELLECT. 


In  certain  morbid  states,  the  five  universally  ac- 
cepted senses  are  subject  to  serious  derangements. 
Their  functions  are  perverted  or  impaired.  Now,  do 
such  disorders,  technically  termed  '^parsesthesia"  and 
'<  dysaesthesia, "  play  a  part  in  the  alterations  of  person- 
ality? Before  examining  this  point  a  preliminary  ques- 
tion arises :  What  happens  in  the  case  of  the  suppres- 
sion of  one  or  of  several  senses?  Is  the  personality 
altered,  injured,  transformed?  The  answer,  resting 
upon  experience,  seems  to  be  a  negative  one. 

The  total  loss  of  a  sense  may  be  acquired  or  be 
congenital.  Let  us  first  examine  the  former  case.  We 
shall  not  consider  here  the  two  secondary  senses  of 
taste  and  smell,  nor  the  sense  of  touch  in  all  its  dif- 
ferent forms,  coming,  as  it  does,  so  near  to  general 
sensibility.  We  shall  limit  ourselves  to  sight  and  hear- 
ing. Acquired  blindness  and  deafness  are  not  rare ; 
and  are  often  accompanied  by  certain  changes  of  char- 
acter, but  these  changes  are  not  radical,  and  the  indi- 
vidual remains  the  same.  Congenital  blindness  and 
deaf-muteness  affect  personality  more  deeply.  Indi- 
viduals who  are  deaf  and  dumb  from  birth,  and  are 
limited  thus   to   their  own  resources  and  deprived  of 


DISORDERS  OF  THE  INTELLECT.       93 

artificial  language,  remain  in  a  state  of  notorious  in- 
tellectual inf eriorit)^  Often  this  has  been  exaggerated,  * 
but  the  fact  is  incontestable,  and  is  due  to  causes  that 
have  been  too  frequently  discussed  to  need  repetition. 
Conscious  personality  here  falls  below  the  normal  aver- 
age ;  but  we  have  in  such  cases  rather  an  arrest  of  de- 
velopment than  an  alteration  of  personality  in  the  strict 
sense  of  the  term. 

As  for  those  who  are  born  blind,  it  is  well  known 
that  many  attain  a  high  standard  of  intellectuality,  and 
nothing  warrants  us  therefore  in  attributing  to  them  any 
diminution  or  alteration  of  personality  whatever.  Not- 
withstanding that  their  conception  of  the  visible  world, 
formed  only  from  descriptions  of  it,  may  seem  odd  to 
us,  this  does  not  seriously  affect  either  the  nature  of 
their  person  or  the  idea  they  entertain  of  it. 

Let  us  take  the  case  of  Laura  Bridgman,  a  most 
remarkable  instance  of  sensorial  privation,  and  one 
that  has  been  very  minutely  observed,  and  fully  re- 
corded.f  At  the  age  of  two  years  this  woman  was  de- 
prived entirely  of  sight  and  hearing  and  almost  entirely 
of  the  senses  of  smell  and  taste  ;  only  the  sense  of 
touch  was  left.  We  must,  of  course,  make  a  liberal 
allowance  for  the  patient  and  the  intelligent  education 
to  which  she  owed  her  development.  At  the  same 
time  the  fact  remains  that  her  teachers  could  not  en- 
dow her  with  new  senses,  and  that  the  sense  of  touch 
had  to  suffice  for  all  emergencies.  In  spite  of  all  these 
disadvantages  this  woman  shows  herself  possessed  of 

*  Compare  upon  this  point  the  facts  reported  by  Kussmaul,  Die  Stdrungen 
der  Sprache,  chap,  vii,  p.  i6  et  seq. 

t  For  the  chief  facts,  see  the  Revue  Pkilosopkigue,  vol.  i,  p.  401  ;  vol.  vii,  p. 
316.  The  principal  data  relating  to  her  life  have  been  compiled  by  her  teacher, 
Mary  Swift  Lamson,  in  her  work,  The  Life  and  Education  of  Laura  Dewey 
Bridgman,  the  Deaf,  Du7nb,  and  Blind  Girl.     London:  1S78.    Triibner. 


94      THE  DISEASES  OE  PERSONALITY. 

a  distinct  individuality  and  of  a  strongly  marked  char- 
acter; an  amiable  disposition,  an  almost  unfailing  good 
temper,  with  a  patience  surpassed  only  by  her  zeal 
for  self-improvement;  in  short,  confronts  us  as  an  or- 
dinar}^  person. 

Omitting  the  numberless  details  involved  in  the 
preceding  cases,  we  may  safely  infer  that  the  natural 
or  acquired  privation  of  one  or  of  several  senses  is  not 
necessarily  accompanied  with  a  morbid  state  of  per- 
sonality. In  the  least  favorable  cases  there  is  a  rela- 
tive arrest  of  development,  which  is  remedied  by  edu- 
cation. 

It  is  clear,  that  for  those  who  maintain  that  the  ego 
is  an  exceedingly  complex  compound  (and  this  is  our 
thesis),  every  change,  addition,  or  subtraction  in  its 
constitutive  elements  will  more  or  less  affect  the  ego. 
But  it  is  precisely  the  purpose  of  our  analysis  to  dis- 
tinguish among  these  elements  the  essential  from  the 
accessory.  The  part  contributed  by  the  external  senses 
(touch  excepted)  is  not  an  essential  factor.  The  senses 
determine  and  circumscribe  personality,  but  do  not 
constitute  it.  If  it  were  not  too  rash  in  questions  of 
observation  and  experience  to  rely  upon  pure  logic, 
this  conclusion  might  have  been  reached  a  priori. 
Sight  and  hearing  are  pre-eminently  objective ;  they 
reveal  to  us  what  is  without,  not  what  is  within.  As  to 
touch — a  complex  sense,  which  many  physiologists  re- 
solve into  three  or  four  senses — in  so  far  as  it  acquaints 
us  with  the  properties  of  the  external  world,  and  is  an 
eye  to  the  blind,  it  belongs  to  the  group  of  vision  and 
hearing  ;  otherwise  it  is  only  one  form  of  the  feeling 
that  we  have  of  our  own  body. 

It  may  seem  strange  that  paraesthesia  and  dyssesthe- 
sia,  the  simple  sensorial  derangements  with  which  we 


DISORDERS  OF  THE  INTELLECT.       95 

are  now  about  to  occupy  ourselves,  should  disorganise 
the  ego.  Still,  observation  proves,  and  reflexion  ex- 
plains, the  fact.  This  work  of  destruction  does  not 
proceed  from  the  sensorial  derangements  alone ;  they 
are  but  external  symptoms  of  a  much  deeper  internal 
disorder,  affecting  the  sense  of  the  body.  The  sensorial 
alterations  are  rather  auxiliary  than  efficient  causes, 
as  the  facts  will  show. 

Alterations  of  the  personality  with  sensorial  distur- 
bances, but  without  marked  hallucinations  or  loss  of 
judgment,  are  met  with  in  a  certain  number  of  morbid 
states.  We  shall  select  as  a  type  the  neurosis  studied 
by  Krishaber  under  the  name  of  ''cerebro-cardiac  neu- 
ropathy." It  matters  little  to  us  whether  or  not  this 
group  of  symptoms  should  be  regarded  as  a  distinct 
pathological  unity;  this  is  a  question  for  physicians.* 
The  purpose  of  our  investigation  is  quite  different. 

Let  us  go  over  again  the  physiological  disorders 
whose  immediate  effect  is  to  produce  a  change  in  the 
ccensesthesis  (the  sense  of  the  body).  First  we  have 
derangements  of  the  circulation,  consisting  chiefly  of 
an  excessive  irritability  of  the  vascular  system,  proba- 
bly due  to  an  excitation  of  the  central  nervous  system, 
whence  are  produced  contractions  of  the  smaller  ves- 
sels, ischcemia  in  certain  regions,  insufficient  nutrition 
and  exhaustion.  Then  there  are  disorders  of  locomo- 
tion, dizziness,  continuous  feeling  of  vertigo  and  of 
inebriation,  with  stumbling,  relaxation  of  the  limbs,  or 
hesitating  gait,  and  an  involuntary  forward  impulsion 
<<as  if  moved  by  a  spring." 

In  passing  from  the  internal  to  the  external,  we  find 

*De  la  nevropathie  ceribro-cardiaque,  by  Dr.  Krishaber.  Paris  :  Masson. 
1873.  In  general  this  disease  is  regarded  not  as  a  distinct  species,  but  as  a 
particular  case  of  spinal  irritation  or  of  neurasthenia.  See  Axenfeld  and 
Huchard  :   TraiU  des  nevroses,  1883,  pp.  277  and  294. 


96       THE  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

the  sense  of  touch,  which  forms  the  transition  from 
general  sensibihty  to  the  special  senses.  Some  per- 
sons feel  as  if  the}^  were  no  longer  heavy,  or  were  very 
light.  Many  have  lost  the  exact  notion  of  resistance, 
and  are  unable,  b}^  the  sense  of  touch  alone,  to  recog- 
nise the  form  of  objects.  They  imagine  themselves 
'^separated  from  the  world  ";  their  body  is  enveloped, 
as  it  were,  in  insulating  media,  that  interpose  them- 
selves between  the  individual  and  the  external  world. 

''There  appeared,"  said  one  of  them,  "a  dark  at- 
mosphere about  my  person ;  still,  I  saw  very  well  that 
it  was  broad  daylight.  The  word  '  dark  '  does  not  ex- 
actly express  m}^  thought ;  I  ought  to  use  the  German 
word  dumpf,  which  also  means  heavy,  dense,  dull,  ex- 
tinguished. This  sensation  was  not  only  visual  but 
also  cutaneous.  I  was  wrapped  up  in  this  dumpf  at- 
mosphere ;  I  saw  it,  felt  it ;  it  was  like  a  thick  layer  of 
a  bad  conducting  substance  that  insulated  me  from  the 
external  world.  I  cannot  tell  you  how  profound  this 
sensation  was;  it  seemed  to  me  that  I  was  transported 
far,  very  far  from  this  v/orld,  and  mechanicall}^  I  cried 
out,  in  a  loud  voice,  'I  am  far,  far  away.'  At  the  same 
time  I  knew  perfectly  well  that  I  was  not  far  awa}^;  I 
distinctly  remembered  all  that  had  happened  to  me ; 
but  between  the  moment  that  preceded  and  that  which 
followed  my  attack  there  intervened  a  tremendous  in- 
terval, a  distance  like  that  of  the  earth  from  the  sun." 

Vision  is  always  affected.  Not  to  speak  of  slight 
disorders  (such  as  photophobia,  amblyopia)  some  per- 
sons see  objects  double  ;  to  others  they  seem  flattened  ; 
a  man  appears  to  them  as  a  reliefless  silhouette.  To 
many,  the  surrounding  objects  seem  to  shrink  and  to 
recede  into  infinite  space. 

Auditory  derangements  are  of  the  same  character. 


DISORDERS  OF  THE  INTELLECT.       97 

The  patient  no  longer  recognises  the  sound  of  his  own 
voice  ;  it  seems  to  come  from  afar,  or  to  lose  itself  in 
space,  without  being  able  to  reach  the  ear  of  those 
whom  he  addresses,  whose  answers,  likewise,  are 
scarcely  heard. 

If  we  will  unite  in  thought  now  all  these  different 
symptoms  (accompanied  by  physical  pain,  and  by  de- 
rangements of  taste  and  smell),  we  shall  see  arise, 
suddenly,  and  in  a  block,  a  group  of  internal  and  ex- 
ternal sensations,  marked  by  a  new  character,  con- 
nected among  one  another  by  simultaneousness  in 
time,  and  still  more  profoundly  by  the  morbid  state 
which  is  their  common  source.  We  have  here  all  the 
elements  of  a  new  ego,  and,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  it  is 
sometimes  actually  formed.  "I  have  lost  the  con- 
sciousness of  my  being  ;  I  am  no  more  myself."  Such 
is  the  formula  which  is  repeated  in  the  majority  of  the 
observations.  Others  go  even  further,  and  at  times, 
fancy  themselves  double.  '^  One  of  my  strangest  ideas, 
which  is  forced  upon  my  mind  in  spite  of  myself," 
said  a  certain  engineer,  'Ms  my  believing  myself  dou- 
ble. I  seem  to  possess  one  ego  which  thinks,  and  an- 
other which  acts."     (Obs.  6.) 

This  process  of  formation  has  been  too  well  studied 
by  M.  Taine  for  me  to  take  it  up.  ''We  might  com- 
pare the  condition  of  the  patient,"  says  this  author,  "to 
that  of  a  caterpillar,  who,  while  still  preserving  all  the 
ideas  and  recollections  of  a  caterpillar,  should  suddenly 
become  a  butterfly,  with  the  senses  and  sensations  of 
a  butterfly.  Between  the  old  state  and  the  new  state, 
between  the  first  ego — that  of  the  caterpillar — and  the 
second  ego — that  of  the  butterfly — there  is  a  deep  gulf, 
a  complete  break.  The  new  sensations  find  no  an- 
terior series  with  which  to  connect  themselves;   the 


98      THE  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY, 

patient  can  no  longer  interpret  or  make  use  of  them  ; 
he  does  not  even  recognise  them,  they  are  unknown 
to  him.  Hence,  two  strange  conclusions  follow  ;  the 
first,  which  consists  in  saying  :  *'I  am  not;"  the  sec- 
ond, a  trifle  more  advanced,  which  says,  ''  I  am  an- 
other."* 

True,  it  is  difficult  for  the  healthy  and  well-balanced 
mind  to  picture  to  itself  a  mental  state  so  extraordinary 
as  this.  Yet  though  inadmissible  for  the  sceptical  ob- 
server, who  looks  from  without,  these  conclusions  are 
rigorously  correct  for  the  patient  who  sees  from  within. 
To  him  alone  this  continual  feeling  of  vertigo  and  in- 
toxication is  like  a  permanent  chaos,  in  which  the  state 
of  equilibrium,  of  normal  co-ordination,  cannot  be  es- 
tablished, or,  at  least,  cannot  persist. 

If  now  we  compare  this  change  of  personality  a 
sensibus  Icesis  with  the  other  more  or  less  serious  forms, 
we  shall  find  that  a  new  ego  is  not  formed  in  all  cases. 
When  it  is  formed  it  always  disappears  with  the  sen- 
sorial derangements.  It  is  never  able  entirely  to  sup- 
plant the  normal  ego  ;  there  is  alternation  between  the 
two  :  the  elements  of  the  original  ego  preserve  enough 
cohesion  to  enable  it  b}^  turns  to  regain  the  ascendancy. 
Hence  the  illusion  of  believing  oneself  double,  which, 
strictly  speaking,  is  not  an  illusion  to  the  patient  him- 
self. 

As  to  the  psychological  mechanism  by  which  the 
patient  imagines  himself  double,  I  explain  it  as  due  to 
memory.  I  have  previously  attempted  to  show,  that 
the  real  personality,  with  its  tremendous  mass  of  sub- 
conscious and  conscious  states,  is  recapitulated  in 
our  minds  in   a  single  image  or  fundamental  tendency 

*Revue  philosophique,  vol.  i,  p.  289,  and  L" Intelligence,  4th  Edition,  vol.  ii, 
Appendix. 


DISORDERS  OF  THE  INTELLECT,       99 

which  we  call  the  idea  of  our  personality.  This  vague 
image  {schc?fia),  which  represents  the  real  personality, 
about  as  much  as  the  general  idea  ''man"  represents 
individual  men,  or  as  the  plan  of  a  city  represents  the 
city — suffices  for  the  ordinary  needs  of  our  mental  life. 
In  our  patients,  now,  two  images  of  this  kind  must 
exist  and  succeed  each  other  in  consciousness,  accord- 
ing as  the  physiological  state  causes  the  old  or  the 
new  personality  to  prevail.  But  in  the  transition  from 
the  one  to  the  other,  sudden  as  it  may  appear,  there  is 
still  a  certain  continuity.  These  two  states  of  con- 
sciousness have  not  an  absolute  beginning  in  the  one 
case  and  an  absolute  end  in  the  other,  with  a  vacancy 
or  hiatus  between.  Like  all  states  of  consciousness 
they  have  a  duration  ;  they  occupy  a  portion  of  time, 
and  the  terminal  end  of  the  one  touches  the  initial  end 
of  the  other.  In  other  words,  they  encroach  upon 
each  other.  When  the  one  begins  to  exist  the  other 
still  subsists,  in  a  diminishing  state  ;  there  is  a  period 
of  coexistence  in  which  they  reciprocally  penetrate 
each  other.  In  our  opinion  it  is  during  this  period  of 
transition  or  passage,  whenever  it  is  produced,  that  the 
patient  fancies  himself  double. 

Let  us  remark  finally,  that  sensorial  derangements 
are  only  the  result  of  a  more  deeply-seated  disorder 
within  the  organism,  and  consequently  here  also  the 
sense  of  the  body  plays  the  principal  part  in  the  pathol- 
ogy of  personality. 

We  can  now  explain  how  the  natural  or  acquired 
suppression  of  one  or  of  several  senses  leaves  the  in- 
dividuality intact  in  its  foundations,  while  momentary 
perversions  of  less  serious  appearance  will  trans- 
form it. 

Physiologically,  in  the  former  case,  we  have  a  sum- 


lOo     THE  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

total  of  nervous  elements  condemned  to  functional 
inertia,  either  at  the  beginning  or  during  the  course 
of  life  :  the  personalit}'  is  like  a  weak  or  weakened 
orchestra,  which  nevertheless  suffices  for  all  necessar}^ 
purposes.  In  the  second  case,  all  the  nervous  elements 
that  administer  to  the  injured  external  senses,  to  the 
muscular  sensibility,  to  the  organic  and  visceral  sensi- 
bility, have  suffered  an  unwonted  modification  :  it  is 
like  an  orchestra  in  which  the  majority  of  the  instru- 
ments have  suddenly  changed  their  timbre. 

II. 

A  natural  transition  from  perceptions  to  ideas  is 
made  through  hallucinations  ;  and  we  shall  now  study 
the  part  played  by  the  latter  in  the  anomalies  of  per- 
sonality. At  the  outset  let  us  recall  a  few  generalities 
regarding  the  hallucinatory  state.  Four  hypotheses 
have  been  advanced  to  explain  it  *:  (i)  The  peripheral 
or  sensorial  theory,  which  places  the  seat  of  hallucina- 
tion in  the  sense-organs  ;  (2)  the  psychic  theory  which 
localises  it  in  the  centre  of  ideation ;  (3)  the  mixed  or 
psycho-sensorial  theory;  (4)  the  theory  which  attrib- 
utes hallucination  to  the  perceptive  centres  of  the  cor- 
tical layer. 

Observation  teaches  us  that  hallucinations  some- 
times affect  one  sense  only,  and  sometimes  several 
senses  ;  that  most  frequently  they  extend  to  both  sides 
of  the  body,  but  occasionally  to  one  side  only  (right  or 
left,  indifferently);  more  rarely  they  are  bilateral,  yet 
presenting  a  different  character  on  each  side;  thus, 
whilst  one  ear  is  assailed  b};' threats,  injuries,  evil  coun- 
sels, the  other  is  comforted  by  kind  and  soothing  words  ; 

*  For  a  complete  exposition  of  this  subject  see  the  important  articles  of 
M.  Binet,  Revtie philcsophiqiie,  April  and  May,  1884. 


DISORDERS  OF  THE  INTELLECT.      loi 

one  eye  perceives  onl}^  sad  and  repugnant  objects,  the 
other  sees  gardens  full  of  flowers.  These  latter,  at 
once  bilateral  and  of  an  opposite  character,  are  for  us 
the  most  interesting. 

Happily,  in  this  immense  domain,  we  have  only  to 
explore  a  very  small  area.  Let  us  carefully  limit  our 
subject.  In  the  normal  state  the  feeling  and  thinking 
individual  is  adapted  to  his  surroundings.  Between 
the  group  of  states  and  of  internal  relations  which  con- 
stitute the  mind,  and  the  group  of  states  and  of  external 
relations  which  constitute  the  external  world  there  is 
a  correspondence,  as  Spencer  has  minutely  shown.  In 
the  hallucinated  person  this  correspondence  has  been 
destroyed.  Hence,  false  judgments,  absurd  acts,  that 
is,  non-adapted  acts.  Still,  all  this  constitutes  a  dis- 
ease of  the  reason  and  not  of  the  personality.  Un- 
doubtedly the  ego  has  been  dislodged  ;  but  as  long  as 
the  consensus  which  constitutes  it  has  not  disappeared^ 
is  not  split  in  tv/o,  or  has  not  alienated  a  part  of  itself, 
(as  we  shall  see  presently,)  so  long  there  is  no  disease 
of  personality  in  the  proper  sense ;  the  derangements 
are  only  secondary  and  superficial.  Consequently,  the 
immense  majority  of  the  cases  of  hallucination  are  v/ith- 
drawn  from  our  consideration. 

Nor  have  we  to  occupy  ourselves  with  that  numer- 
ous category  of  patients,  who  misjudge  the  personality 
of  others,  and  who  take  the  physicians  and  attendants 
of  the  asylum  for  their  relatives,  or  their  relatives  for 
imaginary  persons  in  some  way  connected  with  their 
delusions.* 

*  With  some  patients,  the  same  individual  is  alternately  transformed  into 
an  imaginary  person  and  maintained  in  his  real  personality.  One  woman  at 
times  recognised  her  husband,  and  at  times  took  him  for  an  intruder.  She 
had  him  arrested,  and  he  had  great  difficulty  in  establishing  his  identity 
(Magnan,  Clinique  de  Sainte-Anne,  February  ii,  1877). 


102     THE  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

These  eliminations  made,  the  cases  to  be  studied  are 
sufficiently  circumscribed;  being  reduced  to  changes 
of  personality  of  which  the  basis  is  hallucination.  Al- 
most invariably  all  is  reduced  to  an  alienation  (in  the 
et3^mological  sense)  of  certain  states  of  consciousness, 
which  the  ego  does  not  consider  as  its  own,  but  makes 
objective  and  places  outside  of  itself,  and  to  which, 
ultimately,  it  attributes  a  distinct  existence  indepen- 
dent of  its  own. 

As  to  the  sense  of  hearing,  the  history  of  religious 
mania  furnishes  numerous  examples.  I  shall  cite  the 
simplest  cases,  those  in  which  the  hallucinatory  state 
acts  at  its  origin.  A  woman  was  persecuted  by  an  in- 
ternal voice,  "which  she  heard  only  within  her  ear," 
and  which  revolted  against  all  that  she  wished.  The 
voice  always  wished  evil  when  the  patient  wished  good. 
Without  being  heard  externally,  the  voice  would  say 
to  her:  "Take  a  knife  and  kill  yourself."  Another  hys- 
terical patient  first  had  thoughts  and  would  utter  words 
she  had  no  intention  of  saying,  and  soon  would  express 
them  in  a  voice  that  differed  from  her  own.  This  voice 
at  first  only  made  indifferent  or  rational  remarks  ; 
afterwards  it  assumed  a  negative  character.  "At  the 
present  time,  after  thirteen  3^ears,  the  voice  simply 
confirms  what  the  patient  has  just  said,  or  comments 
upon  her  words,  criticises  them,  turns  them  into  ridi- 
cule. The  tone  of  this  voice,  when  the  mind  speaks, 
always  differs  a  little,  and  sometimes  entirely,  from  the 
ordinary  voice  of  the  patient,  and  this  is  the  reason 
why  the  latter  believes  in  the  reality  of  this  mind.  I, 
mj^self,  have  frequently  observed  these  facts. "  * 

As  regards  sight,  alienations  of  this  kind  are  less 

♦  Griesinger,  Maladies  mentales,  French  trans.,  pp.  285-286;  Baillarger  re- 
ports an  analogous  case,  Annales  M^dico-psych.,  ist  series,  vol.  vi,  p.  151. 


DISORDERS  OF  THE  INTELLECT.     103 

frequent.  **A  very  intelligent  man,"  says  Wigan  (p. 
126),  ''had  the  power  of  putting  his  double  before  him- 
self. He  used  to  laugh  loudly  at  this  double,  which 
would  also  laugh  in  return.  For  a  long  time  this  was 
a  subject  of  amusement  to  the  man ;  but  the  final  re- 
sult proved  lamentable.  By  degrees  he  became  con- 
vinced that  he  was  being  haunted  by  himself.  This 
other  ego  taunted  him,  worried  and  mortified  him  in- 
cessantly. In  order  to  put  an  end  to  this  sad  existence 
he  arranged  his  private  affairs,  and,  being  loath  to  be- 
gin a  new  year,  on  December  31,  at  midnight,  he  shot 
himself  in  the  mouth." 

Finally,  Dr.  Ball,  in  VEncephale  (1882,  II.),  re- 
ports the  case  of  an  American,  who,  through  simulta- 
neous hallucinations  of  hearing  and  sight,  possessed  in 
all  its  features  an  imaginary  double.  ''  Prostrated  by 
a  sunstroke,  he  remained  unconscious  for  a  month. 
Shortly  after  recovering  his  senses,  he  heard  a  dis- 
tinctly articulated  human  voice,  which  said  :  'How  are 
you?'  The  patient  answered,  and  a  short  conversation 
ensued.  On  the  following  day  the  same  question  was 
repeated.  The  patient  looked  around  but  saw  no  one. 
'Who  are  you?'  said  he.  'I  am  Mr.  Gabbage,'  an- 
swered the  voice.  A  few  days  later  the  patient  got  a 
glimpse  of  his  interlocutor,  who  from  that  time  on  pre- 
sented himself  with  the  same  features  and  in  the  same 
dress ;  he  would  always  appear  in  front,  showing  only 
his  bust.  He  had  the  appearance  of  a  vigorous  and 
well  built  man  of  about  thirty-six  years,  with  a  strong 
beard,  dark-brown  complexion,  large  black  eyes, 
strongly  pencilled  eye-brows,  and  was  always  dressed 
in  hunting  costume.  The  patient  would  fain  have 
known  the  profession  and  habits  of  his  questioner  and 
where  he  lived,  but  the  man  would  never  consent  to 


104    THE  DISEASES  OF  PERSOXALITW 

give  any  other  information  than  simply  his  name."  At 
last  Mr.  Gabbage  grew  more  and  more  tyrannical : 
ordering  the  patient  to  throw  his  newspaper,  watch, 
and  chain  into  the  fire,  to  take  care  of  a  young  woman 
and  her  child  whom  he  had  poisoned,  and  eventually 
to  throw  him.self  through  the  window  of  a  third  floor, 
whence  he  fell  and  was  killed  upon  the  pavement  be- 
low. 

These  facts  show  us  the  beginning  of  a  dissolution 
of  personality.  Later  on  we  shall  cite  other  cases  which 
have  not  hallucination  for  their  basis,  and  which  will 
make  us  better  understand  those  already  referred  to. 
That  more  or  less  perfect  co-ordination  which  in  the 
normal  state  constitutes  the  ego,  is  here  partially 
broken.  Within  the  group  of  states  of  consciousness 
which  we  feel  as  our  own,  because  produced  or  ex- 
perienced by  ourselves,  there  exists  one,  which,  al- 
though having  its  source  in  the  organism,  still  does  not 
enter  into  the  consensus,  but  remains  apart  and  ap- 
pears distinct  from  it.  This,  in  the  order  of  thought,  is 
the  analogue  of  irresistible  impulses  in  the  order  of  ac- 
tion :   a  partial  inco-ordination.* 

But  if  these  voices  and  visions  emanate  from  the 
patient  himself,  why  does  he  not  regard  them  as  his 
own?  This  is  a  ver\'  obscure  question,  but  I  shall  at- 
tempt to  answer  it.  There  must  exist  here  anatomical 
and  physiological  causes,  at  present  unfortunately  un- 
known, the  discovery  of  which  would  solve  the  prob- 
lem. In  our  ignorance  of  these  causes,  we  are  restricted 
to  the  consideration  of  the  surface,  the  symptoms,  and 
the  states  of  consciousness,  with  the  signs  that  reveal 
them.      Let  us   suppose,  accordingly,  a  state   of  con- 

*  Concerning  irreiistible  impulses  considered  as  a  phenomenon  of  partial 
inco-ordina:ion,  see  my  Diseases  oftke  Will  (Chicago,  1S94'  p.  54  and  following. 


DISORDERS  OF  THE  INTELLECT.     105 

sciousness  (with  its  organic  conditions)  which  has  the 
peculiar  characteristic  of  being  local,  that  is  of  having 
in  its  physical  and  ps3'chic  organisation  the  weakest 
possible  radiation.  To  make  myself  understood  by 
antithesis,  let  us  suppose  a  violent,  sudden  emotion  ; 
it  reverberates  through  the  whole  system,  shakes  com- 
pletely the  physical  and  mental  life  ;  it  is  a  complete 
diffusion.  Our  case  is  the  reverse  of  this.  Organically 
and  psychically  it  has  only  infrequent  and  precarious 
connexions  with  the  rest  of  the  individual  ;  it  remains 
apart,  like  a  foreign  body,  lodged  within  the  organism, 
but  having  no  share  in  its  life.  It  does  not  enter  that 
great  woof  of  the  coenaesthesis  which  sustains  and  uni- 
fies all.  It  is  a  cerebral  phenomenon  almost  without 
support,  analogous  to  the  ideas  that  are  imposed  by 
suggestion  in  hypnotism.  This  attempt  at  explanation 
is  corroborated  by  the  fact  that  the  morbid  state — if  it 
be  not  arrested  by  nature  or  by  medical  treatment — 
has  a  fatal  tendency  to  increase  and  expand  at  the  ex- 
pense of  the  primitive  personality,  which,  attacked  by 
this  parasite,  diminishes.  Still,  in  this  case  it  pre- 
serves its  original  qualities,  and  does  not  constitute  a 
duplication  but  an  alienation  of  the  personality. 

I  offer  this  tentative  explanation  only  as  an  hy- 
pothesis, being  convinced  that  our  present  deficient 
knowledge  of  the  organic  conditions  of  the  phenom- 
enon precludes  the  possibility  of  a  satisfactory  diagno- 
sis. In  submitting  it  I  have  been  obliged  to  anticipate 
what  will  afterwards  be  said  concerning  ideas,  and 
which  will  furnish  us,  perhaps,  with  new  arguments 
in  its  favor. 

We  have  now  to  speak  of  some  recent  experiments 
with  hallucinations  which,  with  other  facts,  have  led 


io6     THE  DISEASES  OE  PERSONALITY. 

some  authors  to  offer  an  explanation  of  the  duplica- 
tion of  personality  as  simple  as  it  is  palpable.  In  the 
first  place  the}^  point  to  the  functional  independence 
of  the  two  hemispheres  of  the  brain,  and  conclude  hence 
that  from  their  synergy  results  the  equilibrium  of  the 
mind,  and  from  their  disaccord  various  derangements 
and  ultimate^  the  division  of  the  ps3^chic  individual. 
We  have  here  tvv^o  distinct  questions,  which  several 
of  the  scientists  whom  I  shall  quote  have  clearly  dis- 
tinguished, but  which  others  have  confounded. 

Sir  Henry  Holland,  a  ph3^sician  well  known  as  a 
psychologist,  first  studied  (1840)  the  brain  as  a  double 
organ,  and  suggested  that  certain  aberrations  of  the 
mind  might  be  due  to  the  irregular  action  of  the  two 
hemispheres,  of  which  the  one  in  certain  cases  seems 
to  correct  the  perceptions  and  sentiments  of  the  other. 
In  1844  Wigan  went  still  further.  He  maintained  that 
w^e  had  two  brains  and  not  merely  one  ;  and  that  ''the 
corpus  callosuin,  far  from  being  a  bond  of  union  be- 
tween them,  is  a  wall  of  separation  ; "  affirming,  even 
more  positively  than  his  predecessor,  the  duality  of 
the  mind.*  The  progress  of  cerebral  anatomy  sub- 
sequently jaelded  other  and  more  positive  results  ; 
such  as  the  inequalit}^  of  weight  of  the  two  lobes  of 
the  brain,  their  constant  asymmetry,  differences  in  the 
topography  of  the  cortex,  etc.  The  discovery  by  Broca 
of  the  seat  of  aphasia,  was  a  new  argument  of  great 
value.  It  was  also  supposed  that  the  left  hemisphere 
was  the  principal  seat  of  intelligence  and  of  will,  that 
the  right  hemisphere  was  more  particularly  devoted  to 
the  life  of  nutrition  (Brown-S^quard).      I  abridge  this 

*  Wigan  :  The  duality  of  mind  proved  by  the  structure,  functions,  and  dis- 
eases of  the  brains,  and  by  the  phenomena  of  inental  deratigeme7it,  and  sho-wn 
to  be  essential  to  moral  responsibility.  London,  1844.  This  badly  digested  book 
does  not  bear  out  what  its  title  claims. 


DISORDERS  OF  THE  INTELLECT.      107 

historical  resum^,  which  could  be  much  lengthened, 
to  revert  at  once  to  hallucinations.  The  existence  of 
simultaneous  hallucinations,  sad  on  one  side,  joyous 
on  the  other,  in  all  cases  different  and  even  contra- 
dictory, at  once  attracted  the  attention  of  observers. 
But  better  work  was  on  hand  than  observation ;  ex- 
periments were  to  be  made.  Hypnotism  furnished  the 
means.  Let  us  remember  that  the  hypnotised  subject 
can  pass  through  three  phases  :  the  first  lethargic, 
characterised  by  neuro-muscular  excitability  ;  the  sec- 
ond, cataleptic,  produced  by  raising  the  eyelids  ;  and 
the  third,  somnambulistic,  caused  by  pressure  upon 
the  vertex.  If  during  the  cataleptic  state  we  lower 
the  right  eyelid,  we  act  upon  the  left  brain,  and  we  de- 
termine a  lethargic  state  of  the  right  side  only.  The 
subject  is  thus  divided  into  two — hemilethargic  on  the 
right,  hemicataleptic  on  the  left,  and  I  will  now  state 
what  occurs,  taking  the  facts  from  M.  P.  Richer's 
well-known  book  : 

''  I  place  upon  the  table  a  water-jug,  a  basin,  and 
some  soap ;  as  soon  as  the  patient's  glance  has  been 
directed  towards  these  objects,  or  her  hands  touch  one 
of  them,  she  proceeds  with  apparent  spontaneity  to 
pour  water  into  the  basin,  takes  the  soap  and  washes 
her  hands  with  minute  care.  If  we  then  lower  the  lid 
of  one  of  her  eyes — the  right  eye  for  example — then 
the  whole  right  side  becomes  lethargic,  and  the  right 
hand  immediately  stops  ;  but  the  left  hand  still  con- 
tinues the  movement.  On  again  raising  the  eyelid, 
both  hands  at  once  resume  their  action  as  before." 
The  same  result  may  be  produced  on  the  left  side. 
''  If  we  put  into  the  patient's  hands  the  box  containing 
her  crochet-work,  she  will  open  it,  take  out  her  work 
and  begin  to  crochet  with  remarkable  skill.  ...   If  we 


io8     THE  DISEASES  OE  PERSONALITY. 

close  one  of  her  e3'es,  the  corresponding  hand  will 
stop,  the  arm  drop  motionless  ....  but  the  other  hand, 
unaided,  seeks  to  continue  a  work  that  has  now  be- 
come impossible ;  the  mechanism  continues  to  work 
on  one  side,  but  it  modifies  its  movement  with  the 
view  of  rendering  it  efficacious." 

The  author  reports  several  other  cases  of  the  same 
kind,  of  which  I  shall  only  quote  the  last,  because  it 
confirms  Broca's  discovery.  On  placing  in  the  hands 
of  the  subject  an  open  book,  and  directing  her  glance 
toward  one  of  its  lines,  she  reads.  ''In  the  midst  of 
her  reading,  the  closure  of  the  right  eye,  through  the 
decussation  of  the  optic  nerves,  which  aftects  the  left 
brain,  stops  the  patient  abruptly  in  the  middle  of  a 
word  or  phrase.  As  soon  as  the  eye  is  opened  again, 
she  resumes  her  reading,  finishing  the  word  or  phrase 
that  had  been  interrupted.  If,  on  the  contrary,  the 
left  eye  is  closed,  she  continues  her  reading,  only  hesi- 
tating a  little  on  account  of  partial  amblyopia  and 
achromatopsia  of  the  right  eye."* 

We  can  vary  these  experiments.  A  different  at- 
titude is  impressed  upon  the  limbs  of  each  side  of 
the  body;  on  one  side  the  subject  bears  a  stern  ex- 
pression, while  on  the  other  side  she  smiles  and  sends 
kisses.  The  hallucinatory  state  can  be  provoked  on 
the  left  side  or  on  the  right  side.  Finally,  let  two  per- 
sons approach  the  subject,  one  at  each  ear;  the  person 
on  the  right  describes  fine  weather,  the  right  side  smiles; 
the  other  on  the  left  describes  rain,  the  left  side  be- 
trays displeasure  and  the  labial  commiissure  is  lowered. 
Or  again,  while  suggesting  through  the  right  ear  the 
hallucination  of  a  picnic,  near  the  left  ear  let  the  bark- 

*P.  Richer,  Etudes  cliniques  sur  I'hystiro-epilepsie,  pp.  391-393. 


DISORDERS  OF  THE  INTELLECT.     109 

ing  of  a  dog  be  imitated  ;  the  face  will  express  pleasure 
at  the  right  and  alarm  at  the  left.* 

Th,ese  experiments,  of  which  we  only  give  a  very 
condensed  summary,  together  with  many  other  facts, 
have  very  logically  led  to  the  following  conclusion  :  a 
relative  independence  of  the  two  cerebral  hemispheres 
exists,  which  by  no  means  excludes  their  normal  co- 
ordination, but  which  in  certain  pathological  cases  be- 
comes a  perfect  dualism. 

Some  authors  are  inclined  to  go  still  further,  hold- 
ing that  this  cerebral  dualism  suffices  to  explain  every 
discrepancy  in  the  mind,  from  simple  hesitation  be- 
tween two  resolves,  to  the  complete  duplication  of 
personality.  If  we  will  at  the  same  time  good  and 
evil;  if  we  have  criminal  impulses  and  a  conscience 
that  reproves  them  ;  if  the  insane  at  times  recognise 
their  folly;  if  the  delirious  have  moments  of  lucidity; 
if,  in  fine,  persons  believe  themselves  double,  it  is 
simply  because  the  two  hemispheres  are  in  disaccord ; 
the  one  is  healthy,  the  other  is  morbid  ;  one  state  has 
its  seat  to  the  right,  its  contrary  to  the  left ;  it  is  a 
kind  of  psychological  manicheism. 

Griesinger,  on  encountering  this  theory,  put  forth 
even  in  his  day  with  diffidence,  after  having  cited  the 
facts  which  it  claims,  and  the  case  of  one  of  his  patients, 
who  ''felt  himself  growing  irrational  only  on  one  side 
of  his  head,  that  is  on  the  right  side,"  concludes  with 
these  words  :  "As  for  us,  we  are  not  inclined  to  attrib- 
ute a  high  value  to  these  facts."  f  Have  they  gained 
in  significance  since  his  time  ?  It  is  very  doubtful.  In 
the  first  place  (since  the  theory  rests  on  a  question  of 

*Magnan  and  Dumontpailler,  Union  medicale,  May  15,  1883. 
t  Op.  cit.,  p.  28.    See  also  the  negative  conclusions  of  Charlton  Bastian  on 
this  point,  vol.  ii,  chap.  xxiv. 


no     THE  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY, 

number)  are  there  not  individuals  who  believe  them- 
selves triple?  I  find  at  least  one  instance.  "  In  a  cer- 
tain lunatic  asylum,"  says  Esquirol,  *'I  met  a  priest, 
who  through  excessive  mental  application  to  the  the- 
ological mystery  of  the  Trinity,  eventually  came  to 
regard  all  objects  about  him  as  triple.  He  even  imag- 
ined himself  to  consist  of  three  persons,  and  requested 
the  attendants  to  lay  three  covers  for  him  at  table, 
with  three  plates  and  three  napkins."*  I  believe  that 
by  careful  searching  we  could  find  other  cases  of  this 
kind  ;  but  I  refrain  from  availing  myself  of  this  case  of 
triplicity,  which  seems  to  me  susceptible  of  several 
interpretations.  The  best  possible  reasons,  supported 
by  every-day  facts,  could  be  alleged  against  this  theory. 
It  rests  ultimately  upon  the  wholly  arbitrary  h3'poth- 
esis  that  the  struggle  is  always  between  two  states 
only.  Experience  contradicts  this  hypothesis  com- 
pletely. Who  has  not  hesitated  between  acting  in  two 
different  ways  or  in  ?ieither,  say  between  journeying 
northward  or  southward,  or  remaining  at  home  ?  It 
happens  repeatedly  in  our  lives  that  we  have  to  decide 
between  three  alternatives,  of  vvdiich  each  necessarily 
excludes  the  other  tv/o.  Where  shall  we  locate  the 
third  ?  for  it  is  in  this  strange  form  that  the  question 
has  been  mooted. 

In  a  few  cases  of  congenital  atrophy  of  the  brain, 
apparently  based  upon  authentic  observations,  indi- 
viduals have  been  seen  who  possessed  from  infancy 
only  one  cerebral  hemisphere  ;  yet  their  intellectual 
development  was  not  impaired  and  they  resembled  in 
all  other  respects  ordinary  men.^     According  to  the 

*  Revue  des  Deux-Mondes,  October  15,  1845,  p.  307. 

t  Cotard,  Etude  sur  Vatrophie  cerebrate,   Paris,   1868;    Diet,    encycl.    des 
sciences  medicales,  art.  "  Cerveau  "  (Pathologie),  pp.  298  and  453. 


DISORDERS  OF  THE  INTELLECT,      iii 

hypothesis  here  combated,  in  these  individuals  no  in- 
ternal struggle  could  have  occurred.  However,  it  is 
useless  to  dwell  upon  this  criticism,  and  I  shall  con- 
tent myself  by  recalling  Griesinger's  comment  upon  a 
well-known  line  in  Faust:  ''Not  only  two  but  several 
souls  dwell  within  us." 

In  fact,  this  discussion  would  be  futile,  did  it  not 
furnish  us  the  opportunity  of  viewing  our  subject  un- 
der a  different  aspect.  These  contradictions  in  the 
personality,  these  partial  scissions  of  the  ego,  such  as 
are  found  in  the  lucid  moments  of  insanity  and  of  de- 
lirium,* in  the  self-condemnation  and  reprobation  of 
the  dipsomaniac,  while  still  drinking,  are  not  opposi- 
tions in  space  (from  one  hemisphere  to  the  other),  but 
oppositions  in  tivie.  They  are — to  use  a  favorite  ex- 
pression of  Lewes — successive  ''  attitudes  "  of  the  ego. 
This  hypothesis  accounts  for  all  that  the  other  ex- 
plains, as  also  for  what  it  does  not. 

If  we  are  thoroughly  impregnated  with  the  idea  that 
the  personality  is  a  consensus,  we  shall  have  no  diffi- 
culty in  comprehending  that  the  mass  of  conscious,  sub- 
conscious and  unconscious  states  which  constitute  it, 
may,  at  a  given  moment,  be  summed  up  in  a  tendency 
or  preponderating  state  which  is  its  momentary  ex- 
pression both  to  the  individual  himself  and  to  others. 
Suddenly  the  same  mass  of  constituent  elements  is  re- 
capitulated in  some  contrary  state,  which  thereupon 
assumes  the  front  rank.  Such  is  our  dipsomaniac,  who 
drinks  and  at  the  same  time  reproaches  himself.  The 
preponderating  state  of  consciousness  at  each  moment 
constitutes  to  the  individual  and  to  others  his  person- 
ality.     It  is  a  natural   illusion,  of  which  it  is  difficult 

*  Jessen,  in  his  Versuch  einer  wissenschaftlichen  BegrUndung  der  Psycho- 
logies p.  189,  reports  a  curious  instance  of  this. 


112     THE  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY, 

to  rid  ourselves,  yet  an  illusion  which  rests  upon  a 
partial  consciousness.  In  reality  it  is  only  two  succes- 
sive attitudes,  that  is,  a  different  grouping  between  the 
same  elements  with  predominance  of  some  and  of  what 
follows.  In  the  same  manner  our  body  can  successively 
and  quickly  assume  two  contrary  attitudes  without 
ceasing  to  be  the  same  body. 

It  is  clear  that  three  states  or  more  can  succeed 
each  other  (coexist  apparently)  by  the  same  mechan- 
ism. We  are  no  longer  limited  to  the  number  two.  We 
must,  however,  acknowledge  that  this  internal  scission 
is  more  frequent  between  two  contrary  states,  than  be- 
tween three  or  a  larger  number  of  states.  This  depends 
upon  certain  conditions  of  consciousness  which  must  be 
recalled  to  mind. 

Is  there  a  real  coexistence  between  two  states  of 
consciousness,  or  is  it  a  succession  so  rapid  as  to 
appear  to  be  simultaneousness  ?  This  is  a  very  deli- 
cate question  as  yet  unanswered,  although  at  some  fu- 
ture day  it  may  be  solved  by  psycho-physicists.  Ham- 
ilton and  others  have  maintained  that  we  can  have  as 
many  as  six  impressions  at  the  same  time,  but  their 
results  are  derived  from  very  crude  measurements. 
The  determination,  according  to  the  strict  methods  of 
physical  science,  of  the  duration  of  the  states  of  con- 
sciousness, is  a  great  step  in  advance.  Wundt  has 
tried  to  go  still  further,  and  to  fix  by  experiment  what 
he  correctly  calls  the  area  of  consciousness  {Umfa?ig 
des  Bewusstseins),  that  is,  the  maximum  number  of 
states  which  it  can  contain  at  the  same  time.  His  ex- 
periments bear  only  upon  certain  extremely  simple 
im.pressions  (the  strokes  of  a  pendulum  regularly  in- 
terrupted by  the  strokes  of  a  small  bell),  and  conse- 
quently are  not  in  every  respect  applicable  to  the  com- 


DISORDERS  OF  THE  INTELLECT.     113 

plex  states  that  here  occupy  us.  He  has  found  ''that 
twelve  representations  constitute  the  maximum  area 
of  consciousness  for  successive  and  relatively  simple 
states."*  Experiment,  accordingly,  seems  to  decide 
in  favor  of  a  very  rapid  succession,  equivalent  to  co- 
existence. The  two,  three,  or  four  contrary  states 
would  be,  at  bottom,  a  succession. 

We  know,  moreover,  to  employ  a  frequently  used 
comparison,  that  consciousness  has  its  "yellow  spot," 
like  the  retina.  Distinct  vision  is  only  a  small  portion 
of  total  vision  ;  and  clear  consciousness  is  only  a  small 
portion  of  total  consciousness.  Here  we  touch  the  nat- 
ural and  incurable  cause  of  that  illusion  by  which  the 
individual  identifies  himself  with  his  present  state  of 
consciousness,  especially  when  it  is  intense ;  and,  un- 
happily, that  illusion  is  far  stronger  for  him  than  for 
others.  We  also  perceive  why  apparent  coexistence  is 
much  easier  for  two  contrary  states  than  for  three,  or 
for  a  larger  number.  This  fact  is  owing  to  the  limits 
of  consciousness ;  or,  to  repeat  a  previous  statement, 
it  is  an  opposition  in  time,  not  in  space. 

To  sum  up,  the  relative  independence  of  the  two 
hemispheres  is  indisputable.  The  derangement  pro- 
duced in  personality  through  their  disaccord  is  admit- 
ted ;  but  to  reduce  all  to  a  simple  division  between  the 
left  side  and  the  right  side  is  an  hypothesis  which  as 
yet  is  bereft  of  all  substantial  foundation. 


III. 

A  few  words  on  the  subject  of  memory.     There  is 
no  reason  why  we  should  study  it  apart,  for  it  is  found 

*GrundzUge  der  physiol.  Psychologie,  2d  edition,  vol.  ii,  p.  215.    [See  also 
the  4th  edition,  pp.  286-294.— Trawj.] 


114    THE  DISEASES  OE  PERSONALITY. 

everywhere  throughout  our  subject.  Personahty,  in 
fact,  is  not  a  phenomenon,  but  an  evolution;  not  a 
momentary  event,  but  a  history;  not  merely  a  present 
or  a  past,  but  both.  Let  us  leave  aside  what  I  shall 
call  objective,  intellectual  memory;  viz.,  perceptions, 
images,  experiences,  and  stored-up  knowledge.  All 
this  m.ay  partially  or  totally  disappear;  constituting 
the  diseases  of  memory,  of  which  I  have  given  numer- 
ous examples  elsewhere.  Let  us  consider  only  sub- 
jective memory,  that  of  ourselves,  that  of  our  own 
physiological  life,  and  of  the  sensations  or  feelings  that 
accompany  it.  This  distinction  is  purely  factitious, 
but  it  will  enable  us  to  simplify  matters. 

In  the  first  place,  does  such  a  memory  exist?  It 
might  be  maintained  that  in  a  perfectly  healthy  indi- 
vidual the  vital  tone  is  so  constant  that  the  conscious- 
ness which  such  an  individual  has  of  its  own  body  is 
simply  a  present,  that  is  incessantly  repeated  ;  but,  on 
the  contrary,  this  monotony,  if  it  existed,  would,  by 
excluding  consciousness,  favor  the  formation  of  an 
organic  memory.  In  fact,  there  are  always  changes 
taking  place,  however  slight  they  may  be,  and,  as  we 
are  conscious  only  of  differences,  just  those  changes  are 
felt.  As  long  as  they  are  feeble  and  partial,  the  im- 
pression of  uniformity  persists,  because  the  incessantly 
repeated  actions  are  represented  in  the  nervous  system 
in  a  far  more  stable  manner  than  the  ephemeral  changes. 
Their  memory  accordingly  is  organised  beneath  con- 
sciousness, and  hence  is  all  the  more  solid.  Here 
is  the  foundation  of  our  identity.  Just  these  diminutive 
changes  act  in  time  and  produce  what  is  called  the  in- 
sensible change.  After  ten  years  of  absence  an  ob- 
ject, a  monument  is  seen  the  same,  but  is  not  felt  the 
same  ;  it  is  not  the  faculty  of  perceiving,  but  its  accom- 


DISORDERS  OF  THE  INTELLECT.     115 

paniment,  that  has  changed.  However,  all  this  is  the 
state  of  health,  the  simple  transformation  inherent  in 
all  that  lives  and  evolves. 

Here,  then,  the  vital  habitude  of  an  individual  is 
represented  by  this  other  habitude, — the  organic  mem- 
ory. Causes,  mostly  unknown,  of  which  we  are  only 
able  to  state  the  subjective  and  objective  effects,  super- 
vene. They  produce  a  sudden  and  profound,  or  at 
least  rapid  and  persistent,  transformation  of  the  coenaes- 
thesis.  What  happens?  Experience  alone  is  able  to 
answer,  for  ignorance  of  the  causes  reduces  us  to  pure 
empiricism.  In  extreme  cases,  and  we  shall  not  notice 
others,  the  individual  is  changed.  This  metamorphosis 
is  met  with,  so  far  as  it  concerns  memory,  under  the 
three  following  principal  forms  : 

T.  After  a  more  or  less  protracted  period  of  transi- 
tion, the  new  personality  alone  remains;  the  old  per- 
sonality is  forgotten  (Leuret's  patient).  This  case  is 
rare.  It  supposes  that  the  old  coenaesthesis  has  been 
completely  abolished,  or,  at  least,  rendered  inactive 
for  all  time  and  incapable  of  reviviscence.  We  need 
not  wonder  at  meeting  so  seldom  with  cases  of  this 
character,  if  we  reflect  that  absolute  transformation  of 
the  personality,  that  is,  the  substitution  of  one  per- 
sonality for  another — complete,  w^ithout  reserve,  and 
with  no  connecting  link  between  the  present  and  the 
past — supposes  a  radical  and  total  change  in  the  or- 
ganism. To  my  knowledge  no  case  exists  in  which  the 
second  personality  has  not  inherited  at  least  some 
relics  from  the  old,  be  it  only  certain  acquisitions  that 
are  automatic,  such  as  walking,  speaking,  etc. 

2.  Usually,  beneath  the  new  coenaesthesis  that  has 
been  organised  and  made  the  basis  of  the  existing  ego, 
the  old  organic  memory  still  subsists.     From  time  to 


ii6    THE  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

time  it  returns  to  consciousness,  weakened  like  any 
youthful  recollection  not  revived  by  repetition.  The 
cause  of  this  reviviscence  is  probably  some  background 
common  to  the  two  states  ;  then  the  individual  appears 
to  himself  another.  The  existing  state  of  conscious- 
ness evokes  one  that  is  similar  to  it,  but  which  has  a 
different  accompaniment.  The  two  appear  as  mine, 
although  self-contradictory.  Such  are  the  patients  who 
find  that  everything  has  remained  the  same,  though 
changed  nevertheless. 

3.  Finally,  there  are  the  cases  of  alternation.  Here 
it  is  unquestionable  that  the  two  subjective  memories 
— the  organised  expression  of  the  two  ccenaestheses — 
subsist  and  by  turns  predominate.  Each  is  accompa- 
nied by,  and  puts  into  activity,  a  certain  group  of  feel- 
ings, of  physical  and  intellectual  aptitudes,  which  do 
not  exist  in  the  other.  Each  forms  part  of  a  distinct 
complexus.  The  case  of  Azam  affords  an  excellent 
example  of  the  alternation  of  two  memories. 

Upon  this  subject  we  can  say  nothing  more  with- 
out indulging  in  repetitions  or  amassing  hypotheses. 
Ignorance  of  the  causes  arrests  our  progress.  The 
psychologist  here  is  in  the  dilemma  of  a  physician  con- 
fronted by  a  disease  that  only  exhibits  its  symptoms. 
"What  are  the  physiological  influences  that  thus  change 
the  general  tone  of  the  organism,  consequently  the 
coenaesthesis  and  the  memory?  Is  it  a  state  of  the 
vascular  system?  Is  it  an  inhibitory  action,  a  func- 
tional arrest?  No  one  can  say.  Until  this  question 
is  solved,  we  must  remain  at  the  surface.  All  we  have 
wished  to  show  is  that  memory,  although  in  some  re- 
spects blended  with  personality,  is  not  its  last  founda- 
tion. It  is  based  upon  the  state  of  the  body,  conscious 
or  unconscious  ;  it  depends  upon  it.     Even  in  the  nor- 


DISORDERS  OF  THE  INTELLECT.     117 

mal  state  the  same  physical  situation  has  a  tendency 
to  induce  the  same  mental  situation.  I  have  frequently 
observed  that  at  the  moment  of  falling  asleep,  some 
dream  of  the  preceding  night,  until  then  entirely  for- 
gotten, would  suddenly  return  to  my  recollection  dis- 
tinct in  all  its  details.  In  travelling,  on  leaving  one  town 
to  sleep  in  another,  this  reproduction  sometimes  takes 
place  ;  but  my  dream  then  emerges  in  disconnected 
fragments,  difficult  to  reconstruct.  Is  this  the  effect 
of  physical  conditions  —  the  same  in  one  instance, 
slightly  modified  in  the  other  ?  Although  I  have  not 
seen  this  fact  mentioned  in  any  work  on  dreams,  I 
doubt  if  it  is  a  peculiar  experience  of  my  own. 

Then  again,  there  are  accredited  facts  of  still 
greater  cogency.  In  natural  or  induced  somnambulism 
the  events  of  former  states,  forgotten  during  wakeful- 
ness, return  with  the  hypnotic  state.  Let  us  recall  to 
mind  the  well-known  story  of  the  carrier,  who  when 
intoxicated  lost  a  packet,  which  he  was  unable  to  find 
when  sober  ;  he  got  drunk  again  and  found  it.  Is 
there  not  here  a  marked  tendency  toward  the  consti- 
tution of  two  memories — the  one  normal,  the  other 
pathological — expressions  of  two  distinct  states  of  the 
organism,  and  which  are,  as  it  were,  embryonic  forms 
of  the  extreme  cases  of  which  we  have  spoken? 


IV. 

The  part  played  by  ideas  in  the  transformations  of 
the  personality  has  already  been  incidentally  noted. 
Let  us  now  watch  this  new  factor  at  work^  and  see 
what  it  accomplishes  by  itself  and  separately.  Of  all  the 
numerous  elements  whose  consensus  constitutes  the 
ego,  none,  perhaps,  can  be  more  easily  set  apart,  or 


ii8     THE  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

artificially  separated.  Still,  we  must  be  careful  on  this 
point  to  avoid  an  ambiguity.  To  the  conscious  indi- 
vidual the  idea  of  his  personality  may  be  an  effect  or  a 
cause,  a  result  or  an  initial  factor,  a  point  of  arrival 
or  a  point  of  departure.  In  the  healthy  state  it  is  al- 
ways an  effect,  a  result,  a  point  of  arrival.  In  the 
morbid  state  it  may  be  both  together.  In  many  of 
the  examples  enumerated  we  have  seen  organic  (affec- 
tive or  sensorial)  derangements  produce  such  exuber- 
ance of  life,  or  such  effacement,  that  the  individual  de- 
clares he  is  God,  king,  giant,  great  man,  or  automaton, 
phantom,  corpse.  These  erroneous  ideas  are  obviously 
the  logical  expression  of  some  profound  transformation 
of  the  individual — the  definitive  formula  that  recapitu- 
lates and  fulfils  it.  But  exactly  the  opposite  cases 
exist  in  which  the  transformation  of  personality  is  not 
from  below  but  from  above  ;  in  wdiich  the  transforma- 
tion begins,  but  is  not  completed  in  the  brain  ;  and 
consequently  in  which  the  idea  is  not  a  conclusion,  but 
a  premise.  Unquestionably  it  would  be  very  rash  to 
assert  that  in  many  instances  where  a  wrong  idea 
serves  as  a  starting-point  for  a  change  of  the  ego,  it 
has  not  below  it  and  before  it  some  organic  or  affective 
derangement.  On  the  contrary  we  may  confidently 
afKirm  that  such  will  always  be  present,  even  in  hyp- 
notised individuals,  in  whom  personality  is  changed 
by  suggestion.  Betw^een  the  two  forms  of  metamor- 
phosis above  indicated  no  clear  line  of  demiarcation  ex- 
ists ;  the  term  *' ideal  metamorphosis  of  the  personal- 
ity" is  only  a  designation  a  potiori.  Having  made  this 
reservation,  let  us  examine  this  new  aspect  of  our  sub- 
ject, beginning,  as  before,  with  the  normal  state. 

Nothing  is  more  common  or  better  known  than  the 
momentary  appropriation  of  the  personality  by  some 


DISORDERS  OF  THE  INTELLECT.     119 

intense  and  fixed  idea.  As  long  as  this  idea  occupies 
consciousness,  we  may  say  without  exaggeration  that 
it  constitutes  the  individual.  The  obstinate  pursuit  of  a 
problem,  invention,  or  creation  of  any  kind,  represents 
a  mental  state  in  which  the  whole  personality  has  been 
drained  for  the  profit  of  a  single  idea.  We  are,  to 
use  a  common  expression,  absent-minded,  that  is  auto- 
matic. We  have  here  an  abnormal  state,  a  rupture  of 
equilibrium.  The  numberless  anecdotes  current  about 
inventors,  reasonable  or  flighty,  bear  witness  to  the  fact. 
Incidentally  let  us  observe,  that  every  fixed  idea  is  at 
the  bottom  a  sentiment  or  a  fixed  passion.  Some  de- 
sire, love,  hatred,  or  interest  supports  the  idea,  and 
imparts  to  it  its  intensity,  stability,  tenacity.  Ideas, 
whatever  we  may  plead  to  the  contrary,  are  always  at 
the  behest  of  the  passions  ;  but  they  resemble  masters 
who  obey  in  imagining  they  rule. 

Whatever  may  be  the  result,  this  state  is  simply  a 
mental  hypertrophy,  and  the  public  at  large  are  quite 
right,  in  identifying  the  inventor  and  his  work,  in  des- 
ignating the  one  by  the  other  :  the  work  is  the  equiva- 
lent of  the  personality. 

Hitherto  we  have  had  no  alterations  of  personal- 
ity, but  simply  a  deviation  from  the  normal  type, — or, 
better,  from  the  schematic  type, — in  which  by  hypoth- 
esis the  organic  elements  (affective  and  intellectual) 
form  a  perfect  consensus.  Hypertrophy  at  one  point 
and  atroph}^  at  others,  by  virtue  of  the  law  of  compen- 
sation or  organic  equilibrium.  Now  let  us  consider 
the  morbid  cases.  With  the  exception  of  certain  arti- 
ficial alterations  produced  in  hypnotism,  it  is  difficult 
to  find  many  cases  of  this  class  of  which  the  starting- 
point  is  incontestably  an  idea.  We  may,  I  think,  class 
among  changes  of  personality  due  to  intellectual  causes. 


I20     THE  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY, 

all  facts  (now  rare,  formerly  frequent)  relating  to  ly- 
canthropy  and  zoanthropy  in  their  various  forms.  Still, 
in  all  such  cases,*  of  which  we  have  trust}^  records, 
the  mental  debility  of  the  lycanthrope  is  so  great,  ap- 
proaches so  near  to  stupidity,  that  we  are  tempted 
almost  to  look  upon  it  as  a  case  of  retrogression — as  a 
reversion  towards  animal  individuality.  Let  us  add, 
that,  as  these  cases  are  complicated  with  visceral  dis- 
orders, cutaneous  and  visual  hallucinations,  it  is  not 
easy  to  say  whether  they  are  the  effects  of  a  precon- 
ceived idea,  or  whether  they  produce  it.  -We  must  re- 
mark, however,  that  at  times  lycanthropy  was  epi- 
demic, which  means  that  in  imitators,  at  least,  it  must 
have  originated  in  a  fixed  idea.  Finally,  this  type  of 
disease  disappeared,  when  people  ceased  to  believe  in 
it,  that  is,  when  the  idea  that  a  man  is  a  wolf,  could  no 
longer  fix  itself  in  the  brain  of  a  human  being,  and 
make  him  act  accordingly. 

The  only  perfectly  clear  cases  of  ideal  transforma- 
tion of  personality  are  those  already  cited,  of  men  who 
believe  themselves  women,  and  of  women  who  believe 
themselves  men,  without  the  sexual  anomaly  that  justi- 
fies such  metamorphosis.  The  influence  of  an  idea 
seems  also  initial  or  preponderating  in  "possessed" 
subjects,  in  demonomaniacs.  It  frequentl}''  acts  by 
contagion  upon  the  exorcists  themselves.  To  cite  one 
example  only,  Father  Surin,  who  was  long  implicated 
in  the  notorious  affair  of  the  Ursuline  Nuns  of  Loudun, 
felt  within  him  two  souls,  and  sometimes,  it  seems, 
even  three,  f 

♦See  Calmeil ;  De  lafolie  considerie  sous  Ic  point  de  vue pathologique,  phi- 
losophique,  historique  et  judiciaire,  vol.  i,  bk.  iii,  ch.  ii,  §§  9,  16,  17;  bk.  iv,  ch. 
ii,  §  I. 

t  Surin  has  left  a  detailed  account  of  his  mental  state  in  the  Histoire  des 
diables  de  Loudun, -p. -ziy  &nd  following.     "I  am  not  able  to  describe  to  you 


DISORDERS  OF  THE  INTELLECT.     121 

In  fine,  transformations  of  personality  by  the  agency 
of  ideas  are  not  of  very  frequent  occurrence  ;  and  this 
is  a  fresh  proof  of  what  we  have  again  and  again  af- 
firmed, viz.,  that  personality  comes  from  below.  In 
the  highest  nervous  centres  personality  attains  its  unit}^ 
affirms  itself  with  full  consciousness ;  in  them  it  ful- 
fils itself.  If  through  some  inverse  mechanism  per- 
sonality proceeds  from  above  to  below,  it  remains 
superficial,  precarious,  momentary. 

The  creation  of  artificial  personalities  in  hypnotised 
persons  furnishes  an  excellent  proof  of  this  thesis ; 
and  M.  Ch.  Richet  has  pubhshed  abundant  and  pre- 
cise observations  on  the  subject,*  which  I  shall  briefl}'- 
quote.  In  turn  the  hypnotised  subject  (usually  a  wo- 
man) is  made  to  believe  she  is  a  peasant-girl,  an  ac- 
tress, a  general,  an  archbishop,  a  nun,  a  sailor,  a  little 
girl,  etc.,  and  plays  her  parts  to  perfection.  Here  the 
psychological  data  are  perfectly  clear.  In  this  state  of 
provoked  somnambulism,  the  real  personality  remains 
intact ;  the  organic,   emotional,   intellectual  elements 


what  takes  place  within  me  at  such  a  time  (he  alludes  to  the  time  when  the 
demon  passes  from  the  body  of  the  possessed  woman  into  his  own),  and  how 
that  spirit  unites  itself  with  mine,  without  depriving  me  either  of  conscious- 
ness or  of  the  freedom  of  my  soul,  yet  becoming  like  another  ego  of  myself, 
and  as  if  I  had  two  souls,  of  which  one  is  dispossessed  of  its  body,  and  of  the 
use  of  its  organs,  and  compelled  to  keep  aloof,  merely  looking  upon  the  doings 
of  the  other  intruding  soul.  The  two  spirits  wrestle  together  in  the  same  field, 
which  is  the  body,  and  the  soul  is  as  though  it  was  divided.  According  to  the 
one  side  of  its  ego,  the  soul  is  the  subject  of  the  diabolical  impressions,  and 
according  to  the  other  side  it  is  the  subject  of  the  movements  proper  to  it,  or 
that  God  gives  to  it.  When— by  the  movement  of  one  of  these  two  souls— I 
wish  to  make  a  sign  of  the  cross  on  somebody's  lips,  the  other  soul  very  quickly 
diverts  my  hand  and  seizes  my  finger  to  bite  it  furiously  with  its  teeth.  .  .  . 
When  I  wish  to  speak,  I  am  stopped  short;  at  table  I  cannot  raise  a  morsel  of 
food  to  my  mouth  ;  at  confession  I  suddenly  forget  my  sins,  and  I  feel  the  de- 
mon coming  and  going  within  me  as  in  his  own  house." 

*  Revue  philosophiqite,  March,  1883.  M.  Richet  has  published  more  recent 
observations  in  his  book  V homme  et  I 'intelligence,  pp.  539  and  541.  See  also 
Carpenter:  Mental  Physiology,  p.  562  and  following. 


122     THE  DISEASES  OE  PERSONALITY,     " 

have  undergone  no  important  change,  but  all  exists  in 
a  potential  state.  Some  imperfectly  understood  condi- 
tion of  the  nervous  centres,  some  arrest  of  function, 
prevents  them  from  passing  into  action.  By  sugges- 
tion, an  idea  is  evoked,  and  through  the  mechanism 
of  association  at  once  excites  analogous  states  of  con- 
sciousness, and  no  others;  and  with  them, —  always  by 
association, — are  induced  appropriate  gestures,  acts, 
words,  and  sentiments.  In  this  manner  a  personality 
is  constituted  external  to  the  real  personality,  com- 
posed of  borrowed  and  automatic  elements.  Experi- 
ments of  this  kind  clearly  show  what  an  idea  can  ac- 
complish when  freed  from  all  impediments  simply  by 
its  own  powers  and  destitute  of  the  support  and  co- 
operation of  the  individual  totalit}^ 

In  certain  cases  of  imperfect  hypnotism  a  dualism 
is  established.  Dr.  North,  Professor  of  Physiology  in 
Westminster  Hospital,  says,  when  speaking  of  a  period 
after  he  was  decidedly  affected  by  looking  at  a  bright 
disc  :  '^I  was  not  unconscious,  but  I  seemed  to  exist 
in  duplicate.  My  inner  self  appeared  to  be  thoroughly 
alive  to  all  that  was  going  on,  but  made  up  its  mind 
not  to  control  or  interfere  with  the  acts  of  the  outer 
self ;  and  the  unwillingness  or  inability  of  the  imier  self 
to  control  the  outer  seemed  to  increase  the  longer  the 
condition  was  maintained.'"'' 

*Hack  Tuke,  "On  the  Mental  Condition  in  Hypnotism,"  in  The  Journal 
of  Mental  Science,  April,  1883.  In  this  article  is  also  found  the  case  of  a  physi- 
cian, who,  during  a  restless  sleep  succeeding  twenty  hours'  climbing  in  the 
Alps  was  doubled  in  his  dream  :  one  of  the  two  egos  dies,  and  the  other  makes 
its  autopsy.  In  cases  of  intoxication  and  delirium  the  psychic  co-ordination 
frequently  disappears  and  a  sort  of  double  partition  of  the  person  is  produced. 
See  the  articles  of  Dr.  Azam  on  the  alterations  of  personality  {Revue  Scien- 
tifique,  November  17,  1883)  and  those  of  Dr.  Galicier  {Revue  Philosophigue, 
July,  1877,  p.  72).  Taine  has  reported  a  curious  case  of  semi-pathological  inco- 
ordination :  "I  know  a  lady,  who,  while  conversing  or  singing,  will  write 
without  locking  at  the  paper,  connected  phrases  and  even  whole  pages,  wholly 


DISORDERS  OF  THE  INTELLECT.     123 

Is  it  possible,  now,  to  suppress  altogether  this  in- 
ternal— that  is,  the  true — personality?  Can  the  true 
character  of  the  individual  be  utterly  destroyed,  so  as 
to  be  transformed  into  its  opposite  ?  Beyond  a  doubt ; 
the  persistent  authority  of  the  operator  can  effect  this 
after  a  more  or  less  prolonged  resistance.  Thus  M. 
Ch.  Richet  has  impressed  with  radical  republican  ideas 
a  lady  noted  for  her  ultra-Bonapartist  opinions.  Braid, 
after  hypnotising  a  strict  teetotaller,  repeated  to  him 
several  times  that  he  was  drunk.  '<  The  affirmation 
was  corroborated  by  a  sensation  of  staggering  (pro- 
duced by  muscular  suggestion),  and  it  was  amusing  to 
behold  him  divided  between  this  imposed  idea  and  the 
conviction  resulting  from  his  ordinary  habits. "  *  There 
is  nothing  alarming,  however,  in  this  momentary  meta- 
morphosis. As  M.  Richet  justly  remarks,  ''in  these 
curious  modifications  only  the  external  form  of  the 
person  changes,  the  habit  and  general  attitudes,  not 
the  individuality,  properly  so  called."  Whether,  by  re- 
peated suggestions,  we  might  not,  in  susceptible  sub- 
jects, eventually  produce  a  permanent  modification  of 
character,  is  a  problem  that  experience  alone  can 
solve,  and  one  lying  beyond  our  present  aim. 

Perhaps  this  is  a  favorable  opportunity  for  calling 
attention  to  the  phenomena  known  as  the  disappeaj-- 
ance  of  personality,  which  the  mystics  of  all  epochs  and 


unconscious  of  what  she  writes.  To  me  her  sincerity  is  unquestionable;  she 
declares,  on  arriving  at  the  bottom  of  the  page,  that  she  has  not  the  slightest 
idea  of  what  she  has  been  tracing  on  the  paper  ;  when  she  reads  her  writing, 
she  is  herself  astonished,  sometimes  even  alarmed  at  it.  The  handwriting 
is  different  from  her  ordinary  style.  The  movement  of  the  fingers  is  stiff,  and 
seems  automatic.  Her  writing  always  finishes  with  a  signature— that  of  a  de- 
ceased person— and  gives  the  impression  of  secret  thoughts,  of  a  mental  back- 
ground, which  the  author  is  not  inclined  to  divulge.  {De  I' intelligence,  ^,6. 
edit,  pref.,  pp. 16-17.) 

*Richet,  op,  cit.,  p.  541 ;  Carpenter,  op.  cit.,  §368. 


124    THE  DISEASES  OE  PERSONALITY, 

countries  have  described  from  their  own  experience, 
and  often  in  beautiful  language.*  Pantheistic  meta- 
physicians, though  far  from  attaining  the  state  of  ec- 
stasy, have  also  spoken  of  a  condition  in  which  the 
mind  thinks  itself  ''under  the  form  of  eternity" — ap- 
pears to  itself  beyond  time  and  space,  free  from  all 
contingent  modality,  one  with  the  infinite.  This  psy- 
chological phenomenon,  though  rare,  should  not  be 
overlooked.  I  take  it  to  be  the  absolute  possession  of 
the  mental  activity  by  a  single  idea  (positive  to  mys- 
tics, negative  to  empirics),  but  which,  by  its  high  de- 
gree of  abstraction,  and  its  absence  of  determination 
and  limits,  contradicts  and  excludes  all  individual 
feelings.  Let  a  single  sensation,  however  ordinary,  be 
perceived,  and  the  entire  illusion  is  destroyed.  This 
state  is  neither  above  nor  below  the  personality,  but 
without  and  be3^ond  it. 

In  fine,  those  states  of  consciousness  that  we  call 
ideas,  are  a  secondary  factor  only  in  the  constitution 
and  alterations  of  the  personality.     The  idea  plays  its 

♦Of  these  descriptions  I  shall  cite  only  one— the  nearest  to  us  in  language 
and  time.  "  It  seems  to  me  that  I  have  become  a  statue  on  the  banks  of  the 
river  of  time,  and  am  attending  the  celebration  of  some  mystery  from  whence 
I  shall  come  forth  old  or  without  age,  I  feel  myself  anonymous,  impersonal; 
my  eye  is  fixed  as  in  death  :  my  mind  is  vague  and  universal,  as  nihility  or  the 
absolute.  I  am  in  suspense  ;  as  if  non-existent.  In  these  moments  it  seems 
to  me  that  my  consciousness  withdraws  into  its  eternity  ....  it  perceives  itself 
even  in  its  substance,  superior  to  every  form  containing  its  past,  present,  and 
future;  a  vacuum  that  encloses  everything;  an  invisible  and  prolific  medium; 
virtuality  of  a  world  divesting  itself  of  its  own  existence,  in  order  to  lay  hold 
of  itself  again  in  its  own  pure  inwardness.  In  these  sublime  instants  the  soul 
has  re-entered  into  itself;  and  having  returned  to  the  state  of  indetermination 
it  is  reabsorbed  beyond  the  bounds  of  its  own  life,  it  becomes  again  a  divine 
embryo.  Everything  is  effaced,  dissolved,  distended  ;  changed  into  its  primi- 
tive state,  re-immersed  in  the  original  fluidity,  without  shape,  angles,  or  defi- 
nite design.  This  state  is  contemplation  and  not  stupor  ;  it  is  neither  painful, 
nor  joyous,  nor  sad;  it  is  without  all  special  feeling  and  beyond  all  finite 
thought.  It  is  the  consciousness  of  being,  and  the  consciousness  of  the  latent 
omnipossibility  at  the  base  of  this  being.  Such  is  the  sensation  of  the  spiritual 
infinite."     (Amiel,  Jcurnal  intime,  1856,  cited  by  M.  Scherer  in  his  preface.) 


DISORDERS  OF  THE  INTELLECT.      125 

part,  but  it  is  not  a  preponderating  one.  These  results 
are  in  accord  with  what  psychology  has  long  taught, 
namely,  that  ideas  have  an  objective  character.  Hence, 
they  cannot  express  the  individual  as  his  desires,  senti- 
ments, and  passions  do. 


CHAPTER  IV. 


DISSOLUTION  OF  PERSONALITY. 


In  closing  our  review  of  the  facts,  I  must  not  omit 
to  say  a  few  words  regarding  changes  of  personality 
in  progressive  dementia,  due  to  old  age,  general  par- 
alysis, or  other  morbid  condition.  If  in  the  normal 
state  the  personality  is  a  relatively  perfect  psycho- 
physiological co-ordination,  which  maintains  itself  in 
spite  of  perpetual  changes  and  partial  and  transient 
inco-ordinations  (like  sudden  impulses,  eccentric  ideas, 
etc.),  then  dementia,  vv^hich  is  a  progressive  miarch  to- 
wards physical  and  mental  dissolution,  ought  to  exhibit 
itself  in  a  constantly  increasing  inco-ordination,  up  to 
the  moment  at  which  the  ego  disappears  in  the  abso- 
lute incoherence,  and  there  only  remain  in  the  individ- 
ual purely  vital  co-ordinations,  viz.,  those  that  are  best 
organised,  the  lowest,  simplest,  and  consequently  the 
most  stable,  which  disappear  in  their  turn  also.  Per- 
haps in  these  states  of  progressive  and  inevitable  dis- 
solution we  find  the  only  cases  of  double  personality 
in  the  strict  sense  of  the  word,  that  is,  coexistent  per- 
sonalities. We  have,  in  the  course  of  this  work,  found 
many  cases  of  successive  personalities  (those  of  Azam, 
Dufa3%  Camuset);  of  a  new  personality  substituted  for 
a  forgotten  or  expelled  personality,  regarded  as  ex- 


DISSOLUTION  OF  PERSONALITY.      127 

ternal  and  foreign  (the  cases  of  Leuret  and  the  Auster- 
litz  soldier);  finally,  the  invasion  of  the  normal  person- 
ality by  unusual  sensations,  which  it  resists  as  well  as 
it  can,  and  which  sometimes  and  momentarily  cause  the 
patient  to  believe  himself  double  (case  of  Krishaber, 
etc.).  But  in  demented  subjects  the  disorganisation 
is  organised  :  they  are  double,  believe  themselves 
double,  and  act  as  double  personalities.  There  is  not 
the  least  doubt  about  it  in  their  minds.  They  do  not 
even  preserve  that  remnant  of  indecision,  which  in  the 
numerous  cases  I  have  cited,  show  that  the  normal 
personality  (or  what  remains  of  it)  still  retains  a  resid- 
uum of  force,  which  after  weeks  or  months  is  to  assure 
its  return.  To  them  it  seems  as  natural  to  be  double, 
as  to  us  it  does  to  be  single.  There  is  no  scepticism 
on  their  part  as  regards  their  state,  nor  do  they  tolerate 
it  in  others.  Their  mode  of  existence,  given  to  them 
by  their  consciousness,  appears  to  them  so  clear  and 
evident  as  to  be  above  all  doubt,  or  the  supposition  of 
it.  It  is  important  to  note  this  point,  because  it  proves, 
in  these  morbid  forms  of  the  personality,  that  spon- 
taneity of  affirmation  and  action  which  is  characteristic 
of  all  natural  states.  The  following  are  two  instances 
of  this  kind.  An  old  soldier,  D  .  .  .  .,  who  afterwards 
became  a  sergeant  of  the  police,  sustained  several  se- 
vere injuries  on  his  head,  followed  by  a  gradual  loss 
of  memory  which  rendered  him  incapable  of  perform- 
ing his  duties.  His  mind  became  more  and  more  per- 
turbed, until  finally  he  believed  himself  double.  *'In 
speaking  he  always  uses  the  pronoun  we  :  we  shall  go, 
we  have  walked  much,  etc.  He  explains  that  he  speaks 
in  this  way  because  there  is  another  person  within 
him.  At  table  he  says:  "I  have  had  sufficient,  but 
the  other  has  not."     He  starts  running;  and  upon 


128    THE  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

being  asked  why  he  is  running  he  answers  that  he 
would  prefer  to  rest,  but  that  ^  the  other '  compels 
him  to  run,  although  he  tries  hard  to  hold  him  back 
by  the  tails  of  his  coat.  One  day  he  pounces  upon  a 
child  and  tries  to  strangle  it,  saying  that  it  is  not  him- 
self who  does  it  but  'the  other.'  Finally,  he  tries  to 
commit  suicide  in  order  to  kill  'the  other'  whom  he 
believes  to  be  concealed  in  the  left  side  of  his  bod}', 
and  whom  he  therefore  calls  by  the  name  of  the  left 
D  .  .  .  .  as  opposed  to  himself,  the  right  D  .  .  .  .  This 
patient  by  degrees  became  totally  demented."* 

A  case  reported  by  Langlois  takes  us  one  stage 
lower  still.  "The  subject  G.  .  .  .  is  imbecile,  shift- 
less, loquacious,  without  hesitation  in  speech,  and  free 
from  paratysis  or  derangement  of  the  cutaneous  sen- 
sibility. Notwithstanding  his  loquacity,  he  repeats 
only  certain  stereotyped  phrases.  He  always  speaks 
of  himself  in  the  third  person,  and  almost  every  morn- 
ing he  receives  us  saying  :  '  G  .  .  .  .  is  sick,  he  ought 
to  be  taken  to  the  infirmary.'  Frequently  he  will  go 
down  on  his  knees  and  soundly  box  his  own  ears,  then 
laugh  immoderately,  and,  rubbing  his  hands  with  an 
air  of  satisfaction,  exclaim  :  'G  .  .  .  .  has  been  naughty, 
and  had  to  be  punished. '  He  will  also  seize  his  wooden 
shoe  and  violently  strike  his  head,  thrust  his  nails  into 
his  cheeks  and  tear  the  flesh.  These  moments  of  fury 
occur  suddenly,  and  while  they  last  his  countenance 
expresses  anger,  which  is  followed  by  an  expression  of 
satisfaction  as  soon  as  he  has  ceased  to  correct  the 
other.  When  he  is  not  over-excited  from  his  imagin- 
ary resentments,  we  ask  him:  'Where  is  G.  .  .  .?' 
*Here  he  is,'  he  answers,  striking  his  chest.  We  touch 
his  head,  asking  him  to  whom  it  belongs.    '  That,'  says 

*Jaffe,  Archiv  fiir  Psychiatrie,  1870. 


niSSOL  UTION  OF  PERSONALITY.      1 29 

he,  'is  a  pig's  head.'  'Why  do  you  strike  it  thus?' 
'  Because  the  pig's  head  has  to  be  punished  ! '  '  But 
just  now  you  have  struck  G .  .  .  .'  '■  No,  G .  .  .  .  has  not 
been  bad  to-day;  it  is  the  pig's  head  that  has  to  be 
beaten.'  For  several  months  we  asked  him  the  same 
questions  and  invariably  obtained  the  same  answers. 
Generally  G  .  .  .  .  is  discontented,  but  sometimes 
the  opposite  is  the  case,  and  then  the  head  is  not 
struck."* 

A  patient,  suffering  with  general  paralysis,  in  a 
state  bordering  on  dementia,  was  incessantly  reproach- 
ing himself  or  giving  himself  advice.  He  would  say: 
"You  know,  Mr.  G.  .  .  .,  that  you  have  been  placed 
in  this  establishment.  You  are  doing  very  well  here. 
....  We  warn  you  that  we  entirely  despair  of  3^our 
recovery,  etc.,  etc."  As  the  general  paralysis  pro- 
gressed his  words  became  less  intelligible.  Still,  even 
in  the  midst  of  his  delirium  this  conversation  with 
himself  was  to  be  noticed.  Sometimes  he  would  ask 
and  answer  questions.  The  patient  still  exhibited  this 
inclination  when  the  dementia  was  complete.  He 
would  shout  and  become  excited ;  but  soon  he  would 
calm  down,  and  say  to  himself  in  a  low  voice  and  with 
a  marked  gesture:  "Will  you  be  quiet  and  speak 
lower?"  Then  he  would  reply,  "Yes,  I  will  speak 
lower.  ..."  Another  time  we  found  him  very  busy 
making  all  the  movements  of  tasting  and  spitting.  We 
ask  him:  "Are  you  amusing  yourself,  Mr.  G.  .  .  .?" 
He  answers  :  "Which  one?  " — and  then  relapses  into 
his  previous  incoherence.  This  reply,  reproduced  here 
verbati?n  with  the  question,  may  seem  the  result  of 
chance,  but  it  accords  so  perfectly  with  the  duality 

*Annales  medico-psych,,  sixth  series,  vol.  vi,  p.  80. 


I30    THE  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

long  observed  in  the  patient,  that  we  have  not  ventured 
to  pass  it  over  in  silence.* 

In  the  succeeding  observation  the  dissolution  of  the 
personality  presents  itself  under  a  different  aspect. 
The  individual  there  lost  consciousness  of  a  part  of 
himself,  which  had  become  strange  and  hostile  to  him. 
In  speaking  of  hallucinations,  we  saw  that  the  patient 
gradually  invests  them  with  bodily  form,  finally  cast- 
ing outside  himself  the  creation  of  his  imagination.  In 
demented  patients  the  case  is  more  serious.  It  is  a 
question  here  of  acts  or  states  perfectly  normal  to  a 
healthy  subject  and  having  nothing  of  the  morbid  and 
imaginary  character  of  hallucinations  ;  but  the  patient 
perceives  them  as  external  to  himself,  and  is  not  con- 
scious of  being  the  cause  of  them.  How  are  we  to 
explain  this  singular  condition  without  supposing  a 
profound  change  in  the  coenaesthesis  ;  without  suppos- 
ing that  certain  parts  of  the  body  are  no  longer  repre- 
sented or  felt  within  the  collapsed  brain?  Visual  per- 
ception indeed  still  subsists  (experience  proves  it); 
but  the  patient  sees  his  own  movements  as  an  external, 
antagonistic  phenomenon,  which  he  attributes  neither 
to  himself  nor  to  others  and  attests  only  passively  with- 
out further  searching,  because,  his  internal  sensations 
having  been  abolished,  and  his  faculty  of  reasoning 

♦Descourtis,  Du  fractionnement  des  operations  cSribrales  et  en  parttculier 
de  leur  didoublement  dans  les psychopathies,  Paris,  1882,  pp.  33-34-  See  also  pp. 
32  and  35.  It  is  possible  that  the  second  personality,  which  advises  and  ad- 
monishes the  other,  is  only  the  purely  passive  reproduction  of  the  phrases 
addressed  to  the  patient  by  his  physician  or  attendants.  Let  us  also  remark 
that  it  is  not  by  any  means  uncommon  for  demented  subjects  to  speak  of  them- 
selves in  the  third  person.  This  may  also  be  observed  in  little  children,  and 
has  been  accounted  for  by  the  fact  that  their  personality  has  not  as  yet  re- 
vealed itself.  In  my  opinion  it  is  simply  a  phenomenon  of  imitation.  The 
child  is  accustomed  to  hearing  such  remarks  as :  "Paul  has  been  naughty; 
Paul  must  be  whipped,"  etc.  The  child  thereupon  addresses  itself  in  the 
same  manner.  Could  the  use  of  the  third  person  by  certain  demented  subjects 
be  a  case  of  retrogression  ? 


DISSOLUTION  OF  PERSONALITY.      131 

being  powerless,  there  is  no  help  for  the  existing  inco- 
ordination. 

Then  we  have  the  case  of  the  man  suffering  from 
general  paralysis  in  the  period  of  dementia,  whose  ut- 
terance had  become  almost  unintelligible,  and  whose 
knowledge  of  the  external  world  was  much  obscured. 
"One  day  he  was  engaged  in  picking  peas.  Although 
very  awkward  and  naturally  right-handed,  he  employed 
only  his  left  hand.  Now  and  then  the  right  hand 
would  stretch  forth,  as  if  to  perform  its  share  of  the 
work,  but  would  hardly  reach  its  object,  when  the 
other  hand  would  seize  it  and  violently  restrain  it.  At 
the  same  time  the  countenance  of  the  patient  expressed 
much  anger,  and  he  would  repeat  in  a  commanding 
tone  :  '  No,  no ! '  His  frame  shook  with  sudden  fits  of  ex- 
citement, and  everything  betokened  a  violent  struggle 
going  on  within  him.  At  another  time,  when  they  had 
to  tie  him  in  an  arm-chair,  his  features  grew  clouded, 
and,  seizing  his  right  hand  with  his  left,  he  cried  out : 
<Look!  it  is  your  fault;  it  is  all  through  you  that  I 
have  been  bound  here,'  and  thereupon  he  struck  the 
offending  hand  repeatedly. 

"The  two  occurrences  were  not  isolated.  At  dif- 
ferent times  it  was  observed  that  whenever  the  right 
hand  emerged  from  its  customary  inactivity,  the  pa- 
tient would  stop  it  with  his  left.  He  would  grow  angry 
and  excited,  and  strike  at  the  hand  as  violently  as  his 
strength  allowed  him.  Sensibility  was  still  preserved 
in  the  upper  right-hand  member  as  elsewhere,  although 
it  had  grown  dull."* 

Some  demented  patients  attribute  to  others  the 
sounds  which  they  utter  themselves,  and  complain  of 
being  disturbed  by  their  cries.     Finally,  let  us  quote  a 

♦  Descourtis,  op.  cit.,  p.  37. 


132     THE  DISEASES  OE  PERSONALITY. 

case,  observed  by  Hunter,  of  an  old  man  whose  facul- 
ties were  extremely  enfeebled.  He  incessantly  referred 
to  the  present  time  the  incidents  of  his  earlier  days. 
^'Although  able  to  act  correctly,  according  to  definite 
impressions,  and  to  attribute  them  to  those  parts  of 
his  body  which  they  affected,  he  still  had  the  habit  of 
constantly  imputing  his  own  sensations  to  the  people 
who  surrounded  him.  Thus  he  would  say  to  his  keeper 
and  the  assistants  that  he  was  sure  they  were  hungry 
or  thirst3^  But  if  food  or  drink  was  brought  to  him, 
it  was  evident  from  his  avidity  that  the  absurd  idea  in 
question  had  been  suggested  to  him  by  his  own  feeling 
of  hunger  or  thirst,  and  that  the  word  they  referred 
to  himself,  and  not  to  the  others.  He  was  subject  to 
violent  fits  of  coughing.  After  each  paroxysm  he 
would  resume  the  thread  of  his  conversation  ;  but  only 
after  having  expressed,  in  appropriate  terms,  how  sorry 
he  was  to  perceive  the  sad  state  of  his  friend's  health. 
'I  am  grieved,'  he  would  say,  'to  ^o.^  you  suffering 
from  such  a  painful  and  exhausting  cough.'  "  * 

Gradually  all  these  cases  terminate  in  a  constantly 
increasing  inco-ordination,  in  a  complete  incoherency. 
They  approach  to  that  congenital  imbecility  which  has 
never  yet  reached  the  average  level  of  human  person- 
ality. In  idiots,  that  co-ordination  of  multiple  and 
ascending  states  which  constitutes  the  normal  man, 
has  been  arrested  in  its  development.  Evolution  has 
not  passed  the  first  stage.  It  has  provided  merely  for 
the  physical  life  and  with  it  for  a  few  elementary 
psychic  manifestations.  The  conditions  of  ulterior 
development  have  been  lacking.  In  concluding  this 
treatise,  therefore,  we  must  inquire  more  minutely  into 
this  fact  of  co-ordination,  as  the  basis  of  personality. 

*  Hunter.     See  Winslow's  work,   On  Obscure  Diseases  of  the  Brain,  p.  278. 


DISSOLUTION  OF  PERSONALITY.      133 


II. 

But  first  let  us  make  a  cursory  classification  of  the 
derangements  of  personality  as  shown  in  our  numer- 
ous illustrations,  so  unlike  one  another  that  at  a  first 
glance  it  seems  impossible  to  reduce  them  to  a  few  fun- 
damental types. 

Although  in  the  normal  state  the  sense  of  the  body 
changes  in  various  ways  during  life,  especially  through 
that  evolution  which  leads  us  from  birth  to  death — 
still  the  change  is  usually  so  slow  and  continuous  that 
the  assimilation  of  new  sensations  takes  place  gradu- 
ally and  the  transformation  is  imperceptible,  thus 
realising  what  is  called  the  personal  identity,  or  ap- 
parent permanency  in  the  midst  of  incessant  varia- 
tions. On  the  other  hand,  serious  diseases,  or  certain 
radical  changes,  e.  g.,  climacteric  periods,  puberty, 
etc.,  induce  a  little  indecision  ;  the  fusion  between  the 
new  and  the  old  state  is  not  immediate,  and,  as  has 
been  observed,  ''the  novel  sensations  at  first  present 
themselves  to  the  old  ego  as  a  foreign  ego,  exciting 
surprise."  But  if  the  general  sense  of  the  body  is  ab- 
ruptly modified,  if  a  sudden  and  abundant  afflux  of 
unusual  states  is  produced,  then  the  fundamental  ele- 
ment of  the  ego  is  completely  transformed  ;  the  in- 
dividual is  separated  from  its  old  personality,  appears 
to  itself  like  another.  Most  frequently  a  period  of  de- 
rangement and  uncertainty  occurs,  and  the  rupture  is 
not  instantly  effected.  When  this  morbid  state  is  fixed, 
three  principal  types  of  the  diseases  of  the  personality 
may,  in  our  judgment,  be  presented  : 

I.  The  general  feeling  of  the  body  is  totally  altered. 


134    THE  DISEASES  OE  PERSONALITY. 

The  new  state  serves  as  the  basis  of  a  new  psychic  life 
— of  a  new  mode  of  feeling,  perceiving,  and  thinking, 
whence  results  a  new  memory.  Nothing  of  the  old 
ego  remains  except  the  perfectly  organised  functions, 
such  as  walking,  speech,  manual  work,  etc., — purely 
automatic  and  practically  unconscious  activities,  which 
like  slaves  are  ever  ready  to  serve  a  new  master.  It 
must  be  observed  that  this  type  in  actual  cases  pre- 
sents certain  exceptions.  Occasionally  a  part  of  the 
automatic  acquisitions  do  not  enter  into  the  new  ego. 
Again,  at  wide  intervals  a  few  vestiges  of  the  old  per- 
sonality are  revived,  and  throw  a  transient  indecision 
into  the  new  one.  Taking  a  general  view  of  the  symp- 
toms, and  disregarding  unimportant  deviations,  we 
may  say  that  we  have  here  an  alienation  of  personal- 
ity, the  old  having  grown  alieji  to  the  new,  so  that 
the  individual  is  ignorant  of  its  former  life,  or  when 
reminded  of  it  contemplates  it  objectively,  as  separated 
from  itself.  A  typical  instance  of  this  is  found  in  the 
woman  of  Salpetriere  who  from  her  forty- eighth  year 
always  spoke  of  herself  as  ''the  person  of  myself." 
Concerning  her  former  personality  she  would  give 
much  correct  information,  always  attributing  it,  how- 
ever, to  another:  <'The  person  of  mj^self  does  not 
know  that  which  was  born  in  1779"  (her  former  per- 
sonality).* The  case  of  '*01d  Lambert"  (see  p.  32) 
also  belongs  to  this  type.  Hack  Tuke  cites  the  case  of 
a  patient  who  for  several  3^ears  was  an  inmate  of  Bed- 
lam Hospital.  This  patient  had  lost  his  ego,  (that  is 
the  one  which  was  familiar  to  him,)  and  was  in  the 
habit  of  searching  for  himself  under  his  bed.f 

*  For  a  full  account  of  this  case  see  Leuret,  Fragments  psyclujlogiques,  pp. 
121-124, 

^The  Journal  0/ Mental  Sciences  April,  1883. 


DISSOLUTION  OF  PERSONALITY.      135 

2.  The  second  type  has  as  its  basic  character  the 
alternation  of  two  personahties,  and  to  this  type  espe- 
cially belongs  the  current  designation  of  double  con- 
sciousness. We  have  already  remarked  that  between 
the  first  and  second  type  we  should  find  forms  of  tran- 
sition ;  but  for  the  present  we  shall  only  consider  cases 
that  are  clear  and  well  defined.  The  physical  cause 
of  this  alternation  is  very  obscure,  one  might  say  un- 
known. At  the  time  when  the  second  personality  first 
appears,  these  cases  do  not  differ  from  those  of  the 
first  class  ;  the  difference  begins  with  the  reappearance 
of  the  first  personality.  It  is  difficult  to  resist  the  hy- 
pothesis, that  in  these  patients,  who  are  usually  hyster- 
ical— that  is,  highly  unstable — along  with  the  second- 
ary variations,  two  distinct  habitus  in  the  physical  life 
exist,  each  of  which  is  the  basis  of  a  separate  psychic 
organisation.  This  will  appear  more  probable,  if  we 
remember  that  the  alternation  in  question  affects  the 
character,  affects  that  which  is  innermost  in  personal- 
ity, that  which  most  profoundly  expresses  the  individ- 
ual constitution  (e.  g.  the  cases  of  Azam,  Dufay,  Camu- 
set). 

In  this  type  of  alternation  also  we  have  different 
forms.  Sometimes  the  two  personalities  are  unknown 
to  each  other  (case  of  Macnish).  At  other  times  one 
embraces  the  whole  life,  the  other  being  only  partial  ; 
such  is  the  case  of  Azam.  Finally  in  this  case — which 
is  the  most  instructive,  because  it  now  covers  a  period 
of  twenty-eight  years* — we  see  the  second  personality 
constantly  encroaching  upon  the  first,  which  having 
been  originally  very  long,  is  gradually  becoming  shorter 
and  shorter,  so  that  we  can  foresee  a  time  when  it  will 
completely  disappear,  and  the  second  only  will  remain. 

♦In  1885. 


136    THE  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

It  would  seem,  accordingly,  that  this  state  of  alterna- 
tion, when  prolonged,  has  a  fatal  tendency  to  reduce 
itself  to  the  first  type,  occupying  thus  an  intermediate 
position  between  the  normal  state  and  the  total  aliena- 
tion of  the  personality. 

3.  The  third  type  is  more  superficial ;  I  shall  call 
it  a  substitution  of  personality.  To  this  type  I  refer 
the  rather  common  cases  in  which  the  individual  merely 
believes  his  condition  to  be  changed  ;  e.  g.  a  man  de- 
clares himself  a  woman,  or  vice  versa)  a  rag-picker 
fancies  himself  a  king,  etc.  The  state  of  certain  hyp- 
notised subjects,  of  whom  I  have  spoken,  may  serve 
as  types  of  this  class.  The  alteration  is  rather  psychi- 
cal, in  the  restricted  sense  of  the  word,  than  organic. 
Not  that  I  suppose  for  a  moment  that  it  arises  and 
persists  without  material  conditions.  I  only  wish  to 
say  that  it  is  not,  as  in  the  two  preceding  groups, 
caused  and  supported  by  a  profound  modification  of 
the  feeling  of  the  body,  carrying  with  it  a  complete 
transformation  of  the  person.  It  proceeds  from  the 
brain,  not  from  the  lowest  depths  of  the  organism  ; 
and  is  rather  a  local,  than  a  general,  disorder — the 
hypertrophy  of  a  fixed  idea,  rendering  impossible  the 
co-ordination  necessary  for  the  normal  life  of  the  mind. 
Hence,  whilst  in  alienation  and  alternation  of  person- 
ality everything  conspires  and  co-operates  to  one  end, 
and  exhibits  the  usual  logical  and  internal  unity  of 
organic  compounds,  in  the  present  type  it  is  not  un- 
common for  him  who  claims  himself  a  king  to  admit  he 
has  been  a  workingman,  and  for  the  pretended  mil- 
lionaire to  confess  that  he  has  only  earned  two  francs  a 
day.  Even  apart  from  these  cases,  in  which  the  inco- 
ordination is  obvious,  we  can  easily  see  that  a  fixed 


DISSOLUTION  OF  PERSONALITY.      137 

idea  is  only  a  diseased  excrescence,  which  does  not 
suppose  a  total  transformation  of  the  individual. 

This  classification,  which  proceeds  from  the  gravest 
to  the  lightest  forms,  makes  no  pretensions  to  com- 
pleteness. It  merely  serves  for  bringing  a  little  order 
into  the  facts  :  to  show  how  unlike  they  are ;  and, 
above  all,  to  demonstrate  once  more  that  personality 
has  its  roots  in  the  organism,  and  that  it  changes  and 
is  transformed  with  it. 


CONCLUSION. 
I. 

It  is  an  Inevitable  consequence  of  the  doctrine  of 
evolution  that  the  higher  forms  of  individuality  should 
have  proceeded  from  the  lower  by  aggregation  and 
coalescence.  Consequently,  individuality  at  Its  high- 
est stage,  in  man,  is  the  accumulation  and  condensa- 
tion in  the  cortical  layer  of  the  brain  of  elementary 
consciousnesses,  at  their  origin  autonomous  and  dis- 
persed. 

All  the  different  types  of  psychic  individuality  in 
the  animal  series,  from  the  lowest  to  the  highest,  could 
be  described  and  fixed  onty  by  a  psycho-zoologist,  and 
at  the  cost  of  much  groping  amidst  uncertainties  and 
conjectures.  We  shall  call  attention,  therefore,  only  to 
a  few  types,  and  wholly  in  view  of  the  principal  aim  of 
the  present  work,  which  is  to  show  that  the  ascending 
progress  towards  higher  individuality  Is  epitomised  in 
an  increasing  complexity  and  co-ordination. 

When  we  speak  of  a  man,  of  a  vertebrate,  or  even 
of  an  Insect,  nothing  can  be  more  clear  than  the  term 
"  Individual."  Nothing  is  more  obscure  as  we  descend 
the  scale.  Upon  this  point  all  zoologists  are  agreed.* 
According  to  the  etymology  of  the  word,  the  Individual 

*  See  in  particular  :  Haeckel,  General  3forp/iolo£y  ;  Gegenbaur,  Cojnpara- 
tive  Anatomy  ;  Espinas,  Socictis  animales,  second  edit.,  appendix  ii ;  Pouchet, 
Revue  scientifique,  February  lo,  1883,  etc. 


CONCLUSION.  139 

{individuus)  is  that  which  cannot  be  divided.  On  that 
score,  the  individual,  in  the  strict  sense  of  the  word, 
would  have  to  be  sought  for  at  a  very  low  stage.  While 
nothing  limits  the  dimensions  of  inorganic  compounds 
(crystals),  ''every  protoplasmic  mass  that  attains  a 
few  tenths  of  a  millimetre  splits  up  spontaneously 
into  two  or  several  distinct  masses,  equivalent  to  the 
mass  from  which  they  were  derived,  and  which  are  re- 
produced in  them.  Protoplasm,  accordingly,  exists 
only  in  the  individual  state,  which  is  limited  in  its  size ; 
and  this  is  why  living  beings  are  necessarily  composed 
of  cells."*  Life  could  never  have  attained  a  notable 
growth  except  by  the  indefinite  repetition  of  the  same 
fundamental  theme,  by  the  aggregation  of  an  infinite 
number  of  these  little  elements,  true  types  of  individ- 
uality. 

The  living  and  homogeneous  matter  constituting 
these  elementary,  primordial  individualities  spreads  it- 
self, rolls  itself  up,  lengthens  out  into  tiny  filaments, 
moves  from  place  to  place,  creeps  toward  substances 
fit  for  its  nutrition,  absorbs  them,  decomposes  and  as- 
similates their  matter.  In  this  connexion,  scientists 
have  spoken  of  "rudiments  of  consciousness,"  of  ob- 
scure volition,  determining  itself  under  the  action  of 
external  stimulations  and  vague  needs.  We  may  em- 
ploy this  term  in  default  of  a  better  one,  but  must  not 
forget  that  it  has  no  precise  signification  for  us.  In  a 
homogeneous  mass  which  does  not  present  the  slight- 
est trace  of  differentiation,  in  which  the  essential  vital 
properties  (nutrition,  generation)  are  diffused  and  in- 
distinct, the  only  and  very  humble  representative  of 


*  Perrier,  Les  colonies  anhnales  et  la  formation  des  organisnies,  Paris,  1881, 
p.  41.  According  to  Cattaneo,  Le  colonic  lineari  e  la  tnorfologia  dei  molluschi, 
the  division  might  be  carried  still  further. 


I40    THE  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

psychic  activity  is  the  irritabihty  common  to  all  living 
beings,  which  by  evolution  becomes  later  general  sen- 
sibility, special  sensibility,  and  so  on.  Can  this  be 
called  a  consciousness  ? 

The  first  step  towards  a  higher  individuality  con- 
sists in  the  association  of  individuals  almost  completely 
independent  of  each  other.  <'  Enforced  proximity,  the 
continuity  of  the  tissues,  the  almost  constant  unity  of 
the  digestive  apparatus,  establish  between  them  a  num- 
ber of  relations,  which  prevent  the  individual  from  re- 
maining a  perfect  stranger  to  what  takes  place  in  its 
nearest  companions.  Such  is  the  case  with  sponges, 
colonies  of  hydra-polyps,  coralline  polyps,  bryozoans, 
and  a  few  colonies  of  ascidians."*  Yet,  properly 
speaking,  all  this  is  merely  a  juxtaposition,  a  linking 
together  of  a  heap  of  small,  contiguous,  and  homoge- 
neous consciousnesses,  having  between  them  no  other 
community  than  that  imposed  by  the  limitations  of 
their  aggregation  in  space. 

The  birth  of  a  colonial  individuality  and  conscious- 
ness is  a  great  step  towards  co-ordination.  Formed 
of  elementary  individualities,  such  a  colony  tends  to 
transform  itself  into  an  individuality  of  a  higher  order, 
in  which  a  division  of  labor  takes  place.  In  colonies 
of  HydraciinidcB  we  meet  with  nutritive  individuals,  re- 
productive individuals,  male  and  female,  and  with  in- 
dividuals for  feeling  or  seizing  prey — in  all  seven. 
Among  the  siphonophorans,  for  example,  in  Agalnia, 
whose  whole  organism  measures  over  a  metre,  and  in 
allied  types,  the  function  of  locomotion  is  completely 
centralised.  The  individuals  composing  it  seem  inde- 
pendent so  long  as  the  animal  allows  the  common  axis 
upon  which  they  are  imbedded  to  float,  but  when  in 

*Perrier,  op.  cit.,  p.  774 ;  Espinas,  Les  sociites  animales,  section  2. 


CONCLUSION.  141 

danger,  or  if  the  animal  wishes  to  execute  a  complex 
movement,  the  axis  contracts,  dragging  along  with  it 
all  the  polyps.  Physalia  (Portuguese  man-of-war)  is 
able  to  accelerate  or  slacken  its  movements,  to  float 
and  dive  at  will,  ascend,  descend,  go  straight  forwards, 
or  swerve  aside ;  it  can  make  all  its  individual  organs 
concur  in  these  complicated  acts.  A  migratory  life, 
observes  M.  Perrier,  seems  to  favor  the  development  of 
individuality.  *'A  greater  dependence  of  all  the  indi- 
viduals necessarily  results  ;  more  intimate  bonds  are 
established  between  them  ;  the  impressions  produced 
upon  any  part  of  the  whole  must  necessarily  be  trans- 
mitted to  the  locomotor  parts  ;  and  the  movements 
of  the  latter  must  be  co-ordinated,  or  all  would  be  dis- 
order. There  accordingly  arises  a  kind  of  colonial  con- 
sciousness, through  which  the  colony  tends  to  constitute 
a  new  unity,  and  to  form  what  we  call  an  individual.^^'^ 
In  other  colonies  the  common  consciousness  is  formed 
in  a  different  manner.  In  Botry Hides  (tunicaries)  there 
is  a  common  orifice,  the  cloaca,  round  which  are  dis- 
posed all  the  individuals.  Each  of  them  emits  toward 
the  cloaca  a  tongue-like  member  provided  with  a  ner- 
vous process,  by  the  aid  of  which  communication  can 
be  established  in  a  permanent  manner  between  all  the 
members  of  the  same  group,  "f"  But  '<  because  a  col- 
ony acquires  the  notion  of  its  existence  as  a  colony, 
it  does  not  follow  necessarily  that  each  of  the  individ- 
uals that  compose  it  loses  its  particular  consciousness. 
On  the  contrary,  each  individual  continues  to  act  as  if 
it  were  single.  .  .  .  With  certain  kinds  of  star-fish  each 
severed  arm  continues  to  creep,  to  follow  a  given 
route  or  to  deviate  from  it,  as  the  case  may  happen,  to 

♦Perrier,  op.  cit.,  pp.  232,  239,  770,  248,  and  262. 
tibid.,  p.  771. 


142     THE  DISEASES  OE  PERSONALITY, 

quiver  when  it  is  excited — in  a  word,  to  betray  real 
consciousness.  The  consciousness  of  a  ray  is  neverthe- 
less subordinate  to  the  consciousness  of  the  whole  star- 
fish as  is  proved  by  the  harmony  which  is  established 
between  the  movements  of  the  several  parts,  when  the 
anima]  changes  its  position."* 

As  for  man,  in  whom  centralisation  has  reached  a 
very  high  stage  of  development,  it  is  exceedingly  diffi- 
cult to  obtain  anything  like  a  clear  idea  of  this  mode 
of  psychic  existence  in  which  partial  individualities 
and  a  collective  individuality  exist  together.  Strictly 
speaking,  we  might  find  an  analogue  of  it  in  certain 
morbid  states.  We  might  also  say  that  the  human  in- 
dividual is  conscious  of  itself  both  as  a  person  and  as 
a  member  of  society;  but  I  shall  avoid  comparisons 
that  may  be  contested.  Taking  the  question  objec- 
tively and  looking  at  it  from  without, — the  only  side 
accessible  to  us, — we  see  that  this  colonial  conscious- 
ness, intermittent  and  feebly  co-ordinated  as  it  is  at  its 
origin,  marks,  nevertheless,  a  capital  factor  in  the  evo- 
lutionary process.  It  is  the  germ  of  the  higher  individu- 
alities— of  personality  itself.  By  degrees  it  will  pass  to 
the  front  rank,  confiscating  for  its  benefit  all  the  par- 
ticular individualities.  In  the  political  domain  we  see 
strongly  centralised  countries  pursue  a  similar  evolu- 
tion. The  central  power,  at  first  very  feeble,  hardly 
recognised,  and  often  less  important  than  its  subordi- 
nates, is  strengthened  at  their  cost,  and,  by  slow  and 
gradual  absorption,  at  last  obliterates  them. 

The  development  of  the  nervous  system — the  co- 
ordinator par  excellence — is  the  visible  sign  of  a  pro- 
gress towards  a  more  complex  and  more  harmonious 
individuality.     But  this  centralisation  is   not   estab- 

*Ibid.,  pp.  772-773- 


CONCLUSION.  143 

lished  all  at  once.  In  the  annelidous  animals  the  cere- 
broid  ganglia,  which  send  out  nerves  to  the  organs 
of  the  senses,  seem  to  discharge  the  same  functions  as 
the  brain  of  the  vertebrates.  Yet,  complete  centrali- 
sation is  far  from  having  been  effected  here.  The  psy- 
chological independence  of  the  different  rings  is  evi- 
dent. ''Consciousness,  which  is  more  distinct  in  the 
brain,  tends  to  grow  fainter  in  proportion  as  the  num- 
ber of  rings  increases.  Certain  Eunicece.  (a  group  of 
Annelids)  attaining  a  length  of  1-5  metres,  bite  the 
posterior  extremity  of  their  body  without  seeming  in 
the  least  to  feel  it.  To  this  diminution  of  conscious- 
ness we  have  doubtless  to  attribute  the  facility  with 
which  Annelids,  kept  in  captivity  under  disagreeable 
conditions,  voluntarily  mutilate  themselves."  In  linear 
colonies,  the  individual  forming  the  front,  being  com- 
pelled to  take  the  initiative  for  all  the  rest,  to  ad- 
vance, retreat,  or  modify  the  gait  of  the  colony  which 
it  drags  behind  it,  becomes  a  head\  but  it  must  be  un- 
derstood that  zoologists  only  use  this  term  compara- 
tively, and  we  must  not  assume  that  it  corresponds 
exactly  to  what  is  called  a  head  in  an  insect  or  other 
articulated  animal.  The  individuality  which  it  repre- 
sents is  so  indefinite,  that  in  certain  asexual  Annelids, 
composed  of  forty  rings,  we  see  the  head  of  a  sexual 
individual  form  at  the  level  of  the  third  ring,  furnish 
itself  with  tentacles  and  antennae,  and  thereupon  detach 
itself  from  the  primitive  individual  in  order  to  live  its 
own  life.* 

For  details  we  refer  the  reader  to  special  works ; 
as  to  the  higher  animals  it  is  needless  to  dwell  upon 
the  subject ;  individuality  in  the  usual  sense  of  the 
word  is  already  constituted  there,  and  is  represented 

*Perrier,  ibid.,  p.  448,  491,  501. 


144     THE  DISEASES  OE  PERSONALITY. 

by  the  brain,  which  becomes  more  and  more  predom- 
inant. But  this  digression  into  the  domain  of  zoology 
will  not  have  been  in  vain,  if  it  has  made  clear  that 
the  co-ordination,  so  frequently  mentioned,  is  not  a 
simple  theory,  but  an  objective,  visible,  and  tangible 
fact ;  that,  as  Espinas  maintains,  psychic  individuality 
and  physiological  individuality  are  parallel,  and  that 
consciousness  is  unified  or  dispersed  with  the  organ- 
ism. Still,  the  term  consciousness  or  psychic  indi- 
viduality is  full  of  pitfalls  which  I  shall  not  attempt  to 
conceal.  If  psychic  individuality  is,  as  we  maintain,  only 
the  subjective  expression  of  the  organism,  in  proportion 
as  we  depart  from  the  human  type  the  greater  will  be 
the  obscurity  that  surrounds  us.  Consciousness  is  a 
function  which  can  be  compared  to  that  of  generation, 
because  both  express  the  whole  individual.  Let  us 
grant  to  the  most  elementary  organisms  a  conscious- 
ness— diffiuse  as  all  their  vital  properties,  particularly 
generation.  We  see  the  latter,  according  as  we  ascend, 
become  localised,  monopolise  a  part  of  the  organism, 
which,  by  countless  modifications  and  improvements, 
becomes  for  that  function  and  that  alone  the  represen- 
tative of  the  whole  organism.  The  psychic  function 
follows  a  similar  process.  In  its  highest  degree  it  is 
distinctly  localised  ;  it  has  monopolised  a  part  of  the 
organism,  which  for  that  function  and  that  alone 
becomes  the  representative  of  the  whole  organism. 
By  a  long  series  of  successive  functional  delegations, 
the  brain  of  higher  animals  has  succeeded  in  concen- 
trating within  itself  the  greater  part  of  the  psychic  ac- 
tivity of  the  colony;  by  degrees  it  has  received  a  more 
and  more  extended  mandate,  before  obtaining  the  com- 
plete abdication  of  its  associates.* 

♦Espinas,  Les  sociitis  animales,  p.  520. 


CONCLUSION.  145 

But,  in  taking  an  animal  species  at  hazard,  how  are 
we  to  know  exactly  the  degree  which  the  psychic  ac- 
tivity has  attained?  Physiologists  have  made  many 
experiments  upon  the  spinal  cord  of  frogs ;  is  its  rela- 
tive psychic  value  the  same  with  man?  It  is  very 
doubtful. 


II. 

Let  us  revert  to  man,  and  study  first  his  purely 
physical  personality.  For  the  present  let  us  eliminate 
all  states  of  consciousness, — reserving  them  for  later, 
— and  consider  only  the  material  bases  of  human  per- 
sonality. 

I.  We  need  scarcely  remind  the  reader  that  all  the 
organs  belonging  to  the  so-called  vegetative  life — the 
heart,  the  vessels,  the  lungs,  the  intestinal  canal,  the 
liver,  kidneys,  etc. — although  they  are  apparently  in- 
dependent of  each  other,  and  seem  each  entirely  ab- 
sorbed in  its  own  functions,  are  nevertheless  intimately 
and  solidly  bound  together.  The  centripetal  and  cen- 
trifugal nerves  of  the  great  sympathetic  system  and  of 
the  cerebro-spinal  system  (the  difference  between  which 
tends  more  and  more  to  become  effaced)  together  with 
their  ganglia,  are  the  innumerable  agents  of  this  co- 
ordination. Now,  is  the  activity  of  the  latter  reducible 
to  the  simple  molecular  disturbance  which  constitutes 
the  nervous  influx,  or  has  it  also  a  psychic,  conscious 
effect?  There  can  be  no  doubt  as  to  morbid  cases; 
here  that  activity  is  felt.  In  the  normal  state  it  only 
produces  that  vague  consciousness  of  life  which  we 
have  so  often  mentioned.  But  vague  or  not,  it  mat- 
ters little.  We  maintain  that  these  nervous  actions, 
which  represent  the  totality  of  organic  life,  are  really 


146     THE  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY, 

the  fundamental  facts  of  personality,  and  that  their 
value  as  such  is,  so  to  speak,  in  the  inverse  ratio  of 
their  psychological  intensity.  They  do  vastly  more 
than  merely  call  forth  a  few  unstable  and  superficial 
states  of  consciousness ;  they  fashion  the  nervous  cen- 
tres, and  impart  to  them  their  peculiar  tone  and  habit. 
Imagine  for  a  moment  the  prodigious  power  of  such 
actions  (however  weak  we  may  suppose  them),  carried 
on  incessantly,  without  rest  or  respite,  constantly  re- 
peating the  same  theme  with  few  variations.  Why 
should  they  not  have  for  their  result  the  constitution 
of  organic  states — stable  by  definition,  and  the  ana- 
tomical and  physiological  representatives  of  the  in- 
ternal life?  Obviously,  all  is  not  derived  from  the  vis- 
cera alone,  for  the  nervous  centres  also  have  their  pe- 
culiar innate  or  hereditary  constitution  by  virtue  of 
which  they  react ;  they  are  not  only  receivers,  but  in- 
citers ;  and  we  must  not  separate  them  from  the  organs 
which  they  represent,  and  with  which  they  form  a 
unity  :  between  the  two  there  is  reciprocity  of  action. 
Where  do  all  these  nervous  actions  finally  arrive  that 
thus  recapitulate  the  organic  life?  We  do  not  know. 
Ferrier  supposes  that  the  occipital  lobes  are  in  some 
special  connexion  with  the  sensibility  of  the  viscera, 
and  constitute  the  anatomical  substratum  of  their  sen- 
sations. Let  this  be  granted  merely  as  an  hypothesis, 
and  so  as  to  fix  our  ideas.  The  result  would  be  that 
from  stage  to  stage,  from  delegation  to  delegation,  the 
visceral  life  would  here  find  its  last  representation ; 
that  it  would  be  inscribed  here  in  a  language  unknown 
to  us,  but,  by  its  inscriptions,  or  (to  continue  the  meta- 
phor) by  the  disposition  of  its  words  and  phrases,  ex- 
pressing the  internal  individuality,  and  only  that,  to 
the  exclusion  of  every  other  individuality.     However, 


CONCLUSION.  147 

whether  that  anatomical  representation  exists  here  or 
elsewhere,  whether  it  be  localised  or  scattered,  does 
not  in  the  least  alter  our  conclusion,  provided  it  really 
exists.  Time  is  not  lost  in  dwelling  on  the  point,  be- 
cause this  co-ordination  of  the  innumerable  nervous 
actions  of  the  organic  life  is  the  basis  of  the  physical 
and  psychical  personality ;  because  all  other  co-ordi- 
nations rest  upon  and  are  added  to  it ;  because  it  is 
the  inner  man,  the  material  form  of  his  subjectivity, 
the  ultimate  ground  of  his  mode  of  feeling  and  action, 
the  source  of  his  instincts,  his  sentiments  and  passions, 
or,  to  use  the  phraseology  of  the  Middle  Ages,  his 
principle  of  individuation. 

Let  us  now  pass  from  within  to  without.  The  per- 
iphery of  the  body  forms  a  surface  over  which  the  ter- 
minal laminae  of  the  nerves  are  unequally  distributed. 
Few  or  many,  the  nervous  filaments  receive  and  trans- 
mit from  different  parts  of  the  body  impressions,  that  is, 
molecular  shocks ;  then  the  nerves  are  centralised  in 
the  spinal  cord,  and  ascend  into  the  medulla  and  isth- 
mus cerebri.  Here  there  is  a  new  contribution, — that  of 
the  cranial  nerves, — and  now  the  transmission  of  the 
sensorial  impressions  is  complete.  Let  us  not  forget 
that  the  centrifugal  nerves  behave  in  the  same  way, 
but  in  the  direction  of  increasing  decentraHsation. 
Briefly,  the  spinal  cord,  consisting  of  a  mass  of  juxta- 
posed and  accumulated  ganglia,  and  particularly  the 
medulla  with  its  special  centres  (of  respiration,  phona- 
tion,  deglutition,  etc.),  although  organs  of  transmis- 
sion, represent  at  the  same  time  the  reduction  to  unity 
of  the  infinity  of  nervous  actions  scattered  throughout 
the  body. 

At  this  point  the  question  becomes  exceedingly  ob- 
scure.    The  mesencephalon  seems  to  possess  a  more 


148    THE  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

complicated  reflex  function  than  the  medulla,  and  the 
medulla  a  more  complex  function  than  the  spinal  cord. 
The  striated  bodies  would  seem  to  be  a  centre  in 
which  are  organised  the  habitual  or  automatic  move- 
ments. The  optic  thalami  would  be  the  points  in  which 
the  sensitive  impressions  gather  together,  in  order  to 
reflect  themselves  in  movements. 

However  this  may  be,  we  know  that  the  internal 
capsule — a  bundle  of  white  substance  forming  a  con- 
tinuation of  the  cerebral  peduncle — traverses  the  opto- 
striate  bodies,  penetrating  into  the  channel  between 
the  optic  thalami  and  the  lenticular  nucleus,  and  that 
it  expands  within  the  hemisphere,  forming  the  corona 
radiata  of  Reil.  This  is  the  gateway  through  which 
pass  all  the  sensory  and  motor  fibres  that  come  from 
or  move  toward  the  opposite  side  of  the  body.  The 
anterior  part  contains  only  motor  fibres.  The  poste- 
rior part  contains  all  the  sensory  fibres,  a  certain  num- 
ber of  motor  fibres,  and  all  the  fibres  coming  from  the 
organs  of  sense.  The  sensory  bundle,  being  complete, 
is  again  divided  :  one  part  ascends  towards  the  fronto- 
parietal convolution  ;  the  others  bend  backward  to- 
wards the  occipital  lobe ;  the  motor  bundle  is  distrib- 
uted in  the  grey  cortex  of  the  motor  zones. 

These  details,  wearisome  as  they  may  be  to  the 
reader  despite  their  brevity,  prove  the  intimate  corre- 
lation existing  between  all  the  parts  of  the  body  and 
the  cerebral  hemispheres.  Here,  the  study  of  locali- 
sations, though  imperfect,  has  yielded  some  precise  re- 
sults :  a  motor  zone  (the  ascending  frontal  and  parietal 
convolutions,  paracentral  lobule,  and  base  of  the  fron- 
tal convolutions)  in  which  appear  represented  the 
movements  of  the  different  parts  of  the  body ;  also  a 
sensory   zone,    less   precisely   defined    (the    occipital 


CONCLUSION.  149 

lobes  (?)  and  the  temporo-parietal  region).  The  func- 
tion of  the  frontal  lobes  is  not  accurately  known.  We 
may  note,  however,  in  passing,  the  recent  hypothesis 
of  Dr.  Hughlings  Jackson,  who  looks  upon  them  as 
more  complex  combinations  and  co-ordinations  of  the 
other  centres — a  representation  of  representations,  as 
it  were.* 

We  must  forego  all  past  and  present  discussions 
concerning  the  physiological  and  psychological  role  of 
these  centres  ;  they  would  fill  a  large  volume.  Taking 
the  question  as  a  whole,  we  may  say  that  the  cortical 
layer  represents  all  the  forms  of  the  nervous  activity: 
visceral,  muscular,  tactile,  visual,  auditory,  olfactory, 
gustatory,  motor,  significatory.  This  representation 
is  not  direct ;  an  impression  does  not  go  from  the  per- 
iphery to  the  brain  like  a  telegraphic  dispatch  from  one 
office  to  another.  In  one  case  where  the  spinal  cord 
was  reduced  to  the  size  of  a  quill,  and  the  grey  sub- 
stance was  infinitely  small,  the  subject  still  had  feeling 
(Charcot).  But,  indirect  or  doubly  indirect,  that  repre- 
sentation is  or  can  be  a  total  representation.  Between 
the  equivaletits  of  the  nervous  actions  distributed  in  the 
body  innumerable  connexions  exist  (commissures  be- 
tween the  two  hemispheres  and  between  the  different 
centres  of  each  hemisphere);  some  innate,  others  estab- 
lished by  experience,  f  and  of  all  possible  degrees  from 
the  most  stable  to  the  most  unstable.  Physical  per- 
sonality, accordingly,  or  more  precisely,  its  ultimate 
representation,  appears  to  us,  not  like  a  central  point 

*  Lectures  on  the  Evolution  and  Dissolution  of  the  Nervous  System,  1884. 

t  It  is  clear,  for  example,  that  with  a  man  who  does  not  know  how  to 
write,  certain  associations  of  very  delicate  movements  are  not  established, 
and  consequently  are  neither  represented  in  the  brain,  nor  associated  with  the 
nervous  dispositions  which  represent  the  same  words  in  a  vocal  form.  This 
applies  to  many  other  cases. 


ISO    THE  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

from  which  everything  radiates  and  to  which  all  returns 
(the  pineal  gland  of  Descartes),  but  like  a  prodigiously 
tangled  and  inextricable  maze  in  which  histology,  anat- 
omy, and  physiology  get  lost  at  every  turn. 

From  this  exceedingly  rough  sketch  even,  it  will  be 
seen  that  the  terms  consensus,  co-ordination  are  not  a 
mere  fiutus  vocis,  an  abstraction,  but  the  expression  of 
the  real  nature  of  things. 

2.  Let  us  put  back,  now,  the  psychic  element  which 
we  eliminated,  and  see  what  follows.  Remember  that 
for  us  consciousness  is  not  an  entity,  but  a  sum  of 
states,  each  of  which  is  a  phenomenon  of  a  particular 
class,  bound  up  with  certain  conditions  of  the  activity 
of  the  brain,  existing  when  they  exist,  lacking  when 
they  are  lacking,  disappearing  when  they  disappear. 
It  follows  that  the  sum  of  the  states  of  consciousness 
in  a  man  is  very  inferior  to  the  sum  of  the  nervous  ac- 
tions (reflexes  of  every  order  from  the  most  simple  to 
the  most  composite).  To  be  more  precise  :  during  a 
period  of  say  five  minutes  a  succession  of  sensations, 
feelings,  images,  ideas,  acts,  is  produced  in  us.  It  is 
possible  to  count  them,  and  to  state  their  number  with 
tolerable  precision.  During  the  same  period,  in  the 
same  man,  there  is  produced  a  much  larger  number  of 
nervous  actions.  Conscious  person alit}^  therefore,  can- 
not be  the  representation  of  all  that  takes  place  in  the 
nervous  centres  ;  it  is  only  an  abstract,  a  synopsis  of  it. 
This  is  the  inevitable  consequence  of  our  mental  na- 
ture :  our  states  of  consciousness  are  arranged  in  time, 
not  in  space,  according  to  one  dimension,  not  accor- 
ing  to  several.  By  the  fusion  and  integration  of  sim- 
ple states,  highly  complex  states  are  formed  which 
enter  the  series  as  if  they  were  simple  ;  in  a  measure, 
they  may  even  coexist  for  a  time  ;  but  ultimately  we 


CONCLUSION,  151 

must  admit  that  the  area  of  consciousness,  the  Umfang 
des  Bewusstseins,  particularly  of  distinct  consciousness, 
is  always  very  limited.  It  is,  accordingly,  impossible 
to  regard  conscious  personality,  contrasted  with  objec- 
tive, cerebral  personality,  as  an  impression  that  corre- 
sponds exactly  to  its  pattern  :  it  resembles  rather  a  to- 
pographical sketch-plan,  as  contrasted  with  the  coun- 
try which  it  represents. 

Why  do  certain  nervous  actions  become  conscious, 
and  which?  To  answer  that  question  would  be  to 
solve  the  problem  of  the  conditions  of  consciousness. 
But  as  we  have  already  said,  those  conditions  are  largely 
unknown.  There  has  also  been  much  discussion  con- 
cerning the  part  played  in  the  genesis  of  conscious- 
ness by  the  five  layers  of  the  cortical  cells  ;  but  by  the 
admissions  of  the  authors  themselves  all  this  is  pure 
hypothesis.  Let  us  proceed  ;  psychology  can  derive 
no  profit  from  unfounded  physiology.  We  know  that 
the  unstable  states  of  consciousness  evoke  and  sup- 
plant one  another.  It  is  the  effect  of  a  transmission 
of  force  and  of  a  conflict  of  forces  which,  for  us,  takes 
place,  not  as  is  generally  supposed,  between  the  states 
of  consciousness  themselves,  but  between  the  nervous 
elements  that  support  and  engender  them.  These  as- 
sociations and  antagonisms,  now  so  well  studied,  are 
not  related  to  our  subject.  We  must  go  further  still, 
and  penetrate  to  the  conditions  of  their  organic  unity. 
States  of  consciousness  are  not  will-o'-the-wisps,  al- 
ternately kindled  and  extinguished  :  there  is  something 
that  unites  them,  and  which  is  the  subjective  expres- 
sion of  their  objective  co-ordination.  Here  is  the  ul- 
timate ground  of  their  continuity.  Although  we  have 
already  studied  this  point,  yet,  in  view  of  its  para- 


152     THE  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 

mount  importance,  I  do  not  hesitate   to  revert  to  it 
under  a  different  form. 

Observe  that  for  the  present  it  is  not  a  question  of 
reflective  personality,  but  of  that  spontaneous,  natural 
feeling  of  ourselves,  which  exists  in  every  healthy  in- 
dividual. Each  of  my  states  of  consciousness  enjoys 
the  double  character  of  being  such  and  such,  and  in 
addition  of  being  mine :  a  pain  is  not  merely  a  pain, 
it  is  also  my  pain  ;  the  vision  of  a  tree,  not  only  the 
vision  of  a  tree,  but  my  vision  of  a  tree.  Each  state 
has  a  mark  by  which  it  appears  to  me  as  belonging 
to  myself,  without  which  it  appears  as  something  for- 
eign to  me  ;  as  happens,  we  have  already  seen,  in  sev- 
eral morbid  cases.  This  common  mark  is  the  sign  of 
a  common  origin,  and  whence  could  it  spring  but 
from  the  organism?  Let  us  imagine  we  were  able  to 
abolish  in  a  fellow-man  the  five  special  senses  and  with 
them  all  their  psychological  products  (perceptions, 
images,  ideas,  associations  of  ideas  with  one  another 
and  of  emotions  with  ideas).  That  done,  there  would 
remain  the  internal  organic  life,  with  its  own  special 
sensibility — the  expression  of  the  state  and  of  the  ac- 
tivity of  each  organ,  of  their  general  or  local  variations, 
of  the  rise  or  the  fall  of  the  vital  tone.  The  state  of  a 
man  profoundly  asleep  sensibly  approaches  to  our  hy- 
pothesis. Essay,  now,  the  contrary  hypothesis ;  we 
find  it  absurd  and  self-contradictory.  We  cannot  con- 
ceive the  special  senses,  with  the  psychic  life  which 
they  support,  as  isolated  from  the  general  sensibility 
and  suspended  in  emptiness.  The  sensorial  apparatus 
are  not  abstractions  :  visual  or  auditory  apparatus  in 
general,  such  as  are  described  in  treatises  on  physiol- 
ogy, do  not  exist,  but  only  concrete,  individual  appa- 
ratus, of  which  there  are  never  produced  two  com- 


CONCLUSION,  153 

pletely  identical  specimens  in  individuals  of  the  same 
species,  except,  perhaps,  occasionally  in  twins.  But 
this  is  not  all.  Besides  having  its  special  constitution 
in  each  individual — a  mark  which  it  directly  and  neces- 
sarily stamps  upon  all  its  products — each  sensorial  ap- 
paratus depends,  at  all  times  and  under  all  forms,  on 
the  organic  life,  on  circulation,  digestion,  respiration, 
secretion,  and  the  rest.  These  various  expressions 
of  the  individuality  are  added  to  every  perception, 
emotion,  and  idea ;  they  are  one  with  these,  as  har- 
monics are  with  the  fundamental  tone.  This  personal, 
possessive  character  of  our  states  of  consciousness  is 
not,  therefore,  as  some  authors  have  held,  the  result 
of  a  more  or  less  explicit  judgment  which  affirms  them 
as  mine,  at  the  instant  they  are  produced.  The  per- 
sonal mark  is  not  superadded,  but  is  included \  it  forms  an 
integral  part  of  the  event,  and  results  from  its  physio- 
logical conditions.  By  studying  the  state  of  conscious- 
ness alone  we  cannot  discover  its  origin  ;  for  it  cannot 
at  the  same  time  be  effect  and  cause,  subjective  state 
and  nervous  action. 

Pathological  facts  confirm  this  conclusion.  We 
have  seen  the  feeling  of  the  ego  rise  or  fall  according 
to  the  state  of  the  organism  ;  we  have  seen  certain  pa- 
tients maintain  that  their  '' sensations  have  changed," 
which  means  that  the  fundamental  tone  has  no  longer 
the  same  harmonics.  Finally,  we  have  seen  states  of 
consciousness  gradually  lose  their  personal  character, 
become  objective  and  alien  to  the  individual.  Can 
these  facts  be  explained  on  any  other  theory? 

Stuart  Mill,  in  a  passage  often  quoted,*  asks  where 

♦  In  his  Examination  of  Sir  William  Hamilton's  Philosophy.  It  is  but  fair 
to  observe  that  in  the  form  in  which  Mill  puts  the  question,  the  reduction  of  the 
ego  to  the  organism  would  not  help  matters  much,  for  in  this  passage  he  con- 


r\ 


154     ^^HE  DISEASES  OE  PERSONALITY. 

is  the  bond,  the  inexphcable  law,  ''the  organic  union," 
which  connects  one  state  of  consciousness  with  an- 
other, the  common  and  permanent  element ;  and  he 
finds  that  in  the  end  we  can  affirm  nothing  of  the  mind, 
except  its  states  of  consciousness.  Undoubtedly  so,  if 
we  confine  ourselves  to  pure  ideology.  But  a  group  of 
effects  is  not  a  cause,  and  however  minutely  we  may 
study  them,  our  work  will  be  incomplete  if  we  do  not 
descend  lower — into  that  dark  region  where,  as  Taine 
sa3^s,  "innumerable  currents  incessantly  circulate  with- 
out our  being  conscious  of  them."  The  organic  bond 
demanded  by  Stuart  Mill  exists,  by  definition,  so  to 
speak,  in  the  organism. 

Thus  the  organism  and  the  brain,  as  its  highest 
representation,  constitute  the  real  personality,  contain- 
ing in  itself  all  that  we  have  been  and  the  possibilities 
of  all  that  we  shall  be.  The  whole  individual  charac- 
ter is  inscribed  there  with  all  its  active  and  passive 
aptitudes,  sympathies,  and  antipathies ;  its  genius, 
talents,  or  stupidity;  its  virtues,  vices,  torpor,  or  ac- 
tivity. What  emerges  and  reaches  consciousness  is 
little  only  compared  with  what  lies  buried  below,  albeit 
still  active.  Conscious  personality  is  never  more  than 
a  feeble  portion  of  physical  personality. 

The  unity  of  the  ego,  accordingly,  is  not  that  of 
the  single  entity  of  spiritualists,  dispersing  itself  into 
multiple  phenomena,  but  the  co-ordination  of  a  cer- 
tain number  of  incessantly  renascent  states,  having  for 
their  sole  support  the  vague  sense  of  the  body.     This 

siders  the  body  not  as  a  physiologist,  but  as  a  metaphysician.  We  note,  inci- 
dentally, that  the  theory  maintained  here,  although  materialistic  in  form,  can 
be  adapted  to  any  metaphysics.  We  essay  to  reduce  conscious  personality  to 
its  immediate  conditions — the  organism.  As  regards  the  final  conditions  of 
those  conditions,  we  have  nothing  to  say,  and  every  one  is  free  to  conceive 
them  in  his  own  way.  Regarding  this  point,  see  the  very  pertinent  remarks  of 
M.  Fouillee  In  his  La  science  sociale  contemporaine,  pp.  224-225. 


CONCLUSION.  155 

unity  does  not  pass  from  above  to  below,  but  from  be- 
low to  above  ;  it  is  not  an  initial,  but  a  terminal  point. 

Does  a  perfect  unity  exist?  Obviously  not  in  a 
strict  mathematical  sense.  Relatively,  it  is  met  with 
on  rare  and  transient  occasions.  In  a  good  marksman 
taking  aim,  or  in  a  skilled  surgeon  performing  a  diffi- 
cult operation,  all  converges,  both  physically  and  men- 
talty.  But,  note  the  result :  in  such  conditions  the 
awareness  of  the  real  personality  disappears  ;  the  con- 
scious individual  is  reduced  to  an  idea  ;  so  that  per- 
fect unity  of  consciousness  and  the  awareness  of  per- 
sonality exclude  each  other.  We  may  reach  the  same 
conclusion  by  a  different  course.  The  ego  is  a  co- 
ordination. It  oscillates  between  two  extreme  points 
at  which  it  ceases  to  exist,  viz.,  perfect  unity  and  ab- 
solute inco-ordination.  All  the  intermediate  degrees 
are  met  with  in  fact,  and  with  no  line  of  demarcation  be- 
tween the  healthy  and  the  morbid  ;  the  one  encroaches 
on  the  other.* 

The  unity  of  the  ego,  in  a  psychological  sense,  is, 
accordingly,  the  cohesion,  during  a  given  period,  of  a 
certain  number  of  distinct  states  of  consciousness,  ac- 
companied by  others  less  distinct,  and  by  a  multitude 
of  physiological  states  which,  though  not  accompanied 
by  consciousness  like  the  others,  yet  operate  as  power- 
fully as  they  if  not  more  so.  Unity  means  co-ordi- 
nation. The  conclusion  of  all  is,  that  the  consensus  of 
consciousness  being  subordinate  to  the  consensus  of 
the  organism,  the  problem  of  the  unity  of  the  ego  is, 


*Even  in  the  normal  state  the  co-ordination  is  often  sufficiently  loose  to 
allow  several  series  to  coexist  separately.  We  can  walk  or  perform  manual 
work  with  a  vague  and  intermittent  consciousness  of  the  movements,  at  the 
same  time  singing  and  musing  :  but  if  the  activity  of  thought  increases,  the 
singing  will  cease.  With  many  people  it  is  a  kind  of  substitute  for  intellectual 
activity,  an  intermediate  state  between  thinking  and  not-thinking. 


156    THE  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY, 

in  its  ultimate  form,  a  biological  problem.  To  biology 
belongs  the  task  of  explaining,  if  it  can,  the  genesis  of 
organisms  and  the  solidarity  of  their  component  parts. 
Psychological  interpretation  can  only  follow  in  its  wake. 
This  we  have  attempted  to  demonstrate  in  detail  by 
the  exposition  and  discussion  of  morbid  cases.  At  this 
point,  then,  our  task  ends. 


INDEX. 


Aberrations  of  personality,  30. 

Absence,  10. 

Abulia,  53. 

Achromatopsia,  108. 

Adaptation,  16. 

Aerolite,  88. 

Affective  disorders,  51-91. 

Africa,  59. 

Agalma,  140. 

Alienation  of  the  ego,  102,  134. 

Alterations  of  the  ego,  28 ;  of  person- 
ality, 116,  135. 

Amblyopia,  96,  108. 

Amiel,  124. 

Amnesia,  8,  10. 

Anaesthesia,  cutaneous,  32,  54,  70. 

Animals,  colonies  of,  140-143. 

Animals,  eggs  of,  48. 

Annelids,  143. 

Aphasia,  106. 

Area  of  consciousness,  112,  151. 

Arsano,  Maria,  63. 

Ascidians,  140. 

Association,  81,  122,  149. 

Attack,  10. 

Attitudes  of  the  ego,  iii. 

Auditory  derangements,  96. 

Austerlitz  soldier,  case  of  the,  32, 
127. 

Automatism,  10,  17. 

Aversions,  12. 

Axenfeld,  95. 

Azam,  Dr.,  case  of,  71,  116,  \z%  126, 
135. 

Bain,  23. 

Ball,  47,  103. 

Bastian,  Charlton,  109. 


Baudelocque,  32. 

Bedlam  Hospital,  134. 

Bell,  strokes  of  a,  112. 

Bernard,  CI.,  23. 

Bertrand,  M.,  50. 

Bicetre,  75. 

Bichat,  86. 

Billed,  59. 

Binet,  100. 

Biran,  Maine  de,  21,  82. 

Bird,  consciousness  compared  to  the 
flight  of  a,  90. 

Blindness,  92. 

Body,  general  sense  of  the,  18,  22, 133 
(see  CaencFsthesis)  ;  its  correlation 
with  the  brain,  148. 

Bonneval,  asylum  of,  73. 

Botryllidce,  141. 

Bouillaud,  34. 

Bourg,  Saint-Georges  de,  TJ, 

Bourru  and  Buret's  case,  75. 

Braid,  123. 

Brain,  hierarchy  of  the,  144;  locali- 
sations of,  148-149;  double,  106;  con- 
stitutes the  personality,  154. 

Bridgman,  Laura,  case  of,  93. 

Broca,  106,  108. 

Brown-Sequard,  106. 

Bryozoans,  140. 

Budge,  64. 

Butterfly,  97. 

Cabanis,  22. 

Calmeil,  120. 

Camuset,  Dr.,  72;  case  of,  126,  135. 

Capsule,  internal,  148. 

Carpenter,  121,  123. 

Carrier,  drunken,  story  of  the,  117. 


158     THE  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 


Cases:  of  Dr.  Azam  (Felida),  71,  116, 
126,  135  ;  of  Laura  Bridgman,  93  ; 
of  the  Austerlitz  soldier  (Old  Lam- 
bert), 32,  127,  134;  of  Dr.  North 
(hypnotisation),  122;  of  Mr.  Cab- 
bage (imaginary  double),  103 ;  of 
Braid's  teetotaller,  123  ;  of  Dufay, 
Camuset,  Bourru  and  Burot  (suc- 
cessive personalities),  71-81,  126, 
135  ;  of  Leuret  (alienation),  34,  127; 
of  Langlois  (dementia),  128;  of  Hun- 
ter (alienation),  132  ;  of  Macnish,  71, 
135- 

Castration,  the  effects  of,  62. 

Catalepsy,  107, 

Caterpillar,  97. 

Cattaneo,  139. 

Cells,  consciousness  and  individual- 
ity of,  26 ;  of  the  cortex,  151 ;  the 
elements  of  organisms,  139. 

Centralisation,  nervous,  143  ;  politi- 
cal, 142. 

Cerebellum,  the  seat  of  physical  love, 
64. 

Cerebral,  dualism,  109  ;  hemispheres, 
148. 

Cerebration,  unconscious,  12,  15. 

Cerebro-cardiac  neuropathy,  95. 

Cerebro-spinal  system,  145. 

Champagne  glasses,  bought  by  two 
brothers,  45. 

Chang-Eng,  Siamese  twins,  40. 

Character,  types  of,  25  ;  sexual,  61. 

Charcot,  65,  149. 

Charenton,  insane  woman  of,  59. 

Chartres,  yj. 

Child,  its  ego,  52,  82,  130. 

Christina  and  Millie,  monster,  42. 

Circular  insanity,  57. 

Climacteric  period,  133. 

Cloaca,  of  protozoa,  141. 

Coenaesthesis,  19-28,  95,  115,  130,  133. 

Coexistence,  of  states  of  conscious- 
ness, 112;  of  personalities,  126. 

College-porter,  anecdote  of  a,  44. 

Colonial  individuality  and  conscious- 
ness, 2,   140-143. 

Commissures,  cerebral,  149. 

Condillac,  21. 

Consciousness,  as  a  property  of  mind 
or  entity,  3,  91, 150;  as  a  superadded 


phenomenon,  perfecting  personal- 
ity, 4,  6,  13,  14,  17,  85,  90;  an  ulti- 
mate fact,  5;  its  discontinuity,  6-15; 
physiological  conditions  and  devel- 
opment of,  7,  144,  151 ;  modern  the- 
ory of,  robs  psychology  of  its  dig- 
nity, 13  ;  automaton  theory  of,  13- 
14,  17;  compared  to  a  flash  of  light, 
to  a  shadow,  and  to  the  flight  of  a 
bird,  14,  90;  its  importance  as  a 
factor  in  psychical  evolution,  14-17; 
states  of,  not  will-o'-the  wisps,  151; 
only  a  feeble  portion  of  total  per- 
sonality, 80,  150;  unified  and  dis- 
persed with  the  organism,  144;  co- 
existence and  succession  of  states 
of,  112;  states  of,  happen  in  time- 
not  in  space,  14,  150  ;  personal,  pos, 
sessive  character  of  states  of,  153; 
is  it  constituted  by  general  sensi- 
bility? 27;  yellow  spot  of,  113;  or- 
ganic bond  of,  154 ;  area  of,  112, 151; 
organic,  20,  27;  sexual,  64  ;  colonial, 
2,  140-142  ;  rudimentary,  138-139; 
double,  135.  (See  Personality  and 
Eg^o. 

Consensus,  personality  a.  See  Co- 
ordiiiation. 

Continuity  of  the  ego.     See  Identity. 

Convalescents,  illusions  of,  34. 

Co-ordination,  the  ego  a,  50,  68,  87, 
140,  144,  147,  150,  155. 

Corona  radiata,  the,  148. 

Cortex,  the,  148,  149,  151 

Cotard,  no. 

Crystals,  139. 

Cutaneous  anaesthesia,  32,  54,  70. 


Deafness,  92. 
Degeneracy,  19. 
Dementia,  progressive,  126. 
Depression,  vital,  29. 
Derangements,  auditory,  96;    of  the 

ccenassthesis,  95;  of  the  senses,  92; 

of  personality,  classified,  133-137. 
Descartes,  150. 
Descourtis,  130,  131. 
Despine,  10. 
Despondency,  31. 
Dipsomaniac,  6g,  iii. 


INDEX, 


159 


Disorders,  organic,  18-50;  affective, 
51-91 ;  of  the  intellect,  92-125. 

Double, brain,  106, 109;  consciousness, 
135;  ego,  127;  personality,  28,  35, 
98,  106,  126;  vision,  96;  monsters, 
36. 

Dreams,  24,  117. 

Drunken  carrier,  story  of  the,  117. 

Dualism,  cerebral,  109. 

Dufay,  case  of,  126,  135. 

Dumontpailler,  log. 

Dinnpf,  the  feeling,  96. 

Dysesthesia,  92,  94. 

Effort,  the  ego  as  a  feeling  of,  84. 

Eggs  of  animals,  48. 

Ego,  theories  of  its  origin,  1-3  ;  its 
constitution,  Co,  82;  an  aggregate  of 
instincts,  desires,  etc. ,63  ;  its  unity, 
continuity,  and  identity,  1,  13,  28, 
36,  84,  87,  154-156;  as  an  entity,  es- 
sence, etc.,  42,  87;  a  co-ordination, 
50,  68,  87,  140,  144,  147,  150,  155  ;  its 
alterations,  transformations,  alien- 
ations, scissions,  and  duplications, 
28,  55-57,  102,  III,  116,  127,  134-135  ; 
as  a  feeling  of  effort,  84;  the  true 
and  the  factitious,  82,  85  ;  the  static 
and  the  dynamic,  68;  feeling  of, 
153;  effect  of  puberty  on,  61;  dif- 
ferent at  different  epochs,  69  ;  "  at- 
titudes "  of.  III.  See  Personality 
and  Coiiscwusness, 

Electricity,  78. 

Elementary  consciousness,  138. 

Emperor,  81. 

Empirics,  124. 

Entity,  the  ego  not  an,  42. 

Epicome,  Home's,  39. 

Epilepsy,  hysterical,  72,  79. 

Espinas,  138,  140,  144. 

Esquirol,  32,  53,  no. 

Essence,  ego  not  an,  87. 

Euni'ceie,  143. 

Eunuchs,  62. 

Euphoria,  29. 

Evolution,  138. 

Exuberance,  vital,  29. 

Factitious  ego,  the,  82-83. 
Falret,  53. 


Fathers  0/ the  Cht<rch,  60. 

Fatigue,  23. 

Faust,  III. 

F^lida,  case  of,  71,  116,  126,  135. 

Fichte,  32. 

Fixed  ideas,  81,  119,  136. 

Fcetus,  feeling  of,  88;  also,  27. 

Fouillee,  154. 

Foville's  case,  32. 

Frogs,  145. 

Fundamental  tone,  153. 

Gabbage,  case  of  Mr.,  103. 

Galicier,  Dr.,  122. 

Galton,  44,  46. 

Gegenbaur,  138. 

Generation,  144. 

Gessner,  dream  of,  24. 

Giant,  118. 

Gley,  Dr.,  63. 

Gock,  65. 

God,  81,  118. 

Goethe,  68. 

Gratiolet,  35. 

Grevy,  T]. 

Griesinger,  31,  54,  56,  69,  102,  109,  in. 

Habit,  83. 

Haeckel,  138. 

Hallucinations,   50,   130 ;    hypotheses 

explaining,  100, 
Hamilton,  Sir  William,  112,  153. 
Harmonics,  153. 
Hartmann,  12. 
Heaviness,  feeling  of,  31. 
Helen  and  Judith,  monster,  39. 
Hemianesthesia,  75. 
Hemiplegia,  75. 
Hemispheres,  the  two,  149. 
Henle,  19,  25. 
Heredity,  48,  49,  65. 
Hermaphrodites,  62. 
Herzen,  7. 

Hippocratic  writings,  86. 
Home's  epicome,  39. 
Huchard,  95. 
Hume,  83,  89. 
Hunger,  23. 

Hunter,  case  of,  132,  133 
Huxley,  89. 
Hydra,  individuality  of,  27. 


i6o    THE  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY, 


Hydractinidce,  140. 
Hypertrophy,  mental,  119. 
Hypnotism,  107,  121. 
Hypochondria,  53. 
Hystero-epilepsy,  72,  79. 

Ideas,  fixed,  8i,  119,  136;  latent,  4  et 
seq.;  transforming  personality,  105, 
117. 

Identity,  28,  84,  86,  91,  114,  133. 

Idiots,  132. 

Imitation,  The,  60. 

Inco-ordination,   131-132.     See    Co- 
ordination. 

India,  44. 

Individual,  defined,  141. 

Individuality,  its  marks  and  defini- 
tion, 1-3;  organic,  90;  colonial,  140; 
the  psychic,  18,  19,  138,  144.  See 
Personality. 

Individuation,  principle  of,  18,  25, 
147. 

Insanity,  circular,  57;  of  double  form, 

57- 
Intellect,  disorders  of  the,  92-125. 
Intellectual  tendencies,  as  affecting 

personality,  51-67  et  seq. 
Internal  capsule,  148. 
Inventors,  119. 
Iron,  79. 

Irritability,  26,  140. 
Ischaemia,  95. 

Jackson,  Dr.  Hughlings,  149. 

Jaffe,  128. 

James,  W.,  89. 

Jessen,  iii. 

Joufifroy,  20. 

Judith  and  Helen,  monster,  39. 

Kant,  25. 

Kleinwaechter,  47. 
King.  118. 
Krishaber,  95,  127. 
Kraift-Ebing,  case  of,  59,  65. 
Kussmaul,  93. 

Lacassagne,  g. 

Lallemant,  63. 

Lambert,  Old,  case  of,  32,  134. 

Lamson,  Mary  Swift,  93. 


Langlois,  case  of,  128. 

Latent  ideas,  4  et  seq. 

Laugier,  62. 

Leibnitz,  4. 

Lenticular  nucleus,  148. 

Leo  XIII.,  77. 

Lessing,  9. 

Lethargy,  107. 

Leuret,  34,  64,  65,  115,  127,  134. 

Lewes,  G.  H.,  iii. 

Lightness,  sensation  of,  31. 

Localisations,  cerebral,  148. 

Locomotion,  140. 

Loudun,  Ursuline  Nuns  of,  120. 

Love,  physical,  the  cerebellum  the 

seat  of,  64. 
Lussana,  64. 
Luysant,  78. 
Lycanthropy,  120. 
Lypemania,  53. 

Macario,  dream  of,  24. 

Macnish,  case  of,  71,  135. 

Macon,  •]•]. 

Magitot,  Dr.,  63. 

Magnan,  65,  loi,  109. 

Magnet,  -j-,  78. 

Maine  de  Biran,  82. 

Man,  believes  himself  a  woman,  136. 

Man,  individuality  in,  138. 

Mania,  religious,  102. 

Man-of-war,  Portuguese,  141. 

Marksman  taking  aim,  155. 

Martha,  Sister,  of  the  Five  Wounds, 

58. 
Mary,  Sister,  of  the  Resurrection,  58. 
Maudsley,  6,  10,  23,  62,  70,  71,  87. 
McMahon,  78. 
Medulla,  147,  148. 
Melancholia,  53. 
Memory,  11,  15,  16,91 ;  the  static  ego, 

68;  organic,  90,  113  et  seq. 
Mental  hypertrophy,  119. 
Mental,  influence  of,  on  the  physical 

65. 
Mesencephalon,  147. 
Messiah,  57, 

Metaphysical  psychology,  i,  18,  19. 
Metaphysicians,  pantheistic,  124. 
Metz,  58. 
Michea,  32. 


INDEX. 


i6i 


Mill,  J.  Stuart,  153. 

Millie  and  Christina,  monster,  42. 

Monsters,  36  et  seq. 

Moreau  de  Tours,  46,  71. 

Morel,  58. 

Motor  fibres  and  zones,  148. 

Multicellular  individuals,  26. 

My,  the  feeling,  152. 

Mystics,  123. 

Nabon,  Lieutenant,  59. 

Napoleon,  34,  57. 

Nation,  conscious  individuality  com- 
pared to  a,  19. 

Nerves,  development,  centralisation, 
and  co-ordination  of,  142-143,  147. 

Nervous  actions,  the  rSswffi  of  the 
organic  life,  145-146;  superior  in 
number  to  the  resultant  states  of 
consciousness,  150;  co-ordination 
of,  the  basis  of  personality,  5,  147. 

Neuropathy,  cerebro-cardiac,  95. 

Neuter  personality,  61. 

North,  Dr.,  case  of,  122. 

Nuns,  Ursuline,  of  Loudun,  120. 

Nutrition,  23,  52,  61  ;  tendencies  con- 
nected with,  51. 

Optic  thalami,  148. 

Orchestra,  personality  compared  to 
an,  100. 

Organic,  disorders,  18-50;  conscious- 
ness, 20,  27;  individuality,  90;  life, 
nervous  actions  the  risumS  of,  145- 
146;  memory,  90,  91,  113  et  seq.; 
sense  (coenaesthesis),  18. 

Organism,  consciousness  unified  or 
dispersed  with  the,  144  ;  personal- 
ity varies  with  the,  49. 

Pantheistic  metaphysicians,  124. 
Paraesthesia,  92,  94. 
Paralysis,  general,  129,  131. 
Paraplegia,  ■]■]. 
Parasitic  monsters,  39. 
Pariset,  34. 
Pasquier,  78, 
Peasant,  ego  of,  82. 
Peisse,  Louis,  20. 
Pendulum,  strokes  of  a,  112. 


Perception,  83. 

Perrier,  139,  140,  141,  143. 

Person,  definition  of,  i. 

Personality,  its  evolution,  1-3;  ele- 
ments of,  18;  physical  bases  of,  24, 
145,  154 ;  organic  conditions  of,  18- 
28  ;  varies  with  the  organism,  49; 
mark  of,  not  superadded,  but  in- 
cluded, 153  ;  a  complexus,  3  ;  a  con- 
sensus, III  ;  a  co-ordination,  50, 
147;  an  evolution,  114;  compared 
to  an  orchestra,  100;  physical,  26, 
28,  149 ;  conscious,  only  a  feeble 
portion  of  physical  personality,  80, 
154  ;  consciousness  completes  and 
perfects  it,  90;  colonial  conscious- 
ness the  germ  of,  142;  positive  hy- 
pothesis of  the  nature  of  the,  85; 
alterations  and  aberrations  of,  28, 
30;  partial  scissions  of.  Ill ;  meta- 
morphosis of,  56,  57,  67,  115  ;  trans- 
formed by  ideas,  117;  derangements 
of,  classified,  133-137;  alternation 
of,  116,  135;  alienation  of,  102,  134; 
substitution  of,  136;  alterations  of, 
in  progressive  dementia,  126;  dis- 
solution of,  104,  126-127;  disappear- 
ance and  suppression  of,  123;  con- 
crete, real,  ideal,  factitious,  82-84, 
150;  coexistent  and  successive,  126; 
double,  28,  34,  35,  59,  98,  106,  126; 
triple,  no;  sexual,  61.  See  jE^f?  and 
Consciousness. 

Fctit  vial,  10, 

Photophobia,  96. 

Physalia,  141, 

Physical,  influence   of  the   mental 
upon  the,  65. 

Pineal  gland,  Descartes's,  150. 

Pius  IX.,  78. 

Polyps,  140. 

Pope,  81. 

Porter,  college,  anecdote  of  3,44. 

Portuguese  man-of-war,  141. 

Pouchet,  138. 

Poulmaire,  Mme.,  58. 

Preservation  of  the  species,  tenden- 
cies connected  with,  51,  61-67. 

Protoplasm,  138-139. 

Psychic  life,  88  ;  compared  to  a  piece 
of  tapestry,  89. 


i62     THE  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY, 


Psychology,  metaphysical  and  experi- 
mental, compared,  i. 
Psychometry,  7. 
Puberty,  61,  133. 
Puel,  10. 

Quadruplets,  43. 

Rag-picker,  believes  himself  a  king, 

136. 
Rays  of  a  star-fish,  consciousness  of, 

142. 
Registration,  organic,  15,  91. 
Reid,  9. 

Reil,  corona  radiata,  148. 
Relations,  8g. 
Religious  mania,  102. 
Renaudin's  case,  70. 
Rendu,  71. 
Respiration,  23. 
Ribot's  dream,  117. 
Richer,  107,  108. 
Richet,  Ch.,  121,  123. 
Rings,  of  worms,  143. 
Ritti,  57.  59- 
Rochefort,  75. 
Rudiments  of  consciousness,  139. 

Saint-Hilaire,  I.  Geoflfroy,  39,  40,  62. 

Saint-Urbain,  Reformatory  of,  72. 

Salpfitriere,  woman  of,  134. 

Scherer,  124. 

Scotland,  45. 

Sensation,  first,  88. 

Sense  of  the  body.     See  Ctsnasthesis. 

Senses,  derangements  of,  92;  do  not 
constitute  personality,  g\;  abol- 
ished in  a  man,  152. 

Sensibility,  the  general,  19,  27;  of  the 
viscera,  146;  perturbations  of,  30- 
32.     See  CcencEsthesis. 

Sensorial  apparatus  not  abstractions, 
152. 

Sensorium,  28. 

Sensory,  fibres,  148 ;  nerves,  general 
tone  of  the,  19  ;  zone,  148. 

Servaes,  65. 

Sex,  change  of,  63. 

Sexual,  consciousness.  64  ;  organs,  in- 
fluence of,  on  the  character,  66; 
perversion,  65  ;  character,  61. 


Sexuality,  opposite,  65. 

Shepherd,  Convent  of  the  Good,  58. 

Siamese  twins,  Chang-Eng,  40. 

Siphonophorans,  140. 

Sisters,  anecdote  of  the  twin,  44. 

Sleep  and  dreams,  8,  9,  et  seq. 

Societies  of  animals,  140. 

Soldier,  case  of  the  old,  127. 

Somnambulism,  107,  117,  121. 

Soul,  and  consciousness,  3 ;  as  a 
thinking  substance,  4;  two,  within 
our  breasts,  68. 

Species,  preservation  of,  tendencies 
connected  with,  61-67. 

Spencer,  Herbert,  89,  loi. 

Spinal  cord,  147. 

Spinoza,  18. 

Sponges,  140. 

Stability,  no  criterion  of  dignity,  13 

Star-fish,  141. 

Steel,  76. 

Substitution  of  personality,  136. 

Successive  personalities,  126. 

Suggestion,  118,  122. 

Suppression  of  personality.  123. 

Surgeon,  performing  a  difficult  ope- 
ration, 155. 

Surin,  Father,  120. 

Sympathetic  system,  great,  145, 

Sympathies,  12. 

Tabula  rasa,  88, 

Taine,  71,  97,  122,  134. 

Tapestry,  psychic  life  compared  to  a 

piece  of,  89. 
Tardieu,  62,  63. 
Teetotaller,  case  of  a,  123. 
Temperaments,  the,  25. 
Tendencies,  the  dynamic  ego,  68. 
Teratology,  36. 
Theresa,  Sister,  of  Jesus,  58. 
Thinking,  while  walking,  155. 
Thirst,  23. 

Tone  of  the  sensory  nerves,  19. 
Tonquin,  77. 
Transference,  physical  methods   of, 

75. 
Trembly,  27. 
Trinity,  iic. 
Triple  personality,  no. 
Triplets,  43. 


INDEX. 


163 


Trousseau,  on  twins.  46. 
Tuke,  Hack,  122,  134. 
Tunicaries,  141. 
Tunis,  77. 
Twins,  43-50- 

Unconscious,  the,  defined,  11,  8,  9, 
10;  activities,  134;  states,  4,  at  seq. 

Unity,  of  the  ego,  i,  13,  36,  84,  87,  154- 
156. 

Ursuline  Nuns  of  Loudun,  120. 

Vanves,  Asylum  at,  59. 
Vegetative  life,  the,  145. 
Villeneuve,  Armand  de,  dream  of,  24. 
Viscera,  sensibility  of  the,  146. 
Vision,  double,  96. 


Vital  principle,  86. 
Volition,  15,  139. 

Weber,  E.  H.,  20. 
Westphal,  65. 
Wigan,  103.  106. 

Will-o'-the-wisps,    states    of    con- 
sciousness not,  151. 
Winslow,  Forbes,  10,  132. 
Wolf,  120. 

Workingnian,  ego  of,  82. 
Wrangler  of  Cambridge,  a  senior,  49 
Wundt,  112. 

Yellow  spot,  of  consciousness,  113. 

Zoanthropy,  120. 

Zone,  sensory,  148 ;  motor,  148. 


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